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 iii 
“HIDING BEHIND HISTORY”: WINSTON S. CHURCHILL’S  
PORTRAYAL OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR EAST OF SUEZ. 
 
This thesis is an examination of Winston S. Churchill’s portrayal of the war in 
the Far East, as set out in his six-volume memoir The Second World War.1 The 
research interrogates Churchill’s portrayal of the war against Japan through an 
analysis of the memoirs themselves, and against the backdrop of the post-war 
world. The thesis focuses on Churchill’s depiction of the advent of war with 
Japan; his narrative of the British Empire’s wartime losses of Hong Kong, 
Malaya, and Singapore; his account of the events and crises which occurred in 
India from 1942 to 1943; and his representation of the Indian Army and its role 
in the re-conquest of Burma. Close scrutiny of the memoirs—especially the way 
in which they were written, the draft chapters, the revisions, the proofs and 
galleys, reveal how he performed his historical sleight of hand—but not why.  
Churchill claimed that history would be kind to him, especially as he 
intended to write it, but by studying the historian before studying the history the 
chasm between the Churchillian myth and the reality is revealed. Churchill’s 
self-made, interwar caricature as a die-hard Victorian imperialist backfired when 
it came to narrating the history of the war. His image as the British Empire’s 
dogged defender from the 1930s had caused significant friction during the war 
with the new empire he needed to court—the United States of America. If the 
British Empire were to continue to hold on to any semblance of power and 
prestige after the war, Churchill had to bend to American demands during the 
war. Yet when he came to write his memoirs, Churchill manipulated history so 
that the ‘special relationship’ would not be seen in its true light. He mythologized 
the ties that bound the English-speaking peoples so that the wartime ‘special 
relationship’ would not be revealed as temporary, transient, volatile and fragile. 
How he portrayed the war against Japan and why his glances eastwards were so 
infrequent are the subject of this thesis: how and why did Churchill hide behind 
the history of the war, east of Suez? 
                                                 
1 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volumes I-VI (London: Cassell, 
1948–54). 
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HIDING BEHIND HISTORY 
 
 
There was no one at hand to tell me that this historian 
[Thomas Babington Macaulay] with his captivating style 
and devastating self-confidence was the prince of literary 
rogues, who always preferred the tale to the truth, and 
smirched or glorified great men and garbled documents 
according as they affected his drama. 
 
Winston S. Churchill, My Early Life: A Roving Commission 
(London: Thornton Butterworth, 1930). 
 
 
 
 
Historians, when they have time, will select their 
documents to tell their stories. We have to think of the 
future and not of the past. 
        
  Churchill, House of Commons, 18 June 1940. 
 
 
 
It will be found much better by all Parties to leave the 
past to history, especially as I propose to write that 
history myself. 
 
Churchill, House of Commons, 23 January 1948. 
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Introduction 
On 1 October 1900, Winston Spencer Churchill (1874–1965) was elected as the 
Conservative and Unionist MP for Oldham. Barely three months later, he 
undertook a lucrative lecture tour of America.1 Shortly before one lecture he was 
introduced to the legendary American author Mark Twain, who presented 
Churchill to the audience.2 Twain commented that Churchill was more than 
‘competent’ to talk to the audience about the Boer War, as he had ‘fought 
through it and wrote through it’.3 Because of his fledgling literary career as a war 
correspondent and journalist, Churchill was already being acknowledged 
internationally as a man who could write about a fight he had experienced at first 
hand. The precedent had been set: fighting and then writing about his role in that 
fight was to become Churchill’s literary modus operandi.4  
This thesis focuses upon what was arguably Churchill’s most successful 
fight and his most successful writing—his six-volume memoir The Second World 
War.5 This thesis asks the fundamental question: why did Churchill’s memoirs 
pay such little attention to the war the British Empire had fought against Japan? 
What did Churchill’s narrative ignore or gloss over in the war east of Suez, and 
                                                 
1 Churchill received 12,931 votes (a majority of 222) when he was elected as 
Oldham’s second MP. The first MP was Mr. Emmott (a local mill owner), who 
stood as a Radical and received 12,947 votes.  
2 The lecture took place at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York on 14 Dec. 
1900. See Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: Companion 
Volume I: Part 2, 1896–1900 (London: Heinemann, 1967), p. 1221–3. 
3 Todd Ronnei, ‘Churchill in Minnesota’, Minnesota History, 57/7 (2001), p. 
349, citing Robert H. Pilpel, Churchill in America, 1895–1961: An Affectionate 
Portrait (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 39. 
4 Any research which examines Churchill’s Second World War memoirs owes a 
debt to David Reynolds. See In Command of History: Winston Churchill 
Fighting and Writing the Second World War (London: Allen Lane, 2004). 
5 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volumes I–VI (London: Cassell, 
1948–54). 
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to what extent did his portrayal of events in the Far East influence subsequent 
histories? 
Almost five decades after his death, academic and public interest in 
Churchill continues unabated. In fact, there appears to be little disenchantment 
with the man who was named in a 2002 BBC poll as the greatest Briton of all 
time.6 This thesis will not enter into the debates surrounding the numerous hats 
he wore throughout his lifetime: brick-layer, artist, family man, one-time novelist 
and script-writer, or even race-horse owner, to name but a few.7 Instead, the 
thesis will primarily be concerned with his literary career, as it was his writer’s 
hat alongside his political career which steered him towards ‘history’ and his 
portrayal of world events. Yet these three aspects of Churchill’s life (his literary, 
political and historical hats) have all been researched before. In 2000, Eugene L. 
Rasor listed 3099 research items which either directly referred to Churchill or 
were related to him.8 By 2004, Curt J. Zoller’s annotated bibliography noted that 
                                                 
6 In a nationwide poll conducted over six weeks in 2002 by the BBC, Churchill 
was voted the ‘greatest Briton ever’. 1,622,248 votes were cast and the final vote 
revealed Churchill polled 456,498 votes, beating Isambard Kingdom Brunel by 
more than 57,000 votes. Churchill also beat Charles Darwin, William 
Shakespeare, Isaac Newton, Elizabeth I, Horatio Nelson and Oliver Cromwell. 
See 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/print/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2002/11_november
/25>. More recently, the Campaign for Real Ale in 2011 held a vote for the 
prestigious title of the ‘Person I would most like to have a pint with at the Great 
British Beer Festival’. Although Churchill did not win, he held his own amongst 
Oliver Reed, James May, Brian Blessed and the winner Stephen Fry. See 
<http://www.camra.org.uk/article.php?group_id=742>.  
7 See illustration I on p. 18. By the time Churchill was appointed Colonial 
Secretary in February 1921, he had worn the hats of the Board of Trade, Home 
Secretary, Admiralty, Ministry of Munitions, and Secretary of State for War and 
Air. 
8 Eugene L. Rasor, Winston S. Churchill, 1874–1965: A Comprehensive 
Historiography and Annotated Bibliography (West Port, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 2000). 
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there were 684 works which were ‘entirely about’ Churchill.9 Zoller also listed 
929 books which contained ‘substantial data’ about Churchill, 646 articles in 
periodicals and lectures, and 60 dissertations and theses.10  
In the last decade this list has continued to grow, illustrating how the 
appetite for further contributions to Churchill’s history has yet to be satiated.11 In 
2008, 38 pieces of research were published concerning Churchill.12 They ranged 
from Fred Glueckstein’s amusing article ‘Cats look down on you’, to Raymond 
Callahan’s weightier article about Churchill’s relationship to the military.13 The 
range in titles and content of such publications implies that researchers are now 
concerned with more than the ‘four faces’ of Churchill.14 This leads to the 
                                                 
9 Curt J. Zoller, Annotated Bibliography of Works About Sir Winston Churchill 
(New York: Sharpe, 2004), pp. 3–132. Whilst the publication date is 2004, the 
works listed only go up to, and include, 2002.  
10 Zoller, Annotated Bibliography, pp. 133–247; pp. 249–324; and pp. 345–7. 
Zoller notes that the list of dissertations and theses are mostly from North 
American universities and colleges. See footnote 35 below for the British 
contingent. 
11 A search of the Amazon website, on 3 Oct. 2011, suggests that another four 
titles are due for publication before the end of 2011: Brian Farrell (ed.), 
Churchill and the Lion City: Shaping Modern Singapore (Oct. 2011); Martin 
Gilbert, Winston Churchill, The Wilderness Years: A Lone Voice Against Hitler 
in the Prelude to War (Dec. 2011); Robert McNamara, The Churchills in 
Ireland: Controversies and Connections Since the Seventeenth Century (Oct. 
2011); and T. O. Smith, Churchill, America and Vietnam, 1941–1945 (Oct. 
2011).  
12 This figure was established by conducting a search of the Royal Historical 
Society’s database on 15 July 2009: http://www.rhs.ac.uk/bibl. 
13 Fred Glueckstein, ‘“Cats look down on you…”: Churchill's feline menagerie’, 
Finest Hour: Journal of the Churchill Centre and Societies, 139 (2008), pp. 50–
3; Raymond Callahan, ‘Winston Churchill, Two Armies, and Military 
Transformation’, World War II Quarterly, 5/4 (2008), pp. 36–42. 
14 A.J.P. Taylor (et al), Churchill: Four Faces and the Man (London: Allen Lane, 
1969) in which A.J.P. Taylor considered Churchill ‘The Statesman’, pp. 11–51; 
Introduction 
4 
question: is another piece of research on Churchill needed, or even possible? 
Justification for most dissertations and theses invoke familiar cries of how they 
present new evidence, engender fresh debate, or bridge a gap in current 
knowledge. Whilst this rationale is correctly employed by the majority of 
doctoral candidates, it falls somewhat flat when applied to the arguably ‘over-
cultivated’ discussion of the life and career of Winston Churchill.15 One of the 
latest publications, for example, concerns itself with detailing the sometimes 
highly elaborate wartime dinners Churchill consumed whilst conducting table-
top diplomacy.16 Although an interesting piece of work, Dinner with Churchill 
perhaps illustrates that Churchill studies suffer from ‘an air of exhaustion’.17  
Reading Churchill’s Second World War is akin to picking up a Boy’s 
Own adventure novel. It is all too easy to be swept up by the spirit of defiance as 
France fell and Britain stood alone; to be awed by the heroics of the Battle of 
Britain; to be fortified by the frequently-invoked spirit of those who endured the 
Blitz; and to be moved by the heroism of the D-Day landings. Churchill’s literary 
verve and his passion remain compelling. But even a rudimentary knowledge of 
the course of the Second World War reveals that gaps do exist within Churchill’s 
narrative. What of Bomber Command? What of the Holocaust? What of General 
Sikorski (the leader of the exiled Polish government in London) who represented 
Britain’s first ally? What of the British Empire? What of the vital role played by 
African and Indian troops?18 What of Britain’s role in perhaps antagonising 
                                                                                                                                    
Robert Rhodes James discussed Churchill ‘The Politician’, pp. 55–115; J.H. 
Plumb examined Churchill ‘The Historian’, pp. 119–51; Basil Liddell Hart 
debated Churchill ‘The Military Strategist’, pp. 155–202; and Anthony Storr 
psychoanalysed Churchill ‘The Man’, pp. 205–46. 
15 George Watson, The Literary Thesis: A Guide To Research (London: 
Longman, 1970), p. 13. 
16 Cita Stelzer, Dinner with Churchill: Policy-Making at the Dinner Table 
(London: Short Books, 2011). 
17 Watson, The Literary Thesis, p. 14. 
18 Publications on Indian soldiers will be referenced at length in the sixth chapter. 
The best publications on African soldiers are: Hal Brands, ‘Wartime recruiting 
practices, martial identity and post-World War II demobilization in colonial 
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Japan into aligning themselves with the Axis and attacking the Western powers? 
Why did Churchill weight his memoirs so heavily against these areas?  
Writing in 2006, Douglas Ford commented that,  
 
when viewed alongside the existing literature on the war 
against Germany, Britain’s conduct of the Far Eastern 
conflict has not attracted much scholarly attention. This is 
mainly because the Asia-Pacific theatres were of 
secondary importance for Britain.19 
 
Ford is correct. When the garrison at Singapore surrendered to the Japanese on 
15 February 1942, Mass-Observation (MO) archives illustrate that little attention 
was being paid to the Far East in Britain. For example, one participant in MO, 
Henry Novy, commented that whilst he had ‘been expecting the fall of 
Singapore’ as the situation in the Far East was ‘bad enough’, it did not compare 
to his incredulous reaction to the ‘Channel Dash’ of 12 February 1942: ‘when 
you hear the English Channel is a clear passage to three German battleships ... 
well!’20 Understandably, a geographically more immediate threat will always 
                                                                                                                                    
Kenya’, Journal of African History, 46/1 (2005), pp. 103–25; Frank Furedi, ‘The 
demobilised African soldier and the blow to white prestige’, in David Killingray 
and David Omissi (eds), Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the 
Colonial Powers, c. 1700–1964 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1999), pp. 179–97; Ashley Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World 
War (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006); and David Killingray with Martin 
Plaut, Fighting for Britain: African Soldiers in the Second World War 
(Woodbridge: James Currey, 2010). 
19 Douglas Ford, Britain’s Secret War Against Japan, 1937–1945 (London: 
Routledge, 2006), p. 2. 
20 Henry Novy (1919–87) was one of Mass-Observations (MO) paid participants 
who, even after been drafted, continued to report for MO. Novy was also one of 
the first trustees appointed to the MO archive in the 1970s. Cited in Sandra Koa 
Wing (ed.), Mass-Observation: Britain in the Second World War (London: Folio, 
2007), Henry Novy, 15 Feb. 1942, p. 126. 
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come before a more distant one. But this does not explain the lack of post-war 
interest in what was arguably one of the longest and hardest fought theatres of 
the British (as well as Allied) victory. Ford’s 2006 publication dealt primarily 
with British intelligence matters in the Far East, and one of his aims was to 
firmly locate the subject of British intelligence within the general history of the 
Second World War instead of it retaining its extra-curricular quality. He noted 
how the official histories of British intelligence21 argued that ‘because Britain’s 
engagement in the Far East was minor, its intelligence activities there do not 
demand scholarly research’.22 But what compelled the official histories of the 
war (not only of British intelligence but also of the war in general) to downplay 
the war in the Far East?23 One tentative answer is that it was Churchill’s memoirs 
of the Second World War.  
In the late 1960s, the Cambridge historian John Harold Plumb (1911–
2001) astutely wrote that the history of ‘the war, its narrative and its structure’ 
had been ‘organized in a deliberate way by Churchill’.24 Plumb observed that the 
‘phases of the war’ which Churchill had constructed in order to aid the flow of 
his memoirs were already deeply influencing ‘subsequent historians’ who found 
                                                 
21 See Francis H. Hinsley with E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom and R.C. Knight, 
British Intelligence in the Second World War: Volumes I–II,  Its Influence on 
Strategy and Operations (London: HMSO, 1979–81);  Hinsley with Thomas, 
Ransom and C.A.G. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War: 
Volume III, parts 1 and 2 ,Its Influence on Strategy and Operations (London: 
HMSO, 1984–88); Hinsley and Simkins,  British Intelligence in the Second 
World War:  Volume IV, Security and Counter-Intelligence (London: HMSO, 
1990); and Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War: 
Volume V, Strategic Deception (London: HMSO, 1990). 
22 Douglas Ford, Britain’s Secret War Against Japan, 1937–1945 (London: 
Routledge, 2006), p. 2. 
23 The one obvious exception to this rule was produced by the Military Histories 
Section: Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan: Volumes 
I–V (London: HMSO, 1957–69).  
24 John H. Plumb, ‘The Historian’, in Taylor (et al), Churchill: Four Faces,  
p. 148.  
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themselves moving down ‘the broad avenues’ which Churchill ‘drove through 
war’s confusion and complexity’.25 The conclusion that Plumb drew from 
Churchill’s history was that his ability to influence subsequent historians meant 
that ‘Churchill the historian lies at the very heart of all historiography of the 
Second World War, and will always remain there’.26 Almost half a century later 
Plumb’s critique is as pertinent today as it was then; especially in one area—
Churchill’s portrayal of the war in the Far East. The lens through which 
Churchill viewed the war against Japan has remained the lens through which the 
majority of historians have viewed it: as a sideshow, especially when compared 
to the war Britain fought in Europe, North Africa, and the Atlantic—or even the 
Russian front. This thesis adopts the framework which David Reynolds created 
in 2004; the comparative and contextual exercise of examining memoir and myth 
against the reality.  
A search of the Royal Historical Society’s bibliography conducted in July 
2009 reveals only three pieces of research directly related to ‘Churchill and 
Japan’, of which one focuses on Britain and the origins of the First World War,27 
one relates to Churchill and the ‘Singapore Strategy’,28 and one focuses on 
Churchill, Japan and British security in the Pacific during the period 1904–42.29 
The same search facility yields only six results for ‘Churchill and Singapore’.30 
                                                 
25 Ibid., p. 148–9. 
26 Ibid., p. 149. 
27 Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
28 Christopher Bell, ‘The “Singapore strategy” and the deterrence of Japan: 
Winston Churchill, the Admiralty and the dispatch of Force Z’, English 
Historical Review, 116/467 (2001), pp. 604–34.  
29 Robert O’Neill, ‘Churchill, Japan and British security in the Pacific, 1904–
1942’, in Roger Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (eds), Churchill: A Major New 
Assessment of his Life in Peace and War (Oxford: OUP, 1993), pp. 275–90.  
30 Jerome M. O’Connor, ‘Churchill and Roosevelt’s secret mission to Singapore’, 
Finest Hour: Journal of the Churchill Centre and Societies, 133 (2006–7), pp. 
20–3; Karl Hack and Kevin Blackburn, Did Singapore have to fall? Churchill 
and the Impregnable Fortress (London: Routledge, 2003); Raymond Callahan, 
Introduction 
8 
‘Churchill and India’ produces more results (33), but fewer than half of these 
publications deal specifically with Churchill and India.31 ‘Churchill and Empire’ 
produces 34 records but, once again, only a handful of these publications deal 
specifically with Churchill and his belief in the British Empire and his role 
within it.32 These searches reveal that the subject matter of this thesis is an 
under-researched area when compared to other aspects of Churchill’s political 
                                                                                                                                    
‘Churchill and Singapore’, in Brian Farrell (ed.), Sixty Years On: the fall of 
Singapore revisited (Singapore: Easter University Press, 2002); Bell, ‘The 
“Singapore strategy” and the deterrence of Japan’; Ian Cowman, ‘Main Fleet to 
Singapore? Churchill, the Admiralty and Force Z’, JSS, 17/2 (1994), pp. 79–93; 
Ian Hamill, ‘Winston Churchill and the Singapore Naval Base, 1924–1929’, 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 11/2 (1980), pp. 277–86. 
31 Auriol Weigold, Churchill, Roosevelt and India: Propaganda During World 
War II (London: Routledge, 2008); Arthur Herman, Gandhi and Churchill: The 
Epic Rivalry that Destroyed an Empire and Forged our Age (New York: 
Bantam, 2008); Larry Arnn, ‘India in recent historiography: Perhaps Churchill 
believed in real liberation’, Finest Hour: Journal of the Churchill Centre and 
Societies, 118 (2003), pp. 22–3; Philip Ziegler, ‘The Transfer of Power in India’, 
in R. Crosby Kemper (ed.), Winston Churchill: resolution, defiance, 
magnanimity, good will (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1996); 
Sarvepalli Gopal, ‘Churchill and India’, in Blake and Louis (eds), Churchill, pp. 
457–72; Carl Bridge, ‘Churchill and Indian Political Freedom’, Indo-British 
Review, 13/2 (1987), pp. 26–30; M.S. Venkataramani and B.K. Shrivastava, 
Roosevelt-Gandhi-Churchill: America and the Last Phase of India’s Freedom 
Struggle (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1983); and finally Robin James Moore, 
Churchill, Cripps and India, 1939–1945 (Oxford: OUP, 1979). 
32 Ian St John, ‘Writing to the defence of Empire: Winston Churchill’s press 
campaign against constitutional reform in India, 1929–35’, in Chandrika Kaul 
(ed.), Media and the British Empire (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); 
Ronald Hyam, ‘Churchill and the British Empire’, in Blake and Louis (eds), 
Churchill, pp. 167–86; John Barnes and David Nicholson (eds), The Empire at 
Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries, 1929–1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1988); and 
Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War. 
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career and life in general. Furthermore, as each search produced duplicated 
records, the research fields of ‘Churchill and Japan’, ‘Churchill and Singapore’, 
‘Churchill and India’, and ‘Churchill and Empire’ are clearly inter-related. 
Theses have been written on closely-related matters,33 but none directly deal with 
Churchill’s portrayal of the history of the war in the Far East. Clearly there are 
areas of Churchill’s life and career which retain a fascination amongst historians 
                                                 
33 The following are mainly British University theses (as opposed to the mainly 
America University theses listed by Zoller in footnote 10 above): A.J. Whitfield, 
‘British Imperial consensus and the return to Hong Kong, 1941–45’, PhD thesis, 
University of Birmingham, 1998; A.D. Stewart, ‘Managing the Dominions: the 
Dominions Office and the Second World War’, PhD thesis, King’s College, 
London, 2002; R. Hirasawa, ‘Liberals and empire in Victorian Britain: a study in 
ideas’, PhD thesis, University of Exeter, 2005; K. Evans, ‘The development of 
the overseas trade of the British Empire with particular reference to the period 
1870–1939’, MA thesis, University of Manchester, 1955–56; J. Reece, ‘Henry 
Page Croft, 1881–1947: the Empire and the Conservative Party’, MPhil thesis, 
University of Nottingham, 1991; A.J. Cumming, ‘The Navy as the ultimate 
guarantor of freedom in 1940?’, PhD thesis, University of Plymouth, 2006; N.W. 
Sloane, ‘The Paradox of Unity: Winston Churchill, Mackenzie King and Anglo-
Canadian relations, 1940–1945’, PhD thesis, University of East Anglia, 2007; 
and K.C. Akora, ‘India League and India conciliation groups as factors in Indo-
British relations, 1930–1949’, PhD thesis, London School of Economics, 
London, 1989. The following theses have all been published as books which 
were based on their respective research areas: I. Hamill, ‘The strategic Illusion: 
the Singapore Strategy and the defence of Australia and New Zealand, 1919–
1942’, PhD thesis, University of Leeds, 1974–75; J. Neidpath, ‘The Singapore 
naval base and the defence of Britain’s eastern empire, 1919–1941’, DPhil thesis, 
Oxford University, Oxford, 1975; F. Woods, ‘One more fight: The writings of 
Winston Churchill’, PhD thesis, University of Keele, Newcastle-under-Lyme, 
1992; and I. Cowman, ‘Anglo-American naval relations in the Pacific 1937–
1941’, PhD thesis, King’s College, London, 1989. 
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for further, more intricate, research.34 The complex subject of Churchill’s 
imperialism is at the heart of this thesis, which will argue that it was his 
imperialism, especially how it developed and then mutated, which affected his 
portrayal of the war with Japan in his memoirs. Furthermore, his imperialism had 
a huge effect on how he depicted the losses of Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore 
and Burma; the series of crises which occurred in India in 1942 to 1943; and the 
role of the Indian Army, especially in the reconquest of Burma. This thesis spans 
a research area which, to date, no scholar has attempted in significant depth. 
The amount of research which already exists on Churchill is phenomenal. 
The Herculean tomes of Churchill’s official biography and their accompanying 
companion volumes are only the beginning.35 Although they appear to be quite 
                                                 
34 Two current pieces of research (September 2011) are by David Lough, 
independent scholar, on Churchill and money (most notably his relationship with 
the Rothschild family), and Warren Dokter, PhD candidate, University of 
Nottingham, on Churchill and Islam.  
35 Randolph S. Churchill (Winston’s son) edited the first two volumes, Winston 
S. Churchill: Volume I: Youth, 1874–1900 (London: Heinemann, 1966), and 
Winston S. Churchill: Volume II: Young Statesman, 1901–14 (London: 
Heinemann, 1967), alongside the companion volumes which contain most of the 
documents referred to within the biography. Upon Randolph’s death in June 
1968, the task passed to Martin Gilbert who completed the biography with seven 
more volumes (each with the corresponding series of document companion 
volumes): Winston S. Churchill: Volume III: The Challenge of War, 1914–1916 
(London: Heinemann, 1971); Winston S. Churchill: Volume IV: World in 
Torment, 1917–1922 (London: Heinemann, 1975); Winston S. Churchill: Volume 
V: The Prophet of Truth, 1922–1939 (London: Heinemann, 1976); Winston S. 
Churchill: Volume VI: Finest Hour, 1939–1941 (London: Heinemann, 1983); 
The Churchill War Papers, Volume I: Winston S. Churchill, At The Admiralty, 
September 1939–May 1940 (New York: Norton, 1993); The Churchill War 
Papers, Volume II: Winston S. Churchill, Never Surrender, May–December 1940 
(New York: Norton, 1995); The Churchill War Papers, Volume III: Winston S. 
Churchill, The Ever-Widening War, 1941 (New York: Norton, 2000); Winston S. 
Churchill: Volume VII: Road to Victory, 1941–1945 (London: Heinemann, 
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daunting, the volumes are rather short on analysis. This however, makes their 
publication no less significant as they have generated leads for analysis and 
further research. As previously mentioned, both Rasor and Zoller have listed an 
inordinate amount of research on Churchill, all of which varies in scope, rigour 
and academic value. Clearly, only a fraction of these secondary sources can be 
considered within this thesis. 
The principal archival source for this thesis has been the Churchill papers, 
held at Churchill College, Cambridge.36 In particular, Churchill’s literary papers 
(CHUR 4 and CHAR 8) as well as his post-1945 public and private 
correspondence (CHUR 2) have been extensively mined. Other classes of papers 
consulted include his speeches both pre-1945 (CHAR 9) and post-1945 (CHUR 
5) and his personal papers both pre-1945 (CHAR 1) and post-1945 (CHUR 1). 
Other papers held at the Churchill Archive Centre, Cambridge which have been 
examined for this thesis include those of Leo Amery, Ernest Bevin, William 
Deakin, Dennis Kelly, Charles Eade, Maurice Hankey, Michael Roberts, Lord 
Randolph Churchill, William Slim, and Henry Pownall. (For further details see 
the Bibliography below.) 
Whilst the Churchill Archive Centre has been the central focus for this 
thesis, other archives have yielded important holdings. The Liddell Hart Centre 
for Military Archives at King’s College, London holds the Ismay papers which 
have given a further insight into the workings of the ‘syndicate’. Exeter 
University archive holds rare examples of Japanese anti-British, anti-Raj, but 
above all, anti-Churchill propaganda which filtered through India during the war. 
Exeter also holds papers which provide an insight into how India was viewed by 
a British Anglican clergyman who lived in India from 1913 to 1934 (Henry 
Fulford Williams); and a retired Captain in the Royal Navy, employed as a Coast 
                                                                                                                                    
1986); Winston S. Churchill: Volume VIII: Never Despair, 1945–1965 (London: 
Heinemann, 1988).  
36 The Churchill Archive contains two categories of papers relating to Churchill’s 
life. The papers which date from before 27 July 1945 (when his first term as 
Prime Minister ended) are known as the Chartwell Papers (CHAR), whereas the 
papers dating from after 27 July 1945 are known as the Churchill Papers 
(CHUR).  
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Inspector in the Chinese Maritime Customs Department, who observed the 
fighting between Japanese and Chinese forces in Shanghai August 1937 (Henry 
E. Hillman). The papers of A.L. Rowse, also at Exeter, give a clearer 
understanding of the workings of a renowned historian who was also a 
contemporary of Churchill’s. The papers of Claude Auchinleck* are held at the 
John Rylands University Library of Manchester, and they give a more rounded 
depiction of the Indian Army than Churchill’s portrayal. The archive at the 
University of East Anglia holds the extensive papers of Solly Zuckerman. Whilst 
not an obvious man to include within the remit of this thesis, his papers have 
provided a more measured opinion on the use of atomic bombs on Japan in 1945 
and the need for Britain to reassert its research capability for atomic weaponry in 
the post-war era. Finally, the archives at Hull History Centre contain papers 
which, if not directly used within this particular thesis, have proved to be useful 
in the formation of some of its arguments. 
In the course of researching this thesis, important questions have arisen 
about the nature of history, memoir, myth and revisionism. To become embroiled 
in the debate over what is the definition of a historian, and whether Churchill can 
in fact be defined as one, would be detrimental to what this thesis wishes to 
achieve as space is at a premium. Churchill’s memoirs may have been perceived 
as history, but the fault with this presumption may not lie entirely with Churchill. 
Indeed, Churchill himself noted how his memoirs were not history; they were 
merely ‘a contribution to history’ which would ‘be of service to the future’.37 
Churchill’s notion of history, his method of writing, his use of a team of highly 
professional researchers, drafters and advisors (otherwise known as the 
‘syndicate’) must be addressed, as does the role the Cabinet Secretaries played in 
crafting the aura of semi-official pseudo-history which surrounded the memoirs. 
E. H. Carr advised that as ‘the facts of history never come to us pure’, it is 
essential to ‘study the historian before you begin to study the facts’.38 His 
counsel remains pertinent—so we ought to study Churchill the memoirist before 
                                                 
37 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume I: The Gathering Storm 
(London: Cassell, 1948), p. vii. 
38 E. H. Carr, What Is History? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1961; repr., 
2001), p. 16; p. 17. 
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studying Churchill’s memoirs. But should a memoirist be subject to the same 
level of scrutiny as a historian? Is a certain amount of distortion of truth or 
mythologizing either ‘allowed’ or even expected in memoirs? Are the boundaries 
which separate memoir and history fixed so that never the twain shall meet? Is it 
a case of memoir or history and not memoir as well as history? In short, does one 
exclude the other? These questions will be the subject of the first chapter. As the 
thesis progresses, and as the original question of Churchill’s weighting against 
Japan and the war in the Far East is answered, the issues of memoir, history, 
revisionism, myth and the grey areas that lie in-between will continue to be 
addressed.  
The second chapter examines Churchill’s particular notion of the British 
Empire, and what ‘imperialism’ meant to him. The chapter briefly charts the key 
developmental stages of his imperialism before 1931, until his grand gesture over 
India consigned himself to the back benches of the Commons.39 This chapter 
emphasizes the distinction between Churchill’s genuine pre-1931 imperialism, 
and the more rhetorical imperialism which he purposely cultivated in order for 
his presence on the political scene in the 1930s to remain undimmed. His 
exaggerated imperialism of the 1930s was much like his party politics—it was a 
mantle he wore when it suited him. But his rhetorical imperialism became so 
heavy in the immediate years after the war that when it came to writing his 
memoirs, he abandoned it and chose an Anglo-American rhetoric instead.40 
Churchill’s image as the imperial bulldog may have been a useful weapon in his 
personal arsenal during the 1930s. It was perhaps even more useful when 
                                                 
39 Churchill resigned from his position in the Shadow Business Cabinet on 28 
January 1931 over the possibility of granting self-government to India (one of the 
central tenets contained within the proposed India Act). Churchill’s tension over 
this proposal had been mounting since Stanley Baldwin* had declared that the 
Conservatives would back the Irwin Declaration of October 1929. 
40 So convincing was Churchill’s image as the ardent imperialist that in 1952, 
when Churchill addressed the American houses of Congress, a Congressman’s 
wife remarked that she had ‘felt that the British Empire was walking into the 
room’,  Ashley Jackson, Churchill (London: Quercus, 2011), p. 351, citing 
Alistair Cooke, Manchester Guardian. 
Introduction 
14 
wartime imperial dynamism was flagging and needed fortifying. But Churchill’s 
caricature as the tenacious imperial bulldog was so effective however, that when 
it came to writing about an imperial power which he had drastically underrated, 
and one which had temporarily but dramatically bested the British imperial lion, 
he twisted the facts to suit his tale. Churchill famously claimed that he had not 
‘become the King’s First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the 
British Empire’.41 He turned out to be wrong. 
Chapter Three considers how Churchill portrayed the advent of war in the 
Far East and clarifies the distinction Churchill made between the short and long-
term reasons for the long road to Pearl Harbor. At first, placing the onus for the 
outbreak of the war with Japan firmly at America’s feet comes as a surprise, 
especially as Churchill was so keen to return to Downing Street, and was reliant 
upon maintaining the Anglo-American relationship which he had so carefully 
nurtured throughout the war. However when his reasoning is contextualised, and 
the brevity with which he listed the British perspective is examined, the reasons 
for the infrequency of Churchill’s eastward glances become more obvious. 
 The fourth chapter focuses on Churchill’s narrative of the loss of Hong 
Kong, Malaya, and Singapore. It is in this chapter that the idea of ‘sacrifice for 
salvation’ east of Suez will be explored fully and its implications and 
ramifications not only upon Churchill’s sense of the British Empire (and the 
progress of the war itself), but also on the ‘special relationship’ which he had 
taken great pains to foster. This chapter highlights the extent to which 
Churchill’s portrayal of the war in the Far East—especially the loss of Hong 
Kong and Singapore—became cemented within official histories, when really he 
exaggerated them to prevent closer scrutiny of his own role in their sacrifice. 
Subsequently Churchill drastically watered down his postwar imperial rhetoric, 
because the Attlee government had clawed back the economically viable Hong 
Kong and the strategically important Singapore naval base. Because Burma’s 
wartime conditions had exacerbated internal political tensions and destroyed its 
infrastructure, Attlee willingly jettisoned the postwar imperial disaster zone 
                                                 
41 Churchill, Mansion House speech, London, 10 Nov. 1942, in Robert Rhodes 
James (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches: Volume VI, 1935–
1942 (New York: Chelsea House, 1974), p. 6695. 
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which Burma had become. Had Churchill been in power he would have had to do 
the same. More worryingly for Churchill though, he would have done so gladly. 
Such a dent to his already elegiac imperialism could not be revealed in his 
memoirs. 
Chapter Five analyses Churchill’s rendition of the series of crises he had 
to contend with in India during 1942–43. Plumb’s observation about Churchill’s 
unerring ability to straighten out the chaos and confusion of the Second World 
War faltered when Churchill had little choice but to outline the situation in India. 
His memoirs show little cohesion or forethought for continuity when the subject 
of India and 1942 to 1943 rears its head. When Churchill attempted to lay out the 
history of the British Empire in India, the chaos and confusion of that history 
worked to his advantage as it enabled him to gloss over his mistakes, and to 
diffuse the impact of this period of ‘shocks and change’.42 India had always been 
Churchill’s ‘blind spot’,43 and this tainted his interpretation of the failure of the 
Cripps Mission, the Quit India campaign, the search for a new Viceroy, and the 
Bengal famine of 1943. Churchill’s almost vitriolic distaste for India highlights 
how loathe he was to admit his own culpability and his share of responsibility for 
the eventual loss of the jewel in the British Empire’s crown. Rather 
unexpectedly, Churchill directed as much scorn towards Roosevelt’s opinion on 
the Raj as he did towards the Indian nationalists themselves. In so doing, 
Churchill arguably hoped to distract the reader from the reality of the situation: 
not only his own role in the ultimate death knell of the Raj but also just how 
fragile and temporary the wartime Anglo-American alliance had actually been. 
American anti-imperial pressure proved exhausting for Churchill both during the 
war and, once again, when revisiting wartime India for his memoirs.  
The sixth and final chapter examines Churchill’s portrayal of the Indian 
Army and especially its role in the reconquest of Burma.  The series of crises 
which gripped India from 1942 to 1943 exacerbated Churchill’s postwar 
bitterness. In particular his postwar thinking contaminated his portrayal of the 
                                                 
42 CHAR 20/99B/172: Churchill’s speech, farewell dinner in honour of Wavell 
taking up his post as Viceroy of India, London, 6 Oct. 1943. 
43 Penderel Moon (ed.), Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal (Karachi: OUP, 1974), 
Wavell quoting Mountbatten, 30 Sept. 1943, p. 21. 
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Indian Army and its role in Burma—arguably the most gruelling theatre of the 
war east of Suez.  Churchill may have praised and lauded the Indian Army more 
frequently than other imperial troops, but only when justifying why 
constitutional redress for India was impossible during wartime. As Churchill was 
composing his forever forward-looking memoirs, most of the wartime cankers 
had healed. But Burma still blighted Churchill’s record as it exposed the 
temporary, transient and fragile nature of the Anglo-American alliance.  
Through the medium of his memoirs, Churchill intended to glorify his 
recent past and underpin his eagerly anticipated future. In itself this is neither 
surprising nor a revelation. Many political memoirs have these, or similar, 
considerations as their over-riding impetus. What this thesis highlights is the way 
in which Churchill’s memoirs have been constantly evidenced as history.44 In 
fact, as far as the war with Japan is concerned, Churchill’s memoirs still hold 
sway over official histories. Churchill’s Second World War should be re-
evaluated in light of the context in which it was written. Churchill himself wrote 
that his memoirs were nothing more than a contribution to history which would 
be of service to future historians. It is time historians took an unsentimental view 
of Churchill’s memoirs, and accepted that the influence which he had, in this 
instance, on the depiction of the war in the Far East was far from accurate. 
Churchill may have relegated the war against Japan to a sideshow, to a 
distraction, but this does not excuse those who have followed his lead. The 
Second World War was indeed a world war. It was arguably a war of empires. 
One of the larger conclusions drawn from this research is how no history of the 
Second World War has yet incorporated all aspects of the tale. Perhaps a 
Herculean task, but one which nonetheless suggests that a fresh perspective 
should be given to the Second World War. Historians of the twenty-first century 
                                                 
44 Only recently, David Edgerton and Dan Todman both agreed that certain 
assumptions about Britain and the Second World War (in particular the ‘Blitz 
spirit’ and the notion of a ‘Peoples War’) still held sway over both academe and 
national consciousness. Both academics commented upon how instrumental 
Churchill’s Second World War had been with regards to these and other 
assumptions. Plenary session of the ‘Fresh Perspectives on Britain in World War 
Two’ conference, Imperial College, London, 9 Nov. 2011. 
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must widen the scope, and one of the least-researched areas is the lens through 
which Churchill viewed the Far East and the extent to which he influenced 
subsequent histories. 
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Illustration I  
 
 
 
 ‘‘Hats that helped me’: ‘Mr Winston Churchill (trying on Colonial 
headgear),  
‘Very becoming—but on the small side, as usual’’. 
Punch, 26 January 1921. 
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Chapter I: Between Memoir and History 
 
During his ‘wilderness years’ Churchill had been subjected to criticism, scorn 
and, at times, derision within the Commons.1 Six weeks after the outbreak of war, 
and having returned to the Admiralty, Churchill received a letter from Colin 
Thornton-Kemsley (the Conservative MP for Kincardine and West 
Aberdeenshire). The MP apologised for having opposed Churchill for as long and 
‘as hard as’ he ‘knew how’, and for not having listened to his repeated warnings 
about the ‘German danger’.2 ‘Englishmen ought to start fair with one another 
from the outset in so grievous a struggle’, Churchill answered, and that as far as 
he was concerned ‘the past’ was ‘dead’.3 But the past was never really dead for 
Churchill. At the same time as he sent this reply he was being approached by 
publishers, all vying for his attention (and signature) over what they realised 
would be a great piece of writing.4 Churchill was 65 years old and if he lasted 
through the war, in whatever position, it was expected that he would write about 
his role in the fight as was his habit.5  
This brief opening chapter contextualises Churchill’s literary empire, and 
begins to examine the interplay between memoir and history in relation to 
Churchill’s Second World War.6 Churchill said of his memoirs, ‘this is not 
                                                 
1 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume I: The Gathering Storm 
(London: Cassell, 1948), p. 527.  
2 Colin Thornton-Kemsley to Churchill, 17 Sept. 1939 in Martin Gilbert (ed.), The 
Churchill War Papers: Volume I: At the Admiralty, September 1939–May 1940 
(New York: Norton, 1993), p. 51–2. 
3 Churchill to Thornton-Kemsley, 13 Sept. 1939, in Ibid., p. 91. 
4 See David Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing 
the Second World War (London: Allen Lane, 2004), p. 5–22. 
5 See Winston S. Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode 
of Frontier War (London: Longman, 1898); My Early Life: A Roving Commission 
(London: Thornton Butterworth, 1930); and The World Crisis: Volumes I–V 
(London: Thornton Butterworth, 1923–31). 
6 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volumes I–VI (London: Cassell, 
1948–54). 
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history, this is my case’.7 He also knew that, as time progressed, the ‘flickering 
lamp’ of history would throw a different light on his own life and career.8 Just as 
Churchill was aware that ‘fierce and bitter controversies’ had haunted Neville 
Chamberlain, he was aware that controversies would undoubtedly plague his own 
reputation when he died.9 In order therefore to counteract any controversies whilst 
he was alive, and to smooth his hoped-for return to 10 Downing Street, Churchill 
wrote his memoirs. His wife Clementine wrote ‘when History looks back your 
vision & your piercing energy coupled with your patience & magnanimity will all 
be part of your greatness’.10 Indeed it would, but if Churchill could embellish that 
greatness through his writing—so much the better. 
Throughout his life, Churchill earned a sizable proportion of his income 
from writing.11 His literary career began at the end of the nineteenth century when 
he became a wartime correspondent in Cuba in 1895, and continued a year later in 
Egypt and then in South Africa during the Boer War. His articles were favourably 
received and this prompted him to view writing as not only a way of bolstering his 
constantly fluctuating income, but also of proselytising his own opinions. Writing 
about the reviews his Malakand Field Force had received, Churchill noted   
 
That was the stuff! I was thrilled. I knew that if this would 
pass muster there was lots more where it came from, and I 
                                                 
7 Sir William Deakin in conversation with Martin Gilbert, 15 Mar. 1975 in Martin 
Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, 1945–1965: Volume 8, Never Despair (London: 
Heinemann, 1988), p. 315. 
8 Hansard, HC (series 5) vol. 365, col. 1617 (12 Nov. 1940). 
9 Ibid. 
10 Mary Soames (ed.), Speaking for Themselves: The Personal Letters of Winston 
and Clementine Churchill (London: Black Swan, 1999), Clementine to Churchill, 
23 Nov. 1943, p. 486. 
11 See David Reynolds, ‘Churchill’s Writing of History: Appeasement, 
Autobiography and “The Gathering Storm”’, Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society, Sixth Series, 11 (2001), p. 221; and In Command of History, pp. 13–22. 
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felt a new way of making a living and of asserting myself, 
opening splendidly out before me.12 
 
The money he earned from writing meant that, even though he constantly 
complained of being ‘oofless’ (cash poor), he nonetheless had a reasonably 
regular source of revenue.13 As his inability to be parsimonious with his own 
funds became habitual, he ‘resolved to build a small literary house’ to supplement 
what he saw as a meagre income.14  Money was one reason why Churchill wrote. 
The other reason for continuing his literary career alongside his later political 
career was the way in which it afforded him a platform from which he could vent 
his opinions, justify his beliefs and actions, or present alternative scenarios to 
those which he felt were historically inaccurate. In short, Churchill was conscious 
of how historical perspectives were apt to, and could, be changed. 
Churchill first experienced the power that historical writing held when he 
attempted to silence his late father’s detractors by means of writing his 
biography.15 Whilst not entirely successful in his remit, Churchill did at least quell 
some of the harsher criticisms which had been levelled against Lord Randolph 
Churchill. But as one historian noted, ‘as a vindication Lord Randolph Churchill 
does not succeed, as a great political history it does’.16 Churchill’s most forceful 
early encounter with the power of history however, was his multi-volume 
narrative on the First World War—The World Crisis.17  To date only one historian 
                                                 
12 Churchill, My Early Life, p. 170. 
13 Churchill to his mother Lady Jennie Churchill, 19 May 1891, in Randolph S. 
Churchill (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume I, Part 1: 1874–1896 
(London: Heinemann, 1967), p. 234.  
14 Churchill, My Early Life, p. 168. Churchill’s meagre income was a combination 
of the pay he received as a subaltern in the Queen’s Fourth Hussars (he was 
stationed in Bangalore, India from 1896–9) and contributions from his mother.  
15 Winston S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill: Volumes I–II (London: 
Macmillan, 1906). 
16 John Lukacs, Churchill: Visionary. Statesman. Historian. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002), p. 109. 
17 Churchill, The World Crisis.      
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has tackled the World Crisis, and has concluded that whilst the commitment 
needed to complete such a work was intense, and its ‘thread of humanity’ 
reflected its author’s awareness of the horrors of the new age of warfare, it was 
nonetheless a piece of historical writing which contained ‘distortions and lack of 
balance’.18 The first line of Churchill’s preface to the fourth volume, The 
Aftermath, noted that it had taken him almost ten years to write his ‘contemporary 
contribution to the history of the Great War’.19 While Churchill clearly thought of 
his narrative of the First World War as a ‘contribution’ to history, a phrase which 
he would use once again in the preface to his first volume of memoirs on the 
Second World War,20 the ‘distortions’ within the narrative suggest that A.J. 
Balfour* was perhaps correct to describe the World Crisis as Churchill’s 
autobiography disguised as world history.21  
Churchill wrote the World Crisis between 1919 and 1926. During this time 
his political career had regained some of its pre-Dardanelles vigour and he had 
been Secretary of State for War and Minister of Air (15 January 1919–14 
February 1921 and 1 April 1921 respectively), Secretary of State for the Colonies 
(14 February 1921–October 1922), almost two years out of office, and then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (7 November 1924–30 May 1929). Perhaps his 
desire to justify his role in the Dardanelles strategy increased the verve with 
which he wrote his narrative, and this possibly accounts for the relatively short 
period before the first volume was published. Despite his protestation to the 
contrary, Churchill’s literary output seems not to have been unduly affected by his 
political offices.22 Understandably however, when he entered the ‘political 
wilderness’ in 1931 his literary production rate increased exponentially.23  
                                                 
18 Robin Prior, Churchill’s World Crisis as History (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 
1983), p. 283. 
19 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis: Volume IV, The Aftermath (London: 
Thornton Butterworth, 1929; Folio edn, 2007), p. xi. 
20 Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. vii.  
21 As cited by Reynolds, In Command of History, p. 5.  
22 In the preface to his third volume of The World Crisis, Churchill wrote that the 
‘material had been assembled, the work studied and planned, and the greater part 
actually finished’ when he had been invited back to government as Chancellor of 
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It was during the period from 1931 to 1939 that he ‘undertook his greatest 
literary task’—the four volume Marlborough.24 The intention behind this study of 
his ancestor was to ‘give a more just and generous judgement’ on John Churchill, 
First Duke of Marlborough.25 Churchill was ‘determined from the first to make 
the best case he could’ for Marlborough, and exclusive access to papers and 
documents in the muniment room at Blenheim Palace helped Churchill’s narrative 
become a cohesive historical tale.26 But what Churchill actually wrote was more 
than a political biography of his ancestor. In Churchill’s words, Marlborough was 
also a description of ‘how the harsh and excessive demands of the victors  [had] 
produced innumerable and unforeseen consequences for the defeated nations’.27 
In other words, Marlborough was Churchill’s warning from history—it was 
arguably his implicit treatise against the consequences of the 1919 Treaty of 
Versailles. The volumes received ‘critical acclaim’,28 and Churchill succeeded in 
restoring Marlborough’s ‘good name’.29 Churchill’s literary career preceded his 
entry into Parliament by four years. He honed his journalistic and literary skills to 
help establish his political position, to rally support for whatever cause he 
                                                                                                                                     
the Exchequer in 1924. The ‘weight’ of his official duties, so Churchill continued, 
‘forced’ him to put his ‘literary projects indefinitely aside’ until mid 1926. 
Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis: Volume III, 1916–1918 (London: 
Thornton Butterworth, 1927; Folio edn, 2007), p. xi. 
23 Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 527. 
24 CHAR 20/3/94: ‘Mr. Churchill as a Writer’, script of broadcast to India by Leo 
Amery, 6 Dec. 1940; Winston S. Churchill, Marlborough: His Life and Times, 
Volumes I-IV (London: Harrap, 1933–38). 
25 Winston S. Churchill, Marlborough: His Life and Times, Volume I (London: 
Harrap, 1933; Folio Society, edn, 1991), p. 5. 
26 Maurice Ashley, Churchill as Historian (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968), 
p. 138. 
27 Morton J. Frisch, ‘The Intention of Churchill’s “Marlborough”’, Polity, 12/4 
(1980), p. 562. 
28 Ashley Jackson, Churchill (London: Quercus, 2011), p. 232. 
29 DEKE 5: ‘Churchill as Historian’, Lecture given by Denis Kelly to the Middle 
Temple History Society, London, 13 Jan. 1982, p. 14. 
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subscribed to, and to augment his constantly fluctuating personal finances. Yet 
none of this explains why Churchill’s memoirs of the Second World War acquired 
the status of semi-official history, let alone the way in which they indelibly shaped 
the history of the Second World War. 
Anyone who researches Churchill’s Second World War owes a debt to 
David Reynolds, whose In Command of History clarified why Churchill wrote his 
memoirs, explained how they were physically constructed, and set them against 
the contextual background of a hot war turning into a Cold one.30 Churchill did 
not write his memoirs due to the vanity of age. He wrote his memoirs (although 
compiled and edited are perhaps more apt terms) to increase his chances of a 
return to 10 Downing Street.31 In writing his ‘contribution to history’, Churchill 
hoped that he would either appease or silence his critics before they could hinder 
his return to power.32 One historian wrote that Churchill’s political actions after 
his defeat in the general election of July 1945 ‘added little to his stature’ but that 
‘his history’ of the war ‘lent lustre to his fame’.33 It was this lustre which (if he 
embellished it enough) would possibly help him become a peacetime prime 
minister. Having recovered from his landslide defeat in the general election of 
                                                 
30 Only recently Reynolds’s In Command of History has once again been lauded 
as required reading alongside Churchill’s Second World War. See David 
Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine: Weapons, Resources and Experts in the Second 
World War (London: Allen Lane, 2011), fn. 1, p. 303. Raymond Callahan wrote 
that Reynolds’s In Command of History is ‘one of the most important books yet 
produced about Churchill’. See Raymond Callahan, ‘In Command of History: 
Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War’, Journal of Military 
History, 70/2 (2006), p.551. 
31 David Reynolds, ‘Churchill’s Writing of History: Appeasement, Autobiography 
and “The Gathering Storm”’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Sixth 
Series, 11 (2001), pp. 221–47.  
32 Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. vii. 
33 John Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory: A political biography (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1993), p. 647. 
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July 1945,34 having revived his international presence on a lecture tour of 
America in early 1946,35 and having successfully negotiated the all-important tax 
position regarding any profits he would make by picking up a pen again,36 
Churchill resolved to compose his memoirs.37 His intention to do so had been 
evident much earlier than the aftermath of what his wife deemed to be perhaps ‘a 
blessing in disguise’.38 In spite of Churchill having instructed one of his 
secretaries, in August 1945, to respond politely but negatively to several quite 
persistent telegrams enquiring as to not whether he would write his memoirs but 
when he would start them, Churchill had already broadcast his intention to record 
his memoirs within a month of becoming Prime Minister.39 After France had 
fallen, Churchill told the Commons that Britain could ill afford any ‘utterly futile 
and even harmful’ recriminations regarding the evacuation of the British 
Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk.40 In this speech, Churchill expressed the view 
that the whys and wherefores of Operation Dynamo (the codename for the 
Dunkirk evacuation) had to be put aside. It had to be ‘put on the shelf, from which 
the historians, when they have time, will select their documents to tell their 
stories’.41 Churchill, however, thought that he would be one of the historians.42 
                                                 
34 Labour won 393 seats, the Conservatives and their supporters 210, and the 
Liberals 12 seats. Labour made 203 gains and had a majority of 159 seats over all 
other parties. Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour in Power, 1945–1951 (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1984), p. 41. 
35 See John Ramsden, Man of the Century: Winston Churchill And His Legend 
Since 1945 (2nd edn, London: HarperCollins, 2003), pp. 154–62; and Reynolds, In 
Command of History, pp. 41–8. 
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This simple sentence begs a complicated answer to the following question: was 
Churchill an historian? 
Churchill’s concept of ‘history’ was ‘essentially a personal and family 
affair’.43 He believed that history was irrevocably tied up with politics, was made 
by great individuals, who were, more often than not, men of destiny operating 
under a grand theme. The grand theme which Churchill visited and revisited time 
and again was the British Empire. The 1920s and 30s were a golden age for travel 
and travel writing.44 European frontiers may have owed much to the post-Great 
War treaties and may have caused the traveller some distress (at least as far as the 
issue of passport control was concerned),45 but this era further opened up British 
eyes to a world beyond Dover—a world that was crucial to Churchill as it was a 
world in which the British Empire took centre stage. By 1945 however, the British 
Empire was beginning its final descent and British literature began to reflect this 
withdrawal as it became concerned with all things British. Literature started to 
look inwards and became comparably insular. Churchill’s Second World War 
tapped into this need to concentrate and refocus on Britain. Three days after he 
became Prime Minister, Churchill had warned the British people that ‘victory’ 
could be theirs, but it would come at a price—it would be ‘victory at all costs’.46 
‘Conscious of the consequences of the decline of empire’, Churchill’s memoirs 
encapsulated the collective psychological need to be victorious—not only 
                                                                                                                                     
42 The more commonly quoted remark, how Churchill announced that history 
would be kind to him, especially as he intended to write it, is still powerful, but 
not as portentous as some have claimed. After all, he had already been approached 
(as early as September 1939 when he returned to the Admiralty) by several 
publishers for first refusal on any memoirs he chose to write at the end of the war. 
See Reynolds, In Command of History, pp. 5–7. 
43 Ashley, Churchill as Historian, p. 13; Reynolds, ‘Churchill’s Writing of 
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44 See Paul Fussell, Abroad: British Literary Travelling between the Wars 
(Oxford: OUP, 1980; 2nd edn, 1982). 
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alongside their Allies, or over the Axis powers, but also victorious over their own 
fortunes, and over their own history.47 
Until Reynolds published his Wolfson prize-winning work, In Command 
of History, Churchill’s method of writing history had been systematically 
discussed by only a handful of people.48 Instead of physically writing his 
memoirs, Churchill preferred to have his secretaries type up his dictated 
recollections of key events which he would then annotate when he was ready.49 
He would trawl through wartime telegrams and Minutes, a process the syndicate 
called ‘strigging’, which enabled him to string ideas and recollections together.50 
He was also in the enviable position of being able to hire a team of researchers (a 
method which he had first employed with successful results during the interwar 
years), who became known as the ‘syndicate’. At first glance the members of the 
syndicate appeared to be an unlikely and disparate team (made up of historians, 
wartime colleagues and close friends of Churchill’s) but this disparity belied a 
tremendous effort and complete loyalty to Churchill’s narrative. First and 
foremost was the professional historian Frederick William (Bill) Deakin who had 
previously been employed by Churchill from 1935 to 1938 as a researcher for 
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both Marlborough and the History of the English-Speaking Peoples.51 Denis Kelly 
became the syndicate’s next foundation stone. He had been an unenthusiastic 
lawyer whom Churchill employed as a literary assistant (in 1947), in order to 
create a ‘cosmos out of chaos’.52 Three years later in 1950 Kelly may have been 
describing himself as ‘the junior, unqualified stooge’ of the syndicate, but his 
humility belied the great contribution he made to the memoirs—not least of which 
was his ability to keep the paperwork in some semblance of order.53 Churchill’s 
lack of interest in organising paperwork was well known amongst the syndicate. 
Once, whilst the syndicate were in full research mode, Pownall commented that in 
order to keep much sought after telegrams and documents from becoming lost, 
Churchill should perhaps be provided with copies because ‘you know what 
happens to papers chez lui’.54 Formidable military knowledge came from a wide 
circle of Churchill’s wartime colleagues, yet he relied mostly upon General Henry 
Pownall, General ‘Pug’ Ismay and Commodore Allen. Close personal friends, 
such as Frederick Lindemann and Edward Marsh, were willing and valued proof 
readers.  
Yet having a syndicate did not make Churchill an historian. Malcolm 
Muggeridge (a contemporary journalist and broadcaster) wrote that the syndicate 
illustrated how adept Churchill was at ‘organising large works’ and that ‘his’ 
memoirs were ‘the productions of a committee rather than of an individual 
                                                 
51 Churchill, Marlborough. Whilst published in the mid to late 1950s his A 
History of the English Speaking Peoples, Volumes I–IV (London: Cassell, 1956–
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54 ISMAY 2/3/50/1: Pownall to Ismay, 10 May 1948. 
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author’.55 In one sense Muggeridge was correct. At times Churchill would recruit 
experts in the relevant field to write draft chapters which would remain largely 
unchanged.56 For example, when Churchill reached the chronological point of the 
Battle of Britain in the memoirs, he recalled an ‘admirable pamphlet ... called Air 
Ministry Pamphlet 156’, and thought that the author could prove ‘very helpful’ to 
him by ‘constructing the short but accurate condensation’ which Churchill 
required.57 Ismay established through ‘private channels’ that ‘the man who did 
most of the work’ was not Sir Robert Brooke-Popham (as was originally thought) 
but Flight-Lieutenant Albert Goodwin.58 Ismay approached Goodwin (by then a 
Professor of History at Jesus College, Cambridge),59 who was ‘honoured to hear 
that Mr. Churchill had been interested’ in the pamphlet.60 Thus whilst 
Muggeridge, to a certain degree, was correct,  the memoirs were still authored by 
Churchill. He directed the syndicate. He directed the work as a whole. He dictated 
his recollections of key events which the syndicate fleshed out.61 As Churchill 
himself wrote, ‘these chapters are merely a provisional build-up. Please do 
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everything you can to fill them in’.62 His memoirs were certainly not ghost 
written.63 Even in 1963, two years before he died, the ‘mechanical rights’ to the 
preface for the abridged one-volume version of the memoirs were reasserted as 
belonging to Churchill.64 He was classified and verified as the ‘author’ as he had 
been in all previous contracts.65  
The syndicate did, at times, work with the least amount of interference 
from Churchill. Ismay and Pownall may have referred to Churchill as ‘the Master’ 
when corresponding with each other (the term suggests endearment rather than 
derogation), but they took their work for their ‘Master’ quite seriously.66 They 
frequently corresponded with each other, made individual notes and comments on 
Churchill’s drafts, and then met to compare notes and impressions, as well as to 
confer on which details would need checking by either Deakin or Kelly. They 
then reported back to Churchill. In one such report, Ismay wrote that at a 
preliminary meeting he and Pownall had discussed ‘suggested amendments (many 
of them of a trivial character)’.67 The two syndicate members had also discussed 
how the workload was to be divided between them, as well as just exactly what 
Churchill wanted from them. Indeed, Ismay actually questioned whether what 
they had done was in fact what Churchill wanted.68  
It was however, the work of Edward Bridges and his successor Norman 
Brook that principally secured the title of ‘historian’ for Churchill.69 As Cabinet 
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Secretary, Bridges (and then Brook) followed their remit which was to smooth 
Churchill’s, and his syndicate’s, path when he sought permissions to quote from 
documents from both domestic and international spheres.70 Such help was 
invaluable as it meant that the vast swathe of original documentation could be 
quoted from directly. Although heavily edited, such documents gave the memoirs 
an aura of veracity which added to the public’s belief that what they were reading 
was the historical truth in Churchill’s words. Brook took on a greater interest in 
the memoirs than Bridges had done.71 In fact, he became one of Churchill’s most 
trusted editors.72 Arguably it was the intellectual and historical weight of the 
documentation which Bridges and Brook helped secure for Churchill’s use which 
gave his memoirs the impression that they were in fact ‘history’.73 Churchill did 
nothing to dispel this belief. 
His memoirs of the Second World War were exactly that—memoirs. But 
The Second World War nonetheless garnered a reputation of being, if not ‘official’ 
history, at least ‘approved’ history.  Several factors contributed to this. Firstly, 
there was his pre-war reputation as a quasi-historian which had come about due to 
his World Crisis, Lord Randolph Churchill and Marlborough. Secondly, there 
was a vast swathe of documents to which Churchill and his syndicate were given 
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access—documents to which no other researcher was privy74—as well as the way 
in which Churchill’s syndicate were made to feel at home in any library or 
archive.75 The aura of authenticity was also provided by Attlee’s Labour 
government who seemingly gave their blessing to the endeavour, by the behind-
the-scenes machinations of the Cabinet Secretaries, and by the fact that no official 
history of the war from the services had yet to be produced. All these factors 
combined made Churchill’s memoirs much more than a mere ‘contribution to 
history’.  
Having been defeated in the general election of July 1945, partly due to 
the damage he did to his own reputation as a result of his ‘crazy’ so-called 
‘Gestapo’ electioneering broadcast,76 Churchill’s reputation as the ‘leader of 
humanity’ needed to be reinvigorated if he were ever to become prime minister of 
peacetime Britain.77 One way in which he could do this was by manipulating his 
role in the history of the Second World War. It just so happened that the ‘broad 
avenues’ which he set out were the roads down which subsequent historians 
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moved.78 Although the syndicate, his friends and favourites, and the Cabinet 
Secretaries aided and abetted the production of Churchill’s memoirs, it was 
Churchill who was the ultimate arbiter and judge of what was recorded. It may 
have been Deakin’s research, Kelly’s precise recall of documents and, at times, 
Pownall’s actual handwriting but, overall, it was Churchill’s narrative. If, as 
Foucauldian theory suggests, it is the narrative that wields the power of history,79 
and the memoirs are Churchill’s narrative (despite the intervention of the 
syndicate and sometimes Brook), it should be Churchill who is held accountable. 
But those historians who do not deviate from Churchill’s broad avenues, and who 
do not give a more rounded perspective of the war in the Far East as part and 
parcel of the world war are equally accountable. 
The syndicate often tried to protect Churchill from himself. In one of the 
chapter proofs, of which there are dozens, one of Churchill’s sentences read: ‘so 
far the Japanese have only had two white battalions and a few gunners against 
them, the rest being Indian soldiers.’80 Kelly rightly surmised that such a sentence 
would ‘be read as a reflection on the Indian Army’, and that it would be better to 
‘delete the words “the rest being Indian soldiers”’.81 This is just one example of 
the syndicate trying to protect Churchill from himself, and it was done in the usual 
manner: thoughtfully suggestive yet persistent due to its connotation for 
Churchill’s contemporary concerns. At other times though, the syndicate had to be 
more forceful and knock Churchill off ‘his present perch’.82 Although Pownall 
was ‘confident’ that Churchill would eventually ‘come down a long way’ and 
make the revision, he did not anticipate that Churchill would do so easily. Pownall 
even concluded that he had seen 
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plenty of previous instances in which I thought he was 
being unfair and I had to wade in. He grumbles and 
mumbles but if one sticks to it he gives way, perhaps at 
the very last moment and secretly, behind one’s back!83 
 
Kelly, Deakin, and Pownall were the researchers on whom Churchill leant most 
heavily for the major drafting of the events of the war in the Far East, especially 
as Kelly and Pownall had been stationed there, but they were also the ones who 
had to contend with an obstreperous Churchill.84   
Historians are subject to an ever-increasing amount of scrutiny, especially 
those who are in the public eye. As John Tosh recently commented, historians are 
currently enjoying a higher public profile than they have done for many years—
some have even become ‘household names’.85 One result of historians becoming 
more visible, and perhaps influential, is that they have an ever-increasing 
responsibility—not only towards their own research but also towards the public, 
as wielding history in such a responsibility-laden way reinforces the old adage 
that history is always about power. For Tosh, the power of history lies in its 
ability to illuminate the present so that ‘intelligent decisions about difficult public 
decisions’ can be made.86 If the ‘past exists for us only as it is written up by 
historians’ what happens if the most palatable narrative (and one written by one of 
the most important and prominent men of the event itself) becomes so engrained 
that it distorts subsequent, more reasoned and measured history?87 This is the 
memoir-history spectrum, and one problem that this thesis faces is finding the 
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most appropriate place in which to situate Churchill’s historical-narrative-
memoir? 
Memoirs come in all shapes and sizes. Some memoirs are produced, for 
example, as a cathartic act and are not normally destined for publication whilst 
others, such as memoirs written by political figures, are exactly the opposite. But 
Churchill’s Second World War is more than just a political memoir; and, at times, 
such as when he recalled the loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, it 
presumably acted as a cathartic experience. One historian noted that memoirs 
appear to be ‘a kind of fiction’ which differs from a novel told in the first person 
only ‘by continuous implicit attestation of veracity or appeals to documented 
historical fact’.88 By definition then, Churchill’s memoirs were political as well as 
autobiographical because they were presented as his recollections of the war. Yet 
Churchill’s memoirs also represented a wider, national and collective experience 
which resonated with the post-war book-buying public. This ability to encapsulate 
the collective memory of recent events, when coupled with the swathe of 
documentation included within the volumes, gave the impression that Churchill’s 
Second World War was, in fact, history. Whilst the presumption that his memoirs 
would be a truthful rendition of history was not Churchill’s, he did little to dispel 
the idea.  
In Churchill, there existed an anomaly. He was a journalist, a politician, a 
statesman, an artist, an orator, and a man who appreciated not only his own but 
also national and international history. All of these factors, along with his ability 
to get what he wanted out of the Cabinet Secretaries as well as the syndicate, 
combined to make him the central figure in a very complicated Venn diagram. 
Added to the anomaly was the fact that he participated in the events about which 
he was writing. It was not just a matter that his memoirs were personal and 
participatory: it was the very fact that they were both personal and participatory 
which gave them the edge over other contemporary personal accounts. But it was 
the way in which Churchill tapped into the need for a collective representation of 
the wartime experience which helped seal the memoirs’ reception and subsequent 
acceptance as history. Churchill’s Second World War was much like the Column 
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of Victory which was built to memorialise the First Duke of Marlborough, the 
only difference being that whilst the Column of Victory was started five years 
after Marlborough’s death,89 Churchill built his own literary column of victory as 
he hoped it would help him realise his remaining ambition—to become prime 
minister of peacetime Britain. In fact, so well-built was Churchill’s literary 
victory column that it still proves hard to break free from a Churchillian-like 
narrative when examining almost any aspect of the Second World War.  
When stationed in Bangalore at the end of the nineteenth century, 
Churchill had studied history and historians. He wrote that although Thomas 
Babbington Macaulay had a ‘captivating style and devastating self-confidence’, 
he was nonetheless 
 
the prince of literary rogues, who always preferred the tale 
to the truth, and smirched or glorified great men and 
garbled documents accordingly as they affected his 
drama.90 
 
Exactly the same could be directed at Churchill and his portrayal of the war in the 
Far East. Churchill may have appreciated history, especially any history in which 
he could lay a claim to be directly involved, but this did not mean that he was an 
historian. He was however, arguably the most influential memoirist of the 
twentieth century. But did Churchill record an existing national consciousness, or 
did he help to manufacture a national historical memory?91 The war in the Far 
East may have ended with Japan’s surrender on 15 August 1945, but its constant 
historiographical relegation to the status of a side-show when compared to the 
European, Atlantic, or Middle Eastern theatres continued beyond the end of the 
century. Has the national memory of the Second World War been so effectively 
manipulated that the Far East still retains this status of a ‘lesser war’? 
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One historian wrote that ‘as Britain’s decline as a Great Power proceeded 
apace, so did the need for Churchill to grow’.92 There seems to have been no 
better vehicle for Churchill’s continued growth than a memoir. Throughout his 
Second World War, Churchill never quite disengaged his own needs (what he 
needed history to say) from the needs of a weary post-war public. As Low’s 
cartoon acerbically portrayed, the ‘leader of humanity’ – through his memoirs – 
became the leader of history. From an early twenty-first century perspective, the 
strength of Churchill’s memoir rests in how he effectively tapped into a collective 
need to make sense of the irrational events of the war itself. His memoirs seeped 
into the ‘historical consciousness’ of the nation.93 And some elements of the 
mythical residue still resonate today: the ‘special relationship’ with America; the 
popular terminology of the ‘people’s war’; and the ‘Blitz spirit’, which even now 
is frequently invoked when community or national crises occur.94 Subsequently 
Churchill’s memoirs became more than memoirs—they were elevated to the 
status of semi-official history. There is no denying that the memoirs were, and 
still are, an invaluable reference point. But the reference point is Churchill’s 
portrayal of events, of what he thought important, what he felt needed 
emphasising or omitting, and the extent to which his memoirs influenced official 
history. The vantage point from which Churchill wrote his recollections, and 
because he could not detach himself from the events, does not ‘preclude historical 
understanding’.95 But, like all memoirs, Churchill’s need to be questioned.96 Since 
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historians have the ability to change the way in which the past is viewed, any 
memoirist who so profoundly influenced history should be subject to the same 
scrutiny. The aim of this thesis is to challenge Churchill’s memoirs and his 
analysis of the war in the Far East. At Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946, as he 
began his quest back to Downing Street, he declared that it was necessary in 
peacetime for the English-speaking peoples to have a ‘constancy of mind’ and a 
‘persistency of purpose’.97 His memoirs were constant and persistent in one of 
their aims—to mythologize the wartime ‘special relationship’ between Britain and 
America.98 The war in the Far East however, had proved to be a thorn in the side 
of Anglo-American relations; it would seem even more troublesome in the cold 
light of a post-war world. Questioning the history that Churchill forgot, ignored or 
glossed over in the Far East is central to this research. Its starting point is 
Churchill’s imperialism. 
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Chapter II: Churchill’s British Empire. 
 
Churchill’s post-war recollection of the fortunes of the British Empire for the 
first half of 1942 was succinct enough—‘all went ill’.1 Whilst the latter half of 
the year had seen some Allied successes, such as El Alamein and Operation 
Torch, Churchill had thought it necessary to reanimate his prewar inveterate 
image as an ‘unreconstructed imperialist’.2 For this reason he declared in 
November 1942 that he had ‘not become the King’s First Minister in order to 
preside over the liquidation of the British Empire’.3 Although a caricature of his 
imperialist beliefs from his first three decades in politics, Churchill resurrected 
his 1930s imperial rhetoric to achieve two objectives. Firstly, to spell out the 
British Empire’s main war aim—‘we mean to hold our own’.4  Churchill felt the 
need to draw a line under the defeats and losses of the previous months, and he 
wanted to emphasize that the British Empire in the Far East was only temporarily 
unhinged. Secondly, Churchill was showing not only Japan but also America and 
Russia that the British Empire would not be extinguished by the war. With 
Churchill at the helm, the imperial British lion would not roll over and be 
squeezed between the American elephant and Russian bear.5 At the end of 1942, 
Churchill felt it necessary to remind the empire’s subjects, allies and enemies 
that the British Empire was still a force to be reckoned with. Yet, when it came to 
                                                 
1 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume IV: The Hinge of Fate 
(London: Cassell, 1951), p. ix. 
2 Nicholas Owen, ‘The Cripps mission of 1942: A reinterpretation’, JICH, 30/1 
(2002), p. 62.  
3 Robert Rhodes James (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches: 
Volume VI, 1935–1942 (New York: Chelsea House, 1974), Churchill, Mansion 
House speech, London, 10 Nov. 1942, p. 6695. 
4 Ibid. 
5 John Colville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries: Volume II, 
October 1941–April 1955 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985; Sceptre edn, 
1987), 24 Feb. 1945, p. 204. Churchill’s analogy sometimes changed to a British 
donkey squeezed between an American eagle and a Russian bear. 
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his memoirs, Churchill’s most defiant and most-quoted imperial declaration was 
absent? Why? What had changed? 
In essence, Churchill needed to protect his post-war reputation from the 
potential damage which his imperial rhetoric of the 1930s could inflict. He 
needed either to hide or to gloss over the constant imperial undercurrent which 
had suffused every ministerial position he had held during his first thirty years in 
politics. David Reynolds wrote that Churchill’s ‘famous phrase’ did not appear in 
his memoirs as it ‘sounded very hollow in 1950, after India, Pakistan and Burma 
had become independent and after Britain had withdrawn in chaos from 
Palestine’.6 Indeed it did, but, as this thesis will illustrate, there was more than 
that to Churchill’s omission, and his imperialism provides the answer. This thesis 
does not single out Churchill as the one reason for the end of the British Empire 
east of Suez. Many factors contributed to the scaling down of the empire into a 
Commonwealth, and then finally being blown away by the winds of change. But 
without doubt, Churchill was one of the ‘small sparks’ to light the ‘long 
historical fuses’ that led to the collapse of the British Empire.7 This thesis 
examines not only how he surreptitiously tried to hide his role in the 
disintegration of the British Empire, east of Suez, from his memoirs, but also 
why.  
Within any thesis space is at a premium, and to chart each facet of 
Churchill’s imperialism, from inception until his death, would be untenable.8 
                                                 
6 David Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the 
Second World War (London: Allen Lane, 2004), p. 336. 
7 John Gallagher, ‘The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire’, in Anil 
Seal (ed.), The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire: The Ford 
Lectures and other essays by John Gallagher (Cambridge: CUP, 1982; edn, 
2004), p. 73. 
8 However, this is not to say that Churchill’s imperialism cannot be briefly yet 
successfully charted. See Piers Brendon, ‘Churchill and Empire’, in Brian P. 
Farrell (ed.), Churchill and the Lion City: Shaping Modern Singapore 
(Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2011), pp. 10–35; and 
Ronald Hyam, ‘Churchill and the British Empire’, in Robert Blake and Wm. 
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This chapter intends to highlight those facets of Churchill’s imperialism which 
he brought to bear on the British Empire by the time he became Prime Minister 
on 10 May 1940; a time when his exaggerated image as the quintessential 
imperial bulldog was used to create the defiance that accompanied his simple 
statement—‘we are alone’.9 In the 1930s such an image suited Churchill’s desire 
to be kept in the public eye, and when he deemed it necessary he also exploited 
this image during the war. But when it came to his memoirs and how he 
portrayed the war in the Far East, he had to hide how dependent the British 
Empire had become on America in the Pacific, and how weak, in general, the 
empire prior to the outbreak of the Second World War had actually been. As the 
bluff and bluster of his wartime imperial rhetoric became inconvenient in the 
post-war world it was quite literally cut out of his memoirs. After briefly 
examining the state of the British Empire when Churchill was born, and the early 
imperial influences which surrounded him, the chapter will examine the main 
episodes in the development of Churchill’s imperialism, particularly those 
episodes which were relevant to the British Empire east of Suez. 
In 1993 Ronald Hyam wrote that, with the exception of India, ‘on no 
aspect of Churchill studies has so little been written by so few as ‘Churchill and 
                                                                                                                                    
Roger Louis (eds), Churchill: A Major New Assessment of his Life in Peace and 
War (Oxford: OUP, 1993), pp. 166–85.   
9 In fact Britain was not alone. As Fougasse’s cartoon shows, it was Britain and 
her empire which faced the Axis powers after the fall of France. See illustration 
II, p. 81. Churchill announced that Britain would ‘ride out the storm of war’ and 
‘outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary for years, if necessary alone’. 
Hansard, HC (series 5) vol. 361, col. 795 (4 June 1940). See David Edgerton, 
Britain’s War Machine: Weapons, Resources and Experts in the Second World 
War (London: Allen Lane, 2011), pp. 11–85, in which he contests the notion of 
how Britain was ‘alone’. Britain not only had an empire to call on but also 
American ties, and suppliers in the form of Denmark and Argentina. See also 
Ashley Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War (London: 
Hambledon Continuum, 2006), whose whole premise is that Britain had an 
empire and was therefore not alone. 
Chapter II: Churchill’s British Empire 
43 
the Empire’’.10 Indeed, in the fascinating field of imperial history,11 the majority 
of works only briefly mention Churchill, his imperialism, and his part in the 
Empire’s downfall.12 One reason for the lack of research on Churchill’s 
                                                 
10 Hyam, ‘Churchill and the British Empire’, in Blake and Louis (eds), Churchill, 
p. 167.  
11 The best of the most recently-published works on the British Empire, its rise 
and decline, are: John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the 
British World System, 1830–1970 (Cambridge: CUP, 2009); After Tamerlane: 
The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400–2000 (London: Penguin, 2008); Niall 
Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London: Penguin, 
2007); Richard Gott, Britain’s Empire: Resistance, Repression and Revolt 
(London: Verso, 2011); Jonathan Hart, Empires and Colonies (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2008); Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to 
Decolonisation 1918–1968 (Cambridge: CUP, 2006);  Britain’s Imperial 
Century, 1815–1914 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Ashley Jackson, 
The British Empire and the Second World War (London: Hambledon, 2006); 
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Sunset (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2007); David Reynolds, America, Empire of 
Liberty: A New History (London: Allen Lane, 2009); Kathryn Tidrick, Empire 
and the English Character: The Illusion of Authority (London: Taurus Parke, 
2009); Jeremy Paxman, Empire: What Ruling the World Did to the British 
(London: Viking, 2011); Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: 
Empire, Society and Culture in Britain (Oxford: OUP, 2004); The Lion’s Share: 
A Short History of British Imperialism 1850–2004 (4th edn, Harlow: Pearson 
Longman, 2004);  and Stanley Wolpert, Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the 
British Empire in India (Oxford: OUP, 2006).  
12 The exceptions to this rule are Raymond Callahan, Churchill: Retreat from 
Empire (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1984); Peter Clarke, The Last 
Thousand Days of the British Empire: The Demise of a Superpower, 1944–1947 
(London: Penguin, 2008); Kirk Emmert, Winston S. Churchill on Empire 
(Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1989); Ronald Hyam, Elgin 
and Churchill at the Colonial Office, 1905–1908:  The Watershed of the Empire-
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imperialism is its seemingly impenetrable and contradictory nature. As the 
historian Richard Toye recently wrote, the story of Churchill’s imperialism and 
his relationship to, and concept of, the British Empire is one which is ‘more 
complex than is often assumed’.13 The intricacy of Churchill’s imperialism 
begins with the term itself, which has proved difficult to define since its 
inception. One historian even remarked that ‘imperialism’ was ‘a pseudo-concept 
which sets out to make everything clear and ends by making everything 
muddled’;14 and a consensus over the definition of the term ‘imperialism’ still 
proves elusive.15 Yet Churchill had no such qualms over any attempt at 
                                                                                                                                    
Commonwealth (London: Macmillan, 1968); and Richard Toye, Churchill’s 
Empire: The World That Made Him and the World He Made (London: 
Macmillan, 2010). 
13 Toye, Churchill’s Empire, p. 4. 
14 William Keith Hancock, Wealth of Colonies (Cambridge: CUP, 1950), p. 17. 
15 See the following for concise overviews at attempts at definition: P. J. Cain 
and A. G. Hopkins, ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas II: 
New Imperialism, 1850–1945’, EconHR, 40/1 (1987); and British Imperialism, 
1688–2000 (2nd edn, Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2002); D.K. Fieldhouse, 
“Imperialism’: An Historiographical Revision’, EconHR, 14/2 (1961); John 
Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, EconHR, 6/1 
(1953); Rosalind O’Hanlon, ‘Gender in the British Empire’, in Judith Brown and 
Wm. Roger Louis (eds), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV: 
The Twentieth Century (Oxford: OUP, 1999), pp. 379–97; John A. Hobson, 
Imperialism: A Study (New York: Cosimo, 2005 [1902]); Ronald Hyam, Empire 
and Sexuality: The British Experience (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1990); Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of 
Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 2004 [1939]); Philippa Levine 
(ed.), Gender and Empire (Oxford: OUP, 2004); Annie McClintock, Imperial 
Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (New York: 
Routledge, 1995); Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage 
Books, 1994); Helmut D. Schmidt and Richard Koebner, Imperialism: The Story 
and Significance of a Political Word, 1840–1960 (Cambridge: CUP, 1964); and 
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definition. His imperialism was relatively instinctive and innate. One of his 
contemporaries remarked that when Churchill delivered the Mansion House 
speech in November 1942 it had not been done for effect. It had not been mere 
‘bravado’, because if Churchill ‘believed in any thing at all’ it was in the British 
Empire.16  
By the time Churchill was born, the British Empire was half way through 
its great ‘imperial century’ from 1815 to 1914.17 Recognizing the independence 
of thirteen of the North American colonies in the 1780s did little to dampen 
British imperialism which, by then, was ‘far too deep-rooted for its momentum to 
be seriously disrupted’.18 Building upon the achievements of the Honourable 
East India Company (granted its charter by Queen Elizabeth I in 1600) the 
empire refocused and pushed eastwards.19 During the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, the empire established a considerable presence in Africa and 
South-East Asia, thereby cementing itself as a dominating, if not the dominant, 
world power.20 The British Empire was at its zenith in terms of its self-
assuredness and there was arguably no need for bluff and bluster as the imperial 
belief in the right to rule appeared to be unquestionable and unflinching. After 
the Great War had seen the piecemeal division of the Turkish Empire, Britain 
acquired new imperial administrative responsibilities in the Middle East.  
                                                                                                                                    
Angela Woollacott, Gender and Empire (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006). 
16 Lord Moran, Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival, 1940–1965 
(London: Constable, 1966), p. 228. 
17 See Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century. 
18 P.J. Marshall (ed.), The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1996), p. 16. 
19 The following provide comprehensive coverage of the Honourable East India 
Company: K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the East India 
Company, 1660–1760 (Cambridge: CUP, 1978); Philip Lawson, The East India 
Company: A History (London: Longman, 1993); and P.J. Marshall, ‘The English 
in Asia to 1700’, in Nicholas Canny (ed.), The Oxford History of the British 
Empire: Volume I: The Origins of Empire (Oxford: OUP, 2001), pp. 264–85. 
20 See Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century. 
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Although it would not reach its territorial zenith until the mid 1930s,21 the British 
Empire was, if not in a state of hegemony, at least enjoying a period of relative 
calm compared to the previous century.22 
By the time Churchill was one year old, Britain had bought a significant 
interest in the Suez Canal.23 The canal provided an alternative and speedier route 
for British ships to India (the country that Queen Victoria described as ‘so bright 
a jewel’), which was to be protected at all costs due to the amount invested in 
garrisons and trade.24 In fact, it was the economic factor which meant that 
‘British policy was assertive not because policy-makers were in the pockets of 
the bond-holders, but because they recognised the need to defend Britain’s 
                                                 
21 See Avner Offer, ‘The British Empire, 1870–1914: A Waste of Money?’, 
EconHR, 46/2 (1993), pp. 215–38, for a cogent argument about the irrationality 
behind the so-called balance sheet of empire analysis to determine whether this 
period was one of imperial investment and profit. Offer concludes that because 
the British Empire, in this period, ‘was an adjunct of British wealth’ it ‘provided 
protection for that wealth’ as well as ‘the temptation to fight for it’, p. 236. The 
kudos that Britain received by way of its imperial sway and influence during this 
period far outweighed the monetary rewards. See also Andrew Porter, ‘The 
Balance Sheet of Empire, 1850–1914’, The Historical Journal, 31/3 (1988), pp. 
685–99, in which Porter warns historians against losing their ‘sense of proportion 
simply because the figures look logical’, p. 686.  
22 John Darwin, ‘From Prudence to Disaster: The Geopolitical Fortunes of British 
Imperialism, 1840–1960’, (University of Hull, Department of History, Research 
and Training Seminar: 4 Nov. 2009). A paper which distilled some of the key 
aspects of Darwin’s most recent publication, The Empire Project. 
23 The purchase of the shares (arranged by Benjamin Disraeli*) from the soon-to-
be bankrupt Khedive of Egypt were worth £4 million (a significant) but not a 
majority interest in the canal. See Martin Lynn, ‘British Policy, Trade, and 
Informal Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century’, in Andrew Porter (ed.), The 
Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume III: The Nineteenth Century 
(Oxford: OUP, 1999: edn, 2001), pp. 102–21.  
24 As quoted in Saul David, Victoria’s Wars: The Rise of Empire (London: 
Penguin, 2007), p. 354. 
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substantial economic interests’.25 Protecting imperial investment, as well as the 
British occupation of Egypt (from 1882), following the army revolt led by Arabi 
Pasha in the previous year, may have highlighted two significant imperial 
thoughts for the young Churchill.26 Firstly, it would have illustrated how 
important it had become to protect British imperial interests in this region. If not 
dealt with swiftly, a revolt could jeopardise British financial investments in the 
Suez Canal and India. Secondly, it would have highlighted the danger that such 
revolts posed to the prestige of the British Empire as a whole.  
Churchill grew up during a period of assertive Victorian imperialism.27 
His burgeoning sense of empire included the need to protect imperial financial 
investment, the importance of maintaining imperial prestige, and swift ‘justice’ 
for colonial subjects who threatened these essential features of the British 
Empire’s success. He became fixated on the notion that the British Raj in India 
was the cornerstone of what was essentially an eastwards-facing empire. British 
rule in India had to be protected—at all costs. In fact, Churchill was so convinced 
                                                 
25 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 
1668–1914 (London: Longman, 1993), p. 369. 
26 Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, ‘The British Occupation of Egypt from 1882’, in 
Porter (ed.), Oxford History of the British Empire: III, pp. 651–64. 
27 The term ‘Victorian’ has acquired various connotations and inflections. Most 
obviously, it refers to the period when Queen Victoria (1819–1901) ruled Britain 
from 1837–1901. The term can be used to infer that someone has an outlook, a 
mentality or viewpoint, which is restricted, old-fashioned and out of date. When 
used in this way it is generally used as a term of derision, of abuse. However if 
someone describes themselves as Victorian, the term denotes a person of strong 
morals and strict beliefs; it takes on a more positive connotation. In Churchill’s 
case he has often been described as essentially the subaltern of the Victorian era, 
most notably when his attitudes towards India are being examined, and especially 
when his attitudes towards race and empire are compared to any of his more 
enlightened contemporaries, such as the attitude of Leo Amery.* In the 1930s 
when Churchill was in his (arguably self-imposed) wilderness, he willingly 
described himself as ‘Victorian’ as it bolstered the imperial image which he was 
fostering. 
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of the need to protect the Raj that he resigned in January 1931 from the 
Conservative Shadow Business Cabinet as he had ‘reached the breaking-point’ in 
his relations with Stanley Baldwin and the majority of the Conservatives over 
this very issue.28 
Churchill’s imperialism was also influenced by some of those great men 
of destiny whom he believed were responsible for the history and future of the 
empire. One such man was his father, Lord Randolph Churchill.* Before helping 
to ‘orchestrate the defeat of Gladstone’s Liberal government’ in 1885, Lord 
Randolph had been one of the few front-bench MPs to visit India.29 When he 
returned to Britain, Lord Randolph informed Parliament that if the British 
Empire wished to secure the future of the Raj then it would have to exert its right 
to rule. If Britain ‘showed the faintest indications of relaxing our grasp’ then the 
Raj, and with it the rest of the Empire, would collapse.30 Fortuitously for Lord 
Randolph, his words proved portentous when in 1885 Russian forces invaded 
Afghan territory at Panjdeh, an oasis south of the Oxus River. The ‘Panjdeh 
incident’ enabled Lord Randolph’s warning to be taken seriously and diplomatic 
negotiations between Britain and Russia were undertaken.31  
Although the young Churchill professed to never having had much 
contact with either of his parents,32 he came to know his father’s thoughts and 
career well after writing Lord Randolph’s biography.33 Even if the two 
Churchills did not discuss their respective concepts of imperialism, or their view 
of the British Raj and its central importance to the rest of the empire, the young 
Churchill was doubtlessly influenced, albeit after his father’s death, by Lord 
                                                 
28 Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 27.  
29 Roland Quinault, ‘Lord Randolph Henry Spencer Churchill (1849–1895)’, 
ODNB (OUP, Sept. 2004; online edn May 2009). 
30 Parl. Debs. (series 3) vol. 292, col. 1540 (4 May 1885). 
31 J. M. Brereton, ‘The Panjdeh Crisis, 1885: Russians and British in Central 
Asia’, History Today, 29/1 (1979), pp. 46–52. 
32 Winston S. Churchill, My Early Life: A Roving Commission (London: 
Thornton Butterworth, 1930), pp. 1–48. 
33 Winston S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill: Volumes I–II (London: 
Macmillan, 1906). 
Chapter II: Churchill’s British Empire 
49 
Randolph. Churchill’s father had been Secretary of State for India in 1885, and 
had stressed the view that India was the centrepiece of the British Empire.34 If 
Britain could not keep hold of India, then the whole of the empire would become 
unstable.35 If Britain were to lose India, it would also lose the corresponding 
prestige and status which three centuries of imperial expansion had engendered 
and Britain would no longer be viewed as a world power. India, and its place 
within the British Empire as a whole, was to become an obsession of Churchill’s 
and the mainstay of his imperialist thinking. 
 Lord Randolph also illustrated that acts of international diplomacy 
certainly had their merits. Lord Dufferin, the Viceroy of India at the time of 
Panjdeh, had held talks with the Russian envoy and the ensuing settlement had 
averted the outbreak of war between Britain and Russia, and had reinforced 
Afghanistan’s convenient role as a geographical and political bulwark against 
any immediate threat to British India from the north-west. Churchill’s pre-
occupation with Russian aggression (and its potential threat to India’s security) 
after the First World War can also be partly attributed to the influence of his 
father. Churchill later acknowledged that, just as his father had used international 
diplomacy to secure India from Russian attack, he too had engaged in 
international diplomacy (in this instance with America) to protect British 
imperial interests in the Pacific. But whilst acknowledging that international 
diplomacy was a necessary measure, Churchill was wary of such acts, not least 
because he believed that the ‘reason for having diplomatic relations is not to 
confer a compliment, but to secure a convenience’.36  
                                                 
34 See Robert F. Foster, Lord Randolph Churchill: A Political Life (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981); and Robert Rhodes James, Lord Randolph Churchill 
(London: Phoenix, 1994). 
35 A sentiment reiterated by Lord Curzon (Viceroy of India, 1898–1905) when he 
stated in 1901 that ‘As long as we rule in India, we are the greatest power in the 
world. If we lose it we shall drop straight away to a third rate power’. Cited by 
Wm. Roger Louis, ‘Introduction’, in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis 
(eds), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV, The Twentieth 
Century (Oxford: OUP, 1999; edn, 2001), p.5. 
36 Hansard, HC (series 5) vol. 469, col. 2225 (17 Nov. 1949). 
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Churchill was similarly influenced by another Victorian imperialist who 
was equally assured of his suitability to rule over imperial territories as his father 
had been—Lord Salisbury.* Michael Bentley’s compelling biography of 
Salisbury highlights the similarity between Salisbury and the young Winston to 
such an extent that the reader has to constantly remind themselves that Salisbury 
and not Churchill is the subject.37 The primary similarities between Salisbury and 
Churchill included their preoccupation with India’s place at the core of the 
Empire, and the theory of racial superiority.38 According to Bentley, Salisbury 
was a parsimonious imperialist. He believed that ‘prudence, not sentiment’ was 
the greatest way to protect the empire.39 Salisbury also saw a clear connection 
between domestic stability and the security of the Empire: he believed that 
‘empire began at home and began, therefore, with the race that made it’.40 
Salisbury’s imperialism had a considerable influence on Churchill and, in turn, 
Churchill gave Salisbury visible support even before Churchill became an MP. In 
one of his first election speeches, made whilst campaigning for election in 
Oldham in 1899,41 Churchill declared that Salisbury’s foreign policy did not 
need vindicating because consolidating the Empire, and strengthening ‘the bonds 
of union between its widely scattered parts’, was a task of which Salisbury was 
                                                 
37 Michael Bentley, Lord Salisbury’s World: Conservative Environments in Late 
Victorian Britain (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), especially chapter 8, ‘The Empire’, 
pp. 220–50. 
38 The point must be made that Churchill was not alone in his concept of racial 
superiority nor, at the turn of the century, was his perception that India was the 
heart of the Empire a solitary view. These were widely held opinions at this time. 
It was, however, Churchill’s obsession with India that separated him from other 
present-minded imperialists. 
39 Bentley, Lord Salisbury’s World, p. 223. 
40 Ibid., p. 222. 
41 Churchill failed to be elected as MP for Oldham in 1899. He succeeded a year 
later (in the so-called Khaki election) after his much publicised escape from a 
Boer prisoner of war camp and was finally elected as the Conservative Unionist 
MP for Oldham on 1 Oct., 1900. 
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clearly capable.42 At the very end of his Early Life, Churchill wrote that the death 
of Lord Salisbury in 1903 led to a phase when ‘much else was to pass away. His 
retirement and death marked the end of an epoch’, as a ‘new century of storm 
and change had already embraced the British Empire in its fierce grip’.43 
Although Churchill’s imperialism, and his staunch belief in the concept of the 
British Empire, remained a prominent consideration, this does not mean that it 
was immutable. He was aware, at the turn of the century, of the change in the 
empire, and of its perception both at home and by other imperial powers.44  
Two other men who had a great effect on Churchill and his imperialism, 
although in very different ways, were Jan Christiaan Smuts and Mohandas 
Karamchand Gandhi. Throughout his life Churchill often relied upon the opinion 
of one of his most loyal friends and confidants, the future prime minister of the 
Union of South Africa—J.C. Smuts. Having passed the bar, Smuts nonetheless 
followed a career in politics. He was appointed Minister of the Interior in the 
South African Republic (in 1898) and soon encountered an Indian lawyer who 
had been sentenced to two years hard labour following a public burning of 
registration certificates that had been issued to Indian immigrants in South 
Africa. Much to Smuts’s chagrin, he had little choice but to negotiate a 
settlement with this Indian lawyer—Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. Smuts’s 
disdain for Gandhi could have influenced Churchill, but Churchill was to develop 
an intense, almost obsessive, hatred of his own for Gandhi. Churchill’s 
frequently-quoted description of Gandhi as ‘a seditious Middle Temple lawyer 
now posing as a fakir of a type well-known in the East’, perfectly illustrates not 
only Churchill’s personal contempt for Gandhi but also his contempt for what the 
                                                 
42 Robert Rhodes James (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 
Volume I: 1897–1908 (New York: Chelsea House, 1974), Churchill election 
address, Oldham, 26 June 1899, p. 34. 
43 Churchill, My Early Life, p. 383. 
44 Churchill’s account of the British Empire, and the Raj, was egocentric in that it 
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Mahatma symbolized.45 This damning indictment came at a time when Churchill 
had resigned himself to the back benches of the Commons, but not even the issue 
of self-government for India could excuse the venom he would later direct 
towards Gandhi during the pivotal year of 1942.  
As Reynolds notes, Churchill made ‘extensive use of his correspondence 
with Smuts’ throughout his memoirs.46 Smuts was a powerful and intelligent 
man who shared the same imperial mind-set as Churchill: both men believed in 
the notion of imperial duty, and to assert their rule over an indigenous population 
(especially when justified as protecting and guiding the vulnerable and weak).47 
Smuts was made a British Field Marshal in 1941, and credited himself with a 
great influence over the military decisions which the British War Cabinet made, 
as well as being on close personal terms with Churchill.48 Undoubtedly the two 
men had a close friendship but this was not the only reason why Churchill relied 
heavily on his correspondence with Smuts in his memoirs.  
Churchill started composing his memoirs in earnest in 1946, at a time 
when Smuts appeared to be ‘in terrific form’ with eyes which were ‘bright blue 
                                                 
45  Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Volume V: Prophet of Truth, 1922–1939 
(London: Heinemann, 1976; Minerva edn, 1990) p. 390. 
46 Reynolds, In Command of History, p. 266.  
47 Smuts was held in high regard by many. When Ernest Bevin heard Smuts had 
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48 See Shula Marks, ‘Smuts, Jan Christiaan (1870–1950)’, ODNB (OUP, 2004; 
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considerable achievements. Also see Ronald Hyam and Ged Martin, ‘The myth 
of the ‘Magnanimous Gesture’: the Liberal government, Smuts and conciliation, 
1906’ in their Reappraisals in British Imperial History (London: Macmillan, 
1975), pp. 167–86, which convincingly argues that Smuts, like Churchill, was 
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as ever with a dancing light in them’.49 Smuts was seen as an international 
statesman who may have visibly aged and had become frail by 1948 (possibly 
due to bereavement), but he nonetheless continued ‘to comment perceptively, 
and on occasion presciently, on world affairs’.50 To some extent, Smuts had 
acted as a sounding-board for Churchill and, along with their respect for each 
other, including this type of correspondence did no harm to Churchill in the post-
war years.51 In fact the correspondence with Smuts, at least that which appeared 
in the memoirs, was used to show how Churchill was not afraid to solicit the 
most senior advice even if he knew he would be disagreed with. Churchill’s 
careful selection of Smuts’s replies gave the impression that at least one of 
Churchill’s influential allies believed in the wartime strength and unity of the 
empire. All this bolstered Churchill’s post-war image as a man who could parley 
with anyone on equal terms—an image Churchill had begun to emphasise at 
Fulton in 1946.  
Whereas Smuts’s notion of imperial protection for the weak and 
vulnerable was directed at the black South African population, Churchill was 
concerned with the Indian population. The idea that Britain’s non-white imperial 
subjects, especially the Indians, would one day demand and control European-
like institutions within their own country was anathema to Churchill. As Amery 
would later comment, ‘India, or any form of self-government for coloured 
peoples’ raised ‘a wholly uncontrollable complex’ in Churchill.52 One example 
of the truthfulness behind Amery’s observation occurred whilst Churchill was on 
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one of his many breaks from the ennui of his life in the British Army in India.53 
Churchill attended a luncheon party in London in 1899 where intellectual 
exercises were the entertainment and he was most intrigued with the question as 
to whether ‘peoples have a right to self government or only to good 
government’.54 Churchill favoured the latter. It was during his time in India that 
Churchill’s concept of the British Raj became fixed and immutable as opposed to 
his pragmatic and comparatively fluid concept of the rest of the British Empire. 
His impressions of India merged with the various influences he had encountered 
in his youth in Britain; and his attitude towards India, the Indian population in 
general, and the Indian Army took the form it would do throughout his life.  
By the time Churchill left India for good in 1899, his definition of 
imperialism, and his belief that India was the cornerstone of the British Empire, 
had become fixed. As long as India remained at the heart of the British Empire 
and under direct control, then the rest of the Empire could, and would, change, 
without loss of prestige, investment or power. He returned to Britain with the aim 
of entering Parliament, secure in the knowledge that there ‘was pride in the broad 
crimson stretches on the map of the globe which marked the span of the British 
Empire, and confidence in the Royal Navy’s command of the Seven Seas’.55 The 
seminal importance of a superior Navy was a recurring theme of Churchill’s 
earliest speeches, and continued to be an influential part of his imperialism. He 
later wrote that although Britain ‘might not have been allowed to escape from her 
colonial war’ against the Boers ‘with an easy victory’, it had been ‘her dominion 
of the seas’ that had ‘caused second thoughts’.56 From his first official political 
speech, addressed to a meeting of the Primrose League in 1897, Churchill 
highlighted the connection between a superior Navy and a strong British 
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Empire.57 He proudly declared that ‘our determination is to uphold the Empire 
that we have inherited from our fathers as Englishmen’, that the British flag 
would ‘fly high upon the sea’, and that the ‘voice’ of the empire would ‘be heard 
in the Councils of Europe’, so that Britain would continue to ‘carry out our 
mission of bearing peace, civilisation and good government to the uttermost ends 
of the earth’.58 
Under the Liberal Prime Minister Henry Campbell-Bannerman,* and 
before contesting (and then winning) the Liberal seat in North-West Manchester 
in 1905, Churchill was appointed as Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the 
Colonial Office. Working under the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, Lord 
Elgin,* Churchill was responsible for handling colonial affairs in the 
Commons.59   
Upon entering the Colonial Office, both men were immediately 
confronted with the problems of the South African settlement (in the form of 
establishing a constitution for the Transvaal), and of the repatriation from South 
Africa of Chinese labour. Churchill deliberated most over the question of the 
Transvaal constitution, and his proposal (masterminded by Elgin) was for self-
government. Churchill’s approach to the constitution of South Africa was 
described by Hyam as ‘a classic statement of the Victorian and Edwardian ruling 
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elite, the principle of timely concession to retain an ultimate control’.60 Indeed, 
but it nonetheless illustrates the way in which Churchill always attempted to look 
at the bigger picture when he was playing some part in imperial affairs—
especially when the security, future, or status of the British Empire was called 
into question. Churchill’s notion of racial superiority informed his approach to 
the South African constitution question (that self-government was applicable to 
the Transvaal but certainly not India). He would have seen self-government for 
the Transvaal as a natural progression – the Boers were, after all, of white Dutch 
descent – and he declared that the act of conferring self-government was a ‘gift’ 
from Britain.61 As long as the overall security of Imperial interests was not 
threatened, it was the ‘magnanimous’ option to take.62 Although his speech to the 
Commons on 31 July 1906 was poorly received (most Conservative members of 
the House had yet to forgive him for crossing the floor), the Transvaal 
constitution was passed, and self-government was granted five months later in 
December 1906. 
Hyam suggests that Churchill’s ‘interest in the empire never fully 
absorbed him entirely’ at the Colonial Office, and it ‘may indeed have been very 
nearly exhausted by it’.63 This is possibly too harsh a judgement on Churchill’s 
mercurial mind. His deep-seated beliefs in the ‘holy trinity’ of empire would not 
have vanished; they simply receded whilst other, more pressing, ministerial 
responsibilities took precedence. Having dealt with the most urgent imperial 
matter (the Transvaal constitution), Churchill once again stepped back to survey 
the bigger imperial picture. His ability to see the overall picture did not decline. 
Nor did it exhaust him. But it was, at times, superseded by whatever matter his 
current ministerial post required. Rather than Churchill being exhausted by his 
post as Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, it is perhaps more appropriate to 
suggest that the experience reinforced his belief in the ‘holy trinity’ of the British 
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Empire. Without domestic stability, without free trade, and without naval 
supremacy, the associated imperial prestige of the British Empire could be 
threatened.  
In April 1908 after Campbell-Bannerman’s resignation, Churchill’s 
position at the Colonial Office came to an end when he was transferred into the 
Cabinet as President of the Board of Trade. Here, his brand of social liberalism 
came to the fore as David Lloyd George,* the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
encouraged him to improve social policy through trade reforms.64 In light of the 
influence that Lord Salisbury had on Churchill, his time at the Board of Trade is 
relevant to the discussion of his imperialism because it illustrates how Churchill 
realised that, since ‘empire began at home’,65 domestic policies should be a 
splendid example of the justice-for-the-vulnerable genre of imperial philosophy 
in which he had engaged during his first position in the Colonial Office—except 
that it was now aimed at Britain’s domestic workforce.66 Paul Addison 
concluded that although ‘Churchill’s impact ought not to be exaggerated’, he was 
nonetheless ‘a dynamic force who arrived at the Board of Trade with a strong 
commitment to reform’.67 Addison acknowledges that the poor physical 
condition of the British troops at the start of the Boer War had been a result of 
poverty, of poor domestic, social and economic conditions. Yet Addison fails to 
link the ‘almost commonplace’ view that domestic ‘poverty was a threat to the 
Empire’, with why Churchill became so enamoured with social reform.68 For 
Churchill, domestic social reform was paramount as it invariably led to an 
increase in domestic stability which, he believed, was an essential element to the 
bigger imperial picture. Churchill reasoned that one way to bolster the image and 
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standing of the empire was if its British troops were of a good physical 
condition—a justification Churchill had previously used in an article he had 
written for the Daily Mail.69    
But social reform (which included the introduction of statutory minimum 
wages, government-funded labour exchanges and compulsory unemployment 
insurance) proved expensive and led to a contradiction for Churchill and his 
imperial philosophy: in order to provide Britain with these social reforms 
Churchill, along with his radical mentor Lloyd George, demanded reductions in 
the naval estimates for 1909. How did Churchill reconcile his recently 
reinvigorated desire for domestic social reform at the expense of his belief in a 
strong navy? This conundrum did not go unnoticed. Even Sir John Fisher, the 
First Sea Lord, and a stalwart supporter of Churchill’s veneration for the 
Admiralty (which in 1909 was in crisis over the apparent rate of German and 
Japanese naval expansionism), confessed to Churchill that he ‘never expected’ 
him ‘to turn against the Navy’ after everything Churchill ‘had said in ‘public and 
private’.70 But once again, Churchill looked at the bigger imperial picture, and 
concentrated on the job at hand.71 After all, if he could succeed at the Board of 
Trade his next ministerial post might be more suited to his imperial philosophy 
and involve more direct involvement in imperial affairs.  
After Asquith had won the general election of January 1910, Churchill 
became Home Secretary but his reputation as rash and eager for action marred 
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any subsequent achievements.72 His much-maligned role in ‘all the stale old 
things—Sidney St., Tonypandy and the Dartmoor Shepherd’ did little to enhance 
his already precarious reputation within the Commons.73 To have unrest in the 
mother country was symptomatic of an unstable empire. If the parent could not 
control its own child, then it would be less likely to control its faraway foster 
children. As President of the Board of Trade, Churchill’s concerted efforts had 
been to improve the prestige of the British at home, because domestic instability 
would reflect poorly in the imperial mirror. He was no less concerned with 
imperial prestige during his tenure as Home Secretary, as he was with his belief 
in the duty Britain had towards the weak and vulnerable. Addison correctly 
surmises that Churchill’s time as Home Secretary ‘exemplified the kind of 
liberalism that was most in harmony with his personality: the extension of mercy 
to the weak and powerless’.74 Addison, however, fails to see the link between 
this belief in justice for the vulnerable with Churchill’s overall imperialism. 
Addison also noted that Churchill’s sense of ‘paternalism was never to disappear 
from his politics’ although his radicalism did.75 Churchill’s sense of paternalism 
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would not fade as it was inextricably linked, in Churchill’s mind, to his notion of 
imperial duty.  
Churchill’s radicalism began to wane by October 1911 as his promotion 
to First Lord of the Admiralty meant that as he was in a position to directly 
influence imperial policy and strategy, he no longer needed to wear a radical 
overcoat. Perhaps this is too cynical a view of Churchill’s political career but he 
was a man who would happily ‘rat’, then ‘re-rat’, in order to maintain his own 
position, if not at the helm then at least, at the periphery of imperial policy.76 
After all, in what can be described as a Machiavellian manoeuvre, Churchill 
highlighted how au fait he was with the possible consequences of the Agadir 
Crisis;77 and this blatant self-promotion led Asquith not only to invite Churchill 
to attend the secret Committee of Imperial Defence meeting of 23 August 1911 
but also, given his recent and accurate predictions over German naval and 
military strategy, to send Churchill to the Admiralty. Asquith wrote that he was 
‘satisfied that Churchill’ was the ‘right man’ to go to the Admiralty.78 Indeed he 
was, as Churchill could finally concentrate on the mainstay of his imperial ‘holy 
trinity’—a superior Navy. 
Before Churchill’s appointment to the Admiralty, Edwardian concerns as 
to the longevity of the Empire had begun to be murmured within the corridors of 
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Whitehall. When Churchill had been Under-Secretary for the Colonies, he had 
been aware of these barely-audible fears but he hoped that such a disparaging 
view of the empire would melt away as his actions, or so he thought, would have 
helped restore the empire’s equilibrium. In Churchill’s mind, those who 
subscribed to the ‘weary Titan’79 view of the British Empire were mistaken.80 
Instead, Churchill saw the British Empire as ‘a strong young giant, flushed with 
the pride of victory’.81 But the nagging doubt remained: in the event of a war in 
Europe, would the Navy be able to protect Britain’s own coast as well as all of its 
imperial shores? In reaction to the disastrous Dardanelles campaign, Churchill 
was removed from the Admiralty in May 1915 and made Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster.82 The fact that Churchill had been removed from the 
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Admiralty and given a minimal post led him to fall on his political sword and he 
resigned from the government in October 1915. These were severe blows to his 
ability to influence imperial policy and strategy. Churchill would later reflect that 
his initial years as First Sea Lord were ‘the four most memorable years’ of his 
life,83 but the combination of his part in the Dardanelles campaign, the long-
lasting Conservative memory of him having crossed the floor, and his 
resignation, meant he was effectively out of office.84  
Following a one-hundred-day stint at the front in the winter of 1916, 
Churchill resigned his commission. He was excluded from further office until 
Lloyd George appointed him Minister of Munitions on 17 July 1917. The end of 
the war ensured the end of Churchill’s latest Ministerial post, but the general 
election of December 1918 saw Churchill continue to hold his Dundee seat. He 
was later awarded the newly-created post of Secretary for Air and War (a post he 
held from 10 January 1919 till 13 February 1921). Although not generally 
considered to be a post from which he would be able to directly influence 
imperial policy, this did not stop Churchill from doing so. An example of his 
attempts to influence Imperial policy is set down in a note he sent to the 
Committee of Imperial Defence, dated 13 February 1921, in which he wanted to 
disassociate himself with Admiral Richmond’s evidence regarding the question 
of Capital ships in the Navy. Churchill concluded that  
 
I do not at all admit that we are unable to maintain British 
sea power. On the contrary, I am confident that the nation 
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has both the means and the will to do so and that it is our 
duty to make every sacrifice for that purpose.85 
 
After a three-year hiatus, Churchill, as Minister for War and Air, was able to 
return to promoting and protecting the British Empire at all costs.  
The collapse of Tsarist Russia sent shivers down Churchill’s imperial 
spine. Whilst he feared that Bolshevism would spread into the rest of Europe, 
especially Germany, his immediate concern was the geographical proximity of 
Russia to India where the growing incidences of Indian nationalist unrest would 
take little encouragement to ignite. The hardships which the Indian troops had 
endured in the name of loyalty to the King and Empire contributed to the 
increase of localised incidences of Indian nationalism.86 In order to gain India’s 
wholehearted cooperation in the First World War, Britain had dangled the 
tantalising carrot of partial self-government in front of India (the Montagu 
Declaration of 1917), and said that it would be considered after the Great War.87 
One result of the Rowlatt Commission of 1918 was the Rowlatt Acts, passed in 
March 1919. These acts were a direct result of the Raj’s fear of the growing 
number of violent expressions of political unrest by Indian nationalists and, 
arguably, General Dyer’s barbaric actions in the Jallianwallah Bagh at Amritsar 
(on 13 April 1919) were symptomatic of the Raj’s fear of the growing incidences 
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of Indian nationalism.88 Although Churchill would later be called upon to justify 
the Government’s reluctance to hardly punish Dyer, it was a task which 
Churchill turned to his advantage as he used it to illustrate the empire’s duty 
towards the weak and vulnerable. However Churchill was considerably more 
fearful of Bolshevism spreading into India, and causing further anti-Raj unrest. 
Preoccupied with the security of the empire as a whole he focused on the 
supposed Russian threat.  
Churchill described the Bolshevik leaders as ‘a selfish blundering crew of 
tyrants and parasites who descended upon an unhappy land and enslaved or 
slaughtered its people, soiled its honour, [and] ruined its prosperity’.89 Not 
wishing India to be infected by such ‘parasites’, as well as wishing to protect 
British investments in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (of which the British 
government had purchased 51 per cent of the stock on Churchill’s initiative), 
Churchill argued that instead of withdrawing British troops, who had remained in 
Russia since the cessation of hostilities, they should merely be transferred to 
Russia to ‘keep alive the Russian forces which were attempting to make headway 
against the Bolsheviks’.90 If Bolshevism were to spread, Churchill feared that the 
resulting Bolshevik Empire would undoubtedly pose a threat to British imperial 
interests in the Middle and Far East. But much like its European neighbours, both 
the vanquished and the victorious, Britain had been virtually bankrupted by the 
Great War and, in 1919, Churchill was faced with a dilemma.91 Demobilisation 
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had to be carried out, but this would mean limited troops (as well as limited 
funding for existing troops) available for policing the empire, especially east of 
Suez. His boundless energy, and his constant efforts to resolve the perceived 
Bolshevik menace, to his own satisfaction, also placed a strain on those who had 
to work with him. (Churchill was not the only Cabinet member, or MP, to 
acknowledge the Bolshevik threat to the British Empire, but his was the loudest 
and most constant of the anti-Bolshevik voices).92  After two years of constant 
pushing about Russia, he received the Cabinet’s definitive answer which came in 
the form of Lloyd George swiftly ‘looking to move Churchill to a post where he 
could cause less trouble, not more’—the Colonial Office.93  
Always looking at the bigger Imperial picture, Churchill accepted the 
post of Colonial Secretary as he felt that it was his ‘duty to comply’.94 However, 
in his acceptance letter, he asked for the ‘power & the means of coping with the 
very difficult situation in the Middle East’.95 Not having even started his post, 
Churchill was already asking that his remit be more than any previous Colonial 
Secretary. This was the first, but definitely not the last, time that Churchill asked 
for the tools to finish the job. After nearly two months, and on the day before he 
officially started, he wrote that, ‘for a week I shall hold the seals of three separate 
Secretaryships of State—I expect a record’.96 As he was already the Minister for 
War and Air, Churchill was au fait with Mesopotamian, Persian and Egyptian 
matters when he transferred to the Colonial Office, and the enthusiasm he had for 
his new post matched his eagerness to protect the Empire. It has been suggested 
that it was this second stint at the Colonial Office that ‘exhausted’ Churchill’s 
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interest in the Empire.97 It has also been suggested that his second Colonial 
Office post was a ‘stop-gap’ as he eagerly eyed the post of Chancellor of the 
Exchequer.98 This research argues that this second period at the Colonial Office 
was not an exhausting stop-gap; this post enabled Churchill to not only deal 
directly with problems that affected the security of the Empire, but also to survey 
the empire, especially east of Suez, for signs of weakness. This turn of events 
compelled him to review his concept of the extent, but never the power or status, 
of the British Empire and he set about his duties with gusto.99 
Even though Churchill was Secretary of State for the Colonies for a 
relatively brief period of time, he still managed to accomplish as much as he 
could to fortify the status and prestige of the British Empire on the world 
stage.100 His vision of a British Empire, that had India (its jewel at the centre) 
protected, stable and bordered by British interests, was once again under threat. 
The development of anti-Bolshevik regimes in countries that bordered Russia 
was encouraged by Churchill but, as Minister for War and Air, he had less direct 
influence on imperial policy and strategy than he would have liked. But this was 
to change because as Secretary of the Colonies Churchill could now not only 
openly take part in Imperial defence, policy and strategy, but he could also direct 
it.  
The British military authorities, having conquered most of Mesopotamia 
during the First World War, continued to oversee the administration of the 
country.101 The British administration was replaced, in 1920, by an Iraqi Council 
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of State but it was still under the supervision of the British military authorities. In 
1921, Iraq became a Kingdom but the British remained as the League of Nations 
had conferred the mandate to the British in 1920.102 Speaking on his proposed 
Middle East settlement to the House of Commons, Churchill declared that the 
British government, as a result of the acceptance of the Peace Treaties had 
entered into obligations which were ‘solemnly accepted before the whole 
world’.103 Holding the mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia meant that 
Britain, having accepted this ‘serious responsibility,’ was duty bound ‘to behave 
in a sober and honourable manner’, and to ‘discharge obligations’ which Britain 
had entered into with her ‘eyes open’.104 Once again, for Churchill, duty was part 
and parcel of imperial responsibility. Britain may have been one of the victors at 
the end of the ‘agony of the Great War,’ but this did not negate the obligations 
she had made along the march to victory.105 Throughout this speech, Churchill 
constantly referred to both the duty that the British government had towards the 
mandates, and the cost. He emphasised that reductions in expense, mainly 
through a large-scale demobilisation programme had been made and that, 
although he hoped not to demand ‘further sacrifices from the British taxpayer’, 
the current government situation (and their financial resources) would enable 
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then to ‘discharge’ their ‘obligations’.106 However, Churchill also temptingly 
acknowledged that the obligations of the British government to the mandates in 
Palestine and Mesopotamia were not ‘unlimited’.107 In other words, if the 
Mandates rewarded the British government in that they either bolstered the 
prestige and power of the British Empire upon the world political stage, then they 
would be maintained.  
Churchill declared that his ‘very simple’ aim for the Cairo Conference of 
March 1921 had been to bring together the British Empire’s ‘civil, military, and 
air’ authorities who, alongside Arab delegates, would establish ‘an independent 
native Arab state ... under an Arab King’ in Mesopotamia, whilst incurring as 
little expense as possible.108 Churchill arrived two days before the start of the 
conference so that he could get the assurance that airpower ‘could transform the 
military situation in Mesopotamia’ and save ‘serious millions’.109 Churchill’s 
parsimonious attitude came from his time as Minister of War and Air (January 
1919 to February 1921), when demobilisation had been his primary objective. He 
continued his belt tightening as Secretary of State for the Colonies—a position he 
accepted a month before the Cairo Conference was due to start.110 Minimising 
the cost of policing this new addition to Britain’s imperial duties (although 
Mesopotamia was a mandate and not a direct imperial territory) was Churchill’s 
preoccupation.111 In fact, instead of the aggrandisement of British imperial 
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responsibility in the aftermath of the Great War, Churchill had hoped that 
imperial stability would arise from investing into the ‘enormous estates of 
immense potential value which we have pitifully neglected’.112 
Policing Mesopotamia through air power would have repercussions for 
the British Empire as a whole—especially its territories which were east of 
Suez.113 As a method of imperial protection, as well as control over its more 
troublesome colonial subjects, air power lent more gravitas to the empire’s 
prestige and authority. Churchill lauded air power’s role in imperial defence as 
one which gave the empire the ability to negotiate from a position of strength 
and, even if ‘a satisfactory solution’ to any kind of confrontation was not 
immediately apparent, the empire would at least be able to ‘maintain a parley’.114 
For Churchill, the Cairo Conference of March 1921 was about saving money 
whilst bolstering the empire’s prestige and power—to imperial rivals as well as 
its more troublesome subjects.115 But there were limits to substituting naval for 
air power,116 a point which later became obvious when Churchill was Chancellor 
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of the Exchequer—no matter what combination of air and naval strength was 
deployed, imperial power and prestige became weaker the further east one 
travelled.117 
Later in 1921, and still being parsimonious, Churchill wrote down his 
thoughts on the possible renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and circulated 
the memorandum to the Cabinet. He wrote that the ‘danger to be guarded 
against’ in the Far East was ‘the danger from Japan’.118 Antagonising either 
Japan or America was likely with whichever power Britain allied itself, but 
Churchill pointed out that: 
 
In balancing between relying on Japan or relying on 
America, it is important to trace the consequences in 
naval armaments. If we rest ourselves upon the United 
States and establish a great unity of interest with them, 
Japan is so hopelessly outmatched that there can be no 
war, and the rivalries in armaments which are the 
precursors of war would have no purpose. The 
combatants will be too unequal for the question ever to 
arise.119 
 
Churchill’s imperial mindset led him to believe that although Japan was not to be 
trusted, Japan was not a potential threat if Britain allied itself with its English-
speaking transatlantic neighbour—America. Yet in his memoirs, and when 
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taking into account post-war sensibilities as the next chapter illustrates, Churchill 
did not advance this argument at all. He wrote that he had always applauded the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance, and that he had regretted how it had been allowed to 
lapse. Churchill portrayed the advent of war in the Far East as having been the 
result of the failures of American economic policies and American diplomatic 
relations. According to Churchill’s narrative of the long road to Pearl Harbor, the 
British Empire had not antagonised Japan. Churchill’s ‘constant & persistent 
interference’ in imperial matters did not go unnoticed.120 Losing his electoral seat 
in November 1922 meant that Churchill could no longer influence imperial 
affairs. However, after being re-adopted by the Conservatives (so as not to oust 
their own candidate) and being made Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1924 his 
influence on imperial matters increased exponentially. 
Churchill was not the best keeper of the nation’s purse.121 His return to 
the Gold Standard damaged British export industry, and this partly precipitated 
the General Strike of 1926.122 Domestic stability was one of the three main tenets 
of his imperialism as a strong home economy, a superior (or at least equal) fleet, 
and strong international trade provided the British Empire with an aura of power 
and prestige. After all, confidence breeds confidence. Yet it could be argued that 
it was as Chancellor of the Exchequer that Churchill did the most damage to the 
British Empire in the Far East—when he refused to increase the Admiralty’s 
budget for the further development of the Singapore naval base.123 Churchill 
exclaimed: 
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A war with Japan! But why should there be a war with 
Japan? I do not believe there is the slightest chance of it 
in our lifetime.124 
  
Churchill was not aware of the potential threat Japan posed to the British Empire 
in the Far East at the time: he simply thought that war would not happen as no 
boy would take on two giants.125 Instead, Churchill implied that if there appeared 
to be no enemy to Britain in home waters (Germany had been temporarily 
defeated and was being economically punished in the post-Versailles Treaty era), 
and should the British fleet be needed as far afield as Singapore, Hong Kong, 
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Australia, or New Zealand, it would not be a hardship to let the fleet go and 
defend the honour of the empire. 
Churchill’s logic was based on the premise, as one historian has noted, 
that ‘Japan would be accommodating enough to mount its challenge at a moment 
when the U.K. was free to respond’.126 Although Churchill was not wholly 
successful in ‘killing the idea’ of the base at Singapore,127 his parsimonious 
arguments did create a lull in the expansion of what was known as the ‘Singapore 
Strategy’.128 To simply reflect that it was Churchill’s awareness of how he had to 
budget carefully with the Treasury’s shallow post-First World War pockets, 
negates his underlying influence and motivation—his imperialism. Keeping tight 
control over Admiralty budgets (or any unnecessary expense in the Treasury’s 
eyes) was one way in which Churchill attempted to re-stabilise the domestic 
budget which would, in turn, help shore up the empire itself. In mid-1921, 
Churchill’s concern over troop budgets had led him to investigate the significant 
role air power could play in imperial territories in the Middle East. But when he 
was Chancellor, Churchill had reverted to advocating the importance of a 
superior navy as the spearhead of the British Empire’s force (even if he was not 
prepared to bankroll it). Perhaps this was a missed opportunity in the Far East. 
At the annual dinner for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on 19 July 
1928, Churchill spoke to the collected audience which comprised of the Directors 
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of the Bank of England, as well as Bankers and Merchants from the City of 
London. As Chancellor, Churchill said, his last four years had been an ‘uphill’ 
struggle.129 He claimed that he had made important economic reductions, 
especially ‘in the sphere of armaments’ which were ‘conceived on a scale almost 
incredibly modest compared with the world-wide responsibility of Britain’.130 He 
had provided for old-age pensions, widows’ pensions and ‘improved public 
services’.131 And by doing so had kept true to his own particular brand of 
imperialism, as he knew that empire—its strength, prestige and ultimately its 
security—began at home. At the same dinner, Churchill said that, 
 
I am inclined to think that when the history of the 
difficult post-War period is written the decision which led 
to the resumption of the gold standard will be found to 
have played a definite part in the consolidation of the 
financial strength and even leadership of the country.132  
 
Ironically, it was Churchill who would write one of the first, and most 
authoritative, histories of the post-War period.133  
The general election of June 1929 saw Ramsay MacDonald* elected as 
Prime Minister, with a narrow Labour majority, and the end of Churchill’s time 
as Chancellor. Less than six months later, Churchill’s vision of India was to be 
tested to its limit. The Irwin Declaration of October 1929, named after Lord 
Irwin the Viceroy of India from 1926 to 1931, reinforced the probability that 
India would, at some point in the future, be eventually granted self-government. 
As a subaltern, and whilst stationed in Bangalore, Churchill had become sick 
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with a fever—an ‘Indian fever’ which, his mother had warned, was ‘very 
difficult to get rid of’.134 Churchill was never able to shake off his ‘Indian fever’ 
and, along with his ‘curious complex about India’, he offered his resignation 
from Baldwin’s Shadow Business Committee in January 1931.135 Perhaps 
Churchill was hoping that his political bluff would not be called. After all, it was 
a tactic that his father (as well as a handful of other Victorian politicians) had 
used.136 But the world of politics had changed and, in 1931, as Churchill was still 
distrusted by his fellow Conservatives his resignation was accepted. Churchill 
may have reached what he called his ‘breaking-point’ with Baldwin (and the 
Conservative support for the National government’s pursuit of the India Bill),137 
but his Victorian imperialism, and his persistent and dogged attitude to India, and 
its importance to him, increased. 
There was a marked difference between what Churchill uttered in public 
and what he said in private. One example was the imposition of taxes on non-
imperial foodstuffs which was spawned by the protectionism of the Ottawa 
agreements of 1932. Churchill, albeit grudgingly, accepted the move as 
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governmental policy in public yet in private he referred to it as ‘Rottowa’.138 
Churchill’s decision to ‘swallow his distaste in public amounted to a realistic 
acknowledgement that he could not fight the National Government on all fronts 
at once’.139 Churchill brought this pragmatism, this realistic view of the 
constantly evolving nature of the British Empire to bear during his time as Prime 
Minister of the wartime coalition government from May 1940. But this 
pragmatism did not extend to India. There was a distinct separation in 
Churchill’s mind between the British Raj and the rest of the British Empire and it 
was this stumbling block which he found so difficult to deal with when 
recounting the miseries which affected the wartime empire situated east of Suez. 
Within the first three decades of his political career, Churchill remained 
loyal to two things: his own career rather than party politics, and to the British 
Empire. The young Winston may have been intoxicated with the ‘heady 
imperialism of the 1890s’,140 but he was sober when it came to 1931. His 
frustration reached its peak in January 1931, the same year that Japan invaded 
Manchuria. Following his resignation, Churchill not only engendered his image 
as an unrepentant, unreconstructed, Victorian imperialist but also exploited it. As 
time away from the front benches and his increasing lack of popularity in the 
early to mid 1930s continued, his literary output increased. Not content with 
grinding his anti-Indian self-government axe in the national press, Churchill 
accepted a proposal for another voluminous history in December 1932. He 
gathered together a syndicate of researchers (albeit a very loose one) in early 
1933 in order to start the research for his A History of the English-Speaking 
Peoples.141 Its subject matter, the growth and superiority of democratic 
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Parliamentary systems, left little to the imagination as to its author’s preference 
(he was steeped in the Whig tradition), but it also reiterated how such similarities 
between democracies in Britain and America led to ties closer than a mere 
common language. Already Churchill’s imperial rhetoric was showing signs of, 
if not weakening, then definitely changing tack.  
Realising he was losing the battle over the proposed India Act, his 
outpourings against Indian self-government certainly lessened towards the end of 
1934, and he scrambled to find another cause to champion. Unfortunately he 
settled on the abdication question, which swiftly became a crisis. In the 1930s – 
out of power, out of favour and outside any sphere of influence – Churchill was 
trying to foster a special relationship between America and Britain. To claim he 
was doing so out of a prophetic sense of what was to befall the British Empire in 
the Far East is to give Churchill far more credit than he deserves. After all, he 
continually derided the Japanese, saying that they were not capable of even being 
a threat. However, the first attempts to cement this tentative relationship were 
being written by Churchill, and his fledgling syndicate, in 1933. His imperial 
rhetoric was changing to an Anglo-American rhetoric especially as his 
unpopularity increased as soon as the word ‘India’ left his lips.  
Churchill would ‘stamp his foot and fulminate’ on imperial issues, 
especially when the wartime British Empire was under verbal attack from 
Roosevelt.142 But perhaps this intense reaction was done not only to divert 
attention away from how vulnerable the British Empire in the Far East had 
become, but also because Churchill had been aware of its weakness since 1912. 
In an undated memorandum when he was First Sea Lord,  Churchill had written 
that if Britain’s naval power collapsed, the only option would be to ‘seek the 
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protection of the United States’.143 By the end of December 1941, the battle for 
Hong Kong had been lost. By mid-February 1942, the fortress at Singapore had 
fallen. By March 1942, American anti-imperialist sentiment was far more vocal 
than Churchill had thought it would become as the ramifications of the Atlantic 
Charter of August 1941 became clear. Churchill was forced to mollify American 
demands for an attempt to broker a political deal with Congress leaders in India, 
whilst pacifying the British Left, by sending Cripps on his Mission to India. 
Little wonder that the man who had resigned from the front benches in January 
1931 felt compelled, a little over a decade later in November 1942, to remind the 
empire’s subjects, allies and enemies that the British Empire was still a force to 
be reckoned with. Yet when it came to his memoirs, the endemic and irreversible 
weakness of the British Empire in the Far East could not be revealed without 
awkward questions being asked about Churchill’s relationship to the empire—or 
Commonwealth. Churchill’s experience and assumptions about the British 
Empire and India informed his reactions to the wartime imperial crises which 
confronted him, and his post-war and post-independence portrayal of the war in 
the Far East.   
Within a few months of Churchill having resigned from Baldwin’s 
Shadow Business Cabinet, he asked his friend and confidant, Professor Frederick 
Lindemann (later Lord Cherwell), to summarise and draw conclusions from the 
Indian Franchise Committee report, which was created in order to submit 
proposals on the enfranchisement of the Indian population. The ‘Prof’, as 
Lindemann was affectionately known to Churchill, duly did as he was asked and 
reported that the ‘blunder’ of the committee was ‘in the terms of reference’ they 
had used ‘rather than in the way they were implemented’.144 Apart from the 
inability of the candidates to keep their electorates informed (due to the vast 
geography of India and the inability to provide inexpensive wireless equipment 
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to the remotest Indian villages),145 Lindemann believed that there was ‘no major 
issue upon which it would be easy to challenge the proposals of the 
Committee’.146 But it was the conclusion Lindemann drew which was startling: 
 
It is pathetic to see these same dictators selecting this 
very moment of acute danger to impose the blessings of a 
democratic constitution, which has failed even on a small 
scale in the educated West, upon a congerie of 340 
million illiterate human beings born of innumerable 
races, speaking hundreds of tongues, torn by traditional 
hatreds and rent by religious differences, who have 
fought and massacred one another since the dawn of 
history and whose rancour and suspicion only await the 
removal of the impartial rule of Britain to burst once 
more into a consuming orgy of murder and blood.147 
 
This was the sentiment which Churchill evoked time and again when India was 
under a further period of ‘acute danger’—1942.  
When reminiscing about the way in which the state of India had been 
described before the Mutiny of 1857, Churchill’s father, Lord Randolph said that 
‘our Government in India’ had been a ‘most magnificent machine; but it lived on 
nothing but character and credit.148 What little ‘character and credit’ the British 
Empire had, not only in the empire as a whole but essentially in India, at its core, 
had steadily eroded since the end of the First World War. It was not that 
Churchill wanted to hide how he had in fact been powerless to prevent this 
erosion. What he had to hide in his memoirs was the way in which he had 
                                                 
145 CHAR 2/189/87: Lindemann report to Churchill on the Indian Franchise 
Committee, c. June 1932. 
146 CHAR 2/189/88: Lindemann report to Churchill on the Indian Franchise 
Committee, c. June 1932. 
147 CHAR 2/189/89–90: Lindemann report (conclusion) to Churchill on the 
Indian Franchise Committee, c. June 1932. 
148 Parl. Debs. (series 3) vol. 292, col. 1540 (4 May 1885). 
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contributed to, if not at times, led the erosion. To have included his defiant 
declaration of November 1942 would have meant admitting that Britain was no 
longer a great imperial power, and that, since the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor, his imperialism had been pure rhetoric and he had paid nothing but lip 
service to both the empire and American anti-imperialist sensibilities. As 
Churchill wanted the opportunity to work alongside American post-war strategy, 
in his capacity as Prime Minister of a peacetime Britain, his imperialism had to 
be toned down or even muted. After all, in March 1946, he had declared to the 
world that ‘if the Western democracies stand together ... no one is likely to 
molest them. If however they become divided or falter in their duty ... 
catastrophe may well overcome us all’.149 He succeeded in this by glancing as 
infrequently eastwards in his memoirs as his narrative would allow. Without 
Churchill, the empire would still have crumbled, but his part in its downfall 
needed to be glossed over, if not ignored. The idea that the British Empire was in 
rude health at the same time as Churchill was born, and the empire’s health 
began to fail when Churchill’s did, is an intriguing coincidence.  
 
                                                 
149 Robert Rhodes James (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 
1987–1963, Volume VII, 1943–1949 (New York: Chelsea House, 1974), 
Churchill, ‘The Sinews of Peace’, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, 5 Mar. 
1946, p. 7292. 
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Illustration II 
 
 
 
As two soldiers look out across the White Cliff of Dover, one turns to the other 
and says: ‘So our poor empire is alone in the world’. His mate replies, 
‘Aye, we are—the whole five hundred million of us’. 
Fougasse, Punch, 17 July 1940. 
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Chapter III: Churchill’s Portrayal of the Advent of War with Japan 
 
There was a veil over my mind about the Japanese 
War. All the proportions were hidden in mist.1 
 
The ‘veil’ over Churchill’s mind about the possibility of war with Japan was 
lifted by the ‘supreme world event’2 of the Japanese attack on the American 
naval base at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.3 Churchill found this ‘felon 
blow’4 very significant—although ‘the mastery of the Pacific had passed into 
Japanese hands,’5 America was now officially in the war.6 The Anglo-American 
alliance, the special relationship which he had nurtured for so long, could finally 
be formally declared and acknowledged the world over. It had arguably been a 
                                                 
1 DEKE 1: Reader Correspondence: Denis Kelly, quoting Churchill, to Martin 
Gilbert, 11 Oct. 1988. 
2 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume III, The Grand Alliance 
(London: Cassell, 1950), p. 538. 
3 The attack on Pearl Harbor continues to be extensively researched. The best 
accounts are: Akira Iriye, Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War: A 
Brief History with Documents and Essays (Boston, USA: Bedford, 1999); 
William Bruce Johnson, The Pacific Campaign in World War II: From Pearl 
Harbor to Guadalcanal (London: Routledge, 2006); Ronald H. Spector, Eagle 
Against the Sun: The American War with Japan (London: Viking, 1984); Iguchi 
Takeo, Demystifying Pearl Harbor: A New Perspective from Japan (Tokyo: 
International House of Japan, 2010); and John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and 
its Aftermath (London: Methuen, 1982).  
4 Churchill, BBC broadcast, London, 13 May 1945 in David Cannadine (ed.), 
The Speeches of Winston Churchill (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 262. 
5 Churchill, Grand Alliance, p. 545. 
6 America and Britain both declared war against Japan on 8 Dec. 1941. 
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long road to Pearl Harbor, one which stretched back beyond the kurai tanima or 
‘dark valley’ to the aftermath of the First World War.7 
 Why did Churchill pay so little attention in his memoirs to the advent of 
war with Japan? It was perhaps due to the personal advantage that focusing on 
Germany’s rearmament in the 1930s ostensibly afforded him. Did Churchill skim 
over the history of the long road to Pearl Harbor because, like successive British 
governments since the Anglo-Japanese alliance had been officially terminated in 
1923, his wartime national government had no realistic policy in place for 
dealing with a rival imperial power in the Far East?8 What led Churchill to 
underestimate a rival imperial power that in both 1894 and 1904 had launched a 
surprise assault that was ‘so accurately timed’ and ‘so skilfully delivered’, that 
they had shown themselves to be formidable enemies?9 In short, what did 
Churchill have to hide? 
This chapter will examine the way in which Churchill portrayed the 
advent of the war with Japan. The chapter will begin with his depiction of the 
way in which the Anglo-Japanese alliance came to an end before going on to 
consider the Washington Conference of 1921, the ramifications of the Great 
Depression of 1929, and the Manchurian crisis of 1931. The chapter will 
                                                 
7 Audrey Sansbury Talks, A Tale of Two Japans: 10 Years to Pearl Harbor 
(Brighton: Book Guild Publishing, 2010), p. xi. This ten-year period is generally 
taken to mean the decade from 1931, starting with Japan’s invasion of 
Manchuria. 
8 Whitehall had continually underestimated Japanese military strength throughout 
the 1930s and this underestimation, along with the reality of imperial overstretch 
in the Far East, arguably shaped British Far Eastern policy at this time. See 
Anthony Best, ‘Constructing an Image: British Intelligence and Whitehall’s 
Perception of Japan, 1931–1939’, Intelligence and National Security, 11/3 
(1996), and ‘“This Probably Over-Valued Military Power”: British Intelligence 
and Whitehall’s Perception of Japan, 1939–41’, Intelligence and National 
Security, 12/3 (1997). 
9 Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume I: Part 
1: 1874–1896 (London: Heinemann, 1967), Churchill to Lady Jennie Churchill, 
19 Sep. 1894, p. 522. 
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illustrate how Churchill differentiated between the long-term and the short-term 
reasons for the war with Japan, and how he placed the onus, for the outbreak of 
the Pacific war on American economic and diplomatic failings during the 
interwar years. The short-term causes of the outbreak of war in the Pacific in 
December 1941 were narrated by Churchill as emanating from the diplomatic 
failure of the American-Japanese negotiations of 1941 and the American-
initiated economic sanctions of the same year.10 The brevity with which 
Churchill outlined the long and short-term reasons for the outbreak of war from 
the British perspective will also be examined.   
Churchill’s first volume of memoirs, The Gathering Storm, was primarily 
devoted to promoting his thesis that there had never been a war more preventable 
than the Second World War.11 The first volume had originally been intended to 
deal with the interwar years, the outbreak of war in Europe, Churchill’s return to 
the Admiralty, and his first seven months as war-time Prime Minister. The first 
volume was to span the period 1919 to the end of 1940, and would consist of 
three books.12 Having solicited the opinion of his syndicate, Churchill felt 
compelled to amalgamate the three books originally planned into two; and, as 
Reynolds noted, this meant that Churchill ‘further condensed his already brief 
                                                 
10 See Michael A. Barnhart, ‘Japan’s Economic Security and the Origins of the 
Pacific War’, JSS, 4/2 (1981), pp. 105–24. Barnhart convincingly argues that 
American economic sanctions did not act as the major impetus for Japan to 
attack Pearl Harbor. Rather it was the internal tension between the Japanese navy 
and army which pushed Japan to war. See also Michael A. Barnhart, Japan 
Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1987; repr. 1988) in which his thesis is analysed in 
more detail and which partially backs up Churchill’s assertion that the 
‘immediate cause of the Pacific War was the failure of the Hull-Nomura 
negotiations’, p. 263. 
11 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume I, The Gathering Storm 
(London: Cassell, 1948), pp. 3–15.  
12 CHUR 4/25A/179: Churchill to Henry Luce, 19 Feb. 1947. 
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account of the 1920s’.13 A sharply-reduced word limit gave Churchill the 
opportunity to gloss over his own less reputable past and to merely touch upon 
issues which, in hindsight, he had either not taken seriously or had been 
completely wrong about. After all, he was presenting himself to the post-war 
world as omniscient, and as central to the world political stage: to have revealed 
his weaknesses would surely have defeated the object of his memoirs.  
Churchill was not just setting the scene for his theory that the Second 
World War had been an unnecessary war, he was also emphasising how his own 
political life had followed similar fortunes to that of Britain and her Empire—it 
was a tale of defeat into victory. Churchill’s defeat was his time in the ‘political 
wilderness’ whereas his victory was leading Britain, eventually aided by her 
Allies, to the defeat of the Axis powers.14 Of his time in the wilderness, 
Churchill wrote that it had enabled him to be free from ‘ordinary Party 
antagonisms’ and that this freedom allowed him, along with only a few cohorts, 
to become pre-occupied with the alarming rate at which Germany was 
rearming.15 By emphasising how the dangers of German rearmament became his 
raison d’étre, Churchill cultivated the image that his voice had been the loudest 
(of only a handful) to warn of the impending danger of Nazi Germany. But what 
of Japan? Why did Churchill make no reference to the fact that the initial spur to 
British rearmament was Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931?16 What of the 
growing ambitions of the rival imperial power in the Far East which had been 
described, in 1936, as ‘the Eastern Menace’?17 
Churchill’s first reference to Japan was a surprisingly loaded gun, 
especially as his memoirs were an attempt to court American post-war opinion in 
order to highlight how integral he remained to the international political stage. 
The loaded gun came in the form of Churchill placing the onus for the 
                                                 
13 David Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the 
Second World War (London: Allen Lane, 2004), p. 85. 
14 Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 527. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Reynolds, In Command of History, p. 100.  
17 Union of Democratic Control, Eastern Menace: The Story of Japanese 
Imperialism (London: Union of Democratic Control, 1936). 
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deterioration in Anglo-Japanese relations during the interwar period, and the 
ending of the formal Anglo-Japanese Alliance, solely on pressure from America. 
As Churchill put it: 
 
The United States made it clear to Britain that the 
continuance of her alliance with Japan ... would 
constitute a barrier in Anglo-American relations. 
Accordingly this alliance was brought to an end.18 
 
Churchill continued to remark how this pressure from America led to a ‘profound 
impression’ in Japan that she was being spurned by Western powers, and that this 
inevitably led to links being ripped apart—links which ‘might afterwards have 
proved of decisive value to peace’.19 He cited the increase in American 
diplomatic pressure on Britain, and the increased American presence in the 
Pacific, as reasons why Japan had felt ill-treated by the Western powers and had, 
in consequence, watched the situation in Europe with an ‘attentive eye’.20  
Churchill’s cursory narrative of the events that led to war with Japan 
implied that, since its formal inception in 1902, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had 
encountered few, if any, problems, and that it had ended at America’s behest.21 
Churchill wrote that the Japanese had ‘punctiliously conformed’ to the Alliance 
and had been worthy partners.22 The overall impression of his narrative was that 
had the Anglo-Japanese Alliance been maintained, Britain would somehow have 
been able to prevent Japanese imperial ambitions or, at the very least, to restrict 
                                                 
18 Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 11. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Although the Anglo-Japanese Alliance may have been formalised in 1902, an 
informal relationship (and one which went through on-off stages) had existed 
since the Iwakura mission of 1872–4. See Ian Nish, ‘Origins of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance: In the shadow of the Dreibund’, in Phillips Payson O’Brien 
(ed.), The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902–1922 (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 
8–25, for the long view of the history of the 1902 Alliance. 
22 Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 11. 
Chapter III: Churchill’s Portrayal of the Advent of War with Japan 
87 
their imperial goals through alliance leverage. In turn, this implied that Britain 
had been the dominant partner in the Anglo-Japanese relationship and that the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance was as strong in 1921 as it had always been. 
Churchill’s narrative implied that if Britain’s diplomats had not given in to 
American pressure to formally end such a reliable alliance then the Pacific war 
could well have been averted.  
This typically Churchillian reductive hypothesis fitted in with his overall 
theme of the first volume of memoirs: that there had never been a more easily 
preventable war. Yet Churchill extended his counterfactual even further when he 
implied that had British diplomats not been swayed by American demands to end 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the early 1920s, then the British Empire would 
not have suffered such ignominious defeats during the war. If the Pacific war had 
been avoidable, the crumbling of the British Empire in the Far East would 
therefore not have occurred.23 This was an extreme counterfactual, but it was one 
which nonetheless had impact. In fact, one recent study of British decolonisation 
has suggested that allowing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to end was ‘one of the 
gravest errors of twentieth-century British diplomacy’ as it meant that Britain’s 
empire in the Far East was left ‘exposed’.24 In reality, Britain’s empire in the Far 
East had been ‘exposed’ for a very long time. Was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
as strong as Churchill suggested, and was it really worth saving?25 Did American 
pressure really affect British policy? And would Britain have been able to control 
Japan’s imperial ambitions? The most important question however is why did 
Churchill, who was usually so careful to be uncritical of American policy, place 
                                                 
23 This is not to say that the British Empire in the Far East would ultimately not 
have crumbled. Changing wartime and post-war sensibilities implied that it 
would have done, but it may not have disintegrated at such an exponential rate.  
24 L. J. Butler, Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2002), p. 24. 
25 For a comprehensive and persuasive argument over the myth surrounding the 
contemporary perception of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance see: Anthony Best, 
‘The “Ghost” of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance: An Examination into Historical 
Myth-Making’, Historical Journal, 49/3 (2006), pp. 811–31.  
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the onus for the Pacific war on what he saw as the failings of interwar American 
diplomacy? 
In reality, by 1921, ending the Anglo-Japanese Alliance suited Britain. 
The Alliance had a rolling renewal attached to it and it had been renewed in 
1905, 1911, and had been due to be renewed again in 1921.26 The alternative to 
renewal was to simply let it expire. Churchill claimed, in his memoirs, that it had 
been ‘with sorrow’ that he had been ‘a party to the ending of the British alliance 
with Japan’—an alliance from which both Britain and Japan had ‘derived both 
strength and advantage’.27 Contrary to Churchill’s portrayal, the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance had encountered problems since its inception. These were the teething 
problems that all young alliances encountered, but these problems became more 
pronounced at the outbreak of the First World War. In 1914 Churchill may have 
been ‘appalled by Sir Edward Grey’s reluctance to accede to the Japanese 
proposal that they should become full belligerents’, but his communiqués with 
Grey revealed that Churchill was certainly aware of an almost menacing imperial 
undercurrent emanating from the Japanese.28 Churchill minuted Grey and warned 
him that his actions towards the Japanese (such as denying them full belligerent 
status) were likely to ‘easily give mortal offence’ which would ‘not be 
forgotten’.29  
Churchill clearly displayed that he had some knowledge of the Japanese 
‘race’, even if his knowledge was loosely based on Victorian racist assumptions. 
But his imperialism stopped him from comprehending that whatever territorial 
gains Japan made at Germany’s expense, they would possibly not be enough to 
                                                 
26 Robert J. Gowen, ‘British Legerdemain at the 1911 Imperial Conference: The 
Dominions, Defense Planning, and the Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’, 
JMH, 52/3 (1980). 
27 Churchill, Grand Alliance, p. 516. 
28 Robert O’Neill, ‘Churchill, Japan, and British Security in the Pacific, 1904–
1942’, in Roger Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (eds), Churchill: A Major New 
Assessment of his Life in Peace and War (Oxford: OUP, 1993), p. 276. 
29  O’Neill, ‘Churchill, Japan, and British Security in the Pacific’, p. 276, 
referencing Martin Gilbert (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: Volume III, 1914–1916 
(London: Heinemann, 1971), Churchill to Grey, 11 Aug. 1914, p. 43. 
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satisfy Japan, and that the British Empire in the Far East would remain stable.30 
But, ever the Admiralty man, Churchill feared ‘a naval setback in the Pacific if 
Britain were not generous to Japan’.31 This fear illustrated the general acceptance 
in Whitehall that should a war break out in both home and Far Eastern waters 
then home waters would be defended first and foremost, and the Far East would 
be left exposed. This fear led Churchill to accept that to have Japan on side was 
better than any alternative.32 In fact, Churchill sent a telegram to Admiral 
Yashiro, the Japanese Marine Minister, expressing his 
 
warm feelings of comradeship and pleasure with 
which the officers & men of the British Navy will 
find themselves allied in a common cause & against 
a common foe with the gallant & seamanlike Navy 
of Japan.33  
 
Germany declared war on Japan on 23 August 1914. Although Britain did not 
request a Japanese squadron in the Mediterranean,34 Churchill believed that such 
                                                 
30 Churchill was not alone in this assumption: for example Grey also thought that 
Japanese imperial gains would not pose a threat to the British Empire. 
31 Gilbert, Churchill: III, p. 42.  
32 Robert J. Gowen, ‘Great Britain and the Twenty-One Demands of 1915: 
Cooperation versus Effacement’, Journal of Military History, 43/1 (1971),  
pp. 76–106. 
33 Gilbert, Churchill: III, p. 42.  
34 The Japanese Navy did however help the British to suppress the Singapore 
mutiny, that of the 5 Light Infantry in February 1915: see Ian Beckett, ‘The 
Singapore mutiny of February, 1915’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research, 62 (1984); Nicholas Tarling, ‘The Singapore Mutiny of 1915’, Journal 
of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 55/2 (1982); Philip Mason, 
A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, Its Officers and Men 
(London: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 425–7; and Budheswar Pati, India and the First 
World War, 1914–1918 (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 1996), pp. 128–30. 
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an invitation would have been taken as a compliment.35  Churchill’s spat with 
Grey over whether Japan’s demands should be granted illustrated the precarious 
nature of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Britain was certainly not as dominant as 
was presumed, and the idea that Japan could be trusted due to her stance and 
actions on the Allied side in the Great War was clearly erroneous. Churchill’s 
memoirs certainly did not portray this reality. 
Having hardly been mentioned in the first two volumes of memoirs, 
Japan, let alone the long road to Pearl Harbor, was conspicuous by its absence.36 
As the overall theme of Churchill’s first volume was how he had been one of a 
‘very small circle’ who regarded Berlin with concern during the 1930s, this 
conspicuous absence of the Japanese made Churchill’s tale easier to tell.37 His 
lack of attention to the Far East in the first two volumes could be explained by 
the fact that as Japan did not officially enter the Second World War until 7 
December 1941, Japan did not figure in the chronology of the war until then. 
But, as Reynolds astutely observes, what of Japan’s invasion of Manchuria?38 
After all, this was the initial reason behind Britain’s rearmament in the early 
1930s, and the implication was clear—Whitehall was clearly concerned over this 
Japanese show of strength. Strangely Churchill did not portray the Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria in 1931 in the same light as he depicted the Italian 
invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. He wrote that Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia 
had been partly to avenge Italian pride for the ‘defeat and shame’ at Adowa in 
1896, as well as being a quest for imperial expansion.39 But most significantly of 
all, he wrote that Mussolini’s action had ‘played its part in the advent of the 
Second World War’.40 Why, therefore, did Churchill skip over the importance of 
the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931? Why did Churchill relegate the war 
in the Far East, let alone the advent of war against Japan, to nothing more than a 
sideshow? The reason, simply put, was America. 
                                                 
35 Gilbert, Churchill: III, p. 44.  
36 Reynolds, In Command of History, p. 189 
37 Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 64. 
38 Reynolds, In Command of History, p. 100. 
39 Churchill, Grand Alliance, p. 71. 
40 Ibid. 
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Churchill portrayed the invasion of Manchuria as being indelibly linked 
with the ‘sudden and violent tempest’ that swept over Wall Street in October 
1929.41 He had already referred to the American diplomatic pressure on Britain 
in the early 1920s to forego the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. By citing America’s 
subsequent economic failure, and how the ‘consequences of this dislocation of 
economic life became world-wide’, Churchill impressed upon the reader that the 
reasons behind Japan’s long march to war were causally related to America.42 
According to Churchill, Japan had been no less affected by the Great 
Depression than any other part of the world. Her rising population required 
secure import and export markets.43 But it was Japan’s close economic reliance 
upon China, especially after American and European tariffs were imposed on 
Japanese goods, that led Japan in September 1931, ‘on a pretext of local 
disorder’,44 to invade and occupy Mukden, the zone of the Manchurian railway.45 
Whilst he included Japan’s precarious post-Wall Street Crash economy, 
Churchill failed to mention the way in which the American economy had been 
dependent upon raw materials imported from South-East Asia (such as tin and 
rubber), and therefore failed to place in context why, ‘from the first shot’, 
America had been outraged on China’s behalf.46 But as America had not joined 
the League of Nations, there was little that America could have done to halt the 
tide of Japanese imperialism. This rising imperial tide, Churchill acknowledged, 
was a concern to Whitehall, but not one which could be acted upon because the 
abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance meant that Britain could not exert 
much influence on Japan. Once again, Churchill placed the onus for the long 
road to Pearl Harbor at America’s door as he asserted that had isolationist 
                                                 
41 Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 27. 
42 Ibid., p. 28. 
43 Ibid., p. 67. 
44 Ibid., p. 68. 
45 For details of the Mukden incident which led to the Manchurian crisis see: W. 
G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), pp. 
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America joined the League of Nations, then the League might have been able to 
punish Japan over Manchuria, and could have halted her imperial 
aggrandisement.47 Churchill concluded that is was America’s interwar 
diplomatic and economic failings which had driven Japan into the arms of 
Germany.48 
The diplomatic pressure to which Churchill referred was the Washington 
Conference of 1921 to 1922.49 After the First World War, Japan had been raised 
by its association with the victors to what Churchill called ‘third place among the 
world’s naval Powers, and certainly to the highest rank’.50 In order to quell the 
potentially troublesome atmosphere in the Far East, the three main naval powers 
who each had vested economic or imperial interests in the Pacific (Britain, 
America and Japan) agreed to adhere to the ‘ratio of strength in capital ships’ of 
five, five and three.51 In his memoirs, Churchill emphasised that ‘as we had to 
choose between Japanese and American friendship I had no doubts what our 
course should be’.52 But he did not refer to the way in which America was 
applying financial pressure on Britain and was insisting that Britain pay her war 
debt (or at least the interest on it) back to America. The implication of 
                                                 
47 Ibid., p. 69. 
48 See illustration III which depicts American isolationism as the first victim of 
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Churchill’s narrative was that the Washington conference signalled the informal 
beginning of what would become a ‘special relationship’ between America and 
Britain with the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Although the conference 
allowed Japan to maintain her naval power, it was not admitted to the first rank 
which, Churchill claimed, led to resentment in Japanese minds and ‘cleared the 
way for war’.53  
Increased American fears over Japanese strategic positions in the West 
Pacific, British fears over the potential threat posed by the Japanese navy to 
British naval superiority, and British imperial interests in the Pacific in general 
were all reasons why the Washington conference came about. The aim of the 
conference was to prevent a naval arms race between the three Pacific powers. 
Neither America nor Britain could afford (whether financially, or even morally) 
an arms race in the early 1920s so they aimed to agree to limit each others’ 
respective naval power (as well as Japan’s) whilst maintaining autonomy and a 
degree of supremacy. Churchill was correct to imply that the war in the Far East 
was evidence that the conference ultimately failed in its goal. Despite American 
and British attempts to mollify Japan, and to limit Japan’s imperial ambitions by 
limiting her naval power, Japan still invaded and occupied Manchuria in 1931. 
Over a decade later, when world conditions presaged success, Japan provoked 
war with America by attacking Pearl Harbor. Within hours of this assault Britain 
declared war on Japan, just as Churchill had promised he would do. But he failed 
to mention one aspect of the origins of the conference, which was how America 
could not decide who was the biggest threat to its vested interests in the Pacific—
Britain or Japan.54 To have included this in his memoirs would have placed the 
special relationship on an altogether different basis from the outset. A portrayal 
of English-speaking rivalry would have seriously altered the portrait of a united 
English-speaking peoples which Churchill was promoting in the aftermath of the 
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war—a portrayal which would possibly have had a detrimental effect not just on  
his standing and reputation, but also on Britain’s position in the post-war world 
hierarchy.  
The next indication that Churchill gave regarding a war brewing in the 
Far East was an incredibly short paragraph on the 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact 
which had been ‘hastily inserted in chapter twelve’.55 The purpose of this hurried 
addition had been to illustrate how Churchill had been aware in the mid-1930s of 
the situation in Asia; that whilst he may have been focused upon the gathering 
storm of Nazism, he was nonetheless fully cognisant on worldwide matters. 
However this paragraph seems incongruous with the rest of the chapter, as it 
reveals how Churchill, both at the time and over a decade later when he was 
compiling his memoirs, thought the situation in Asia to be nothing more than a 
distraction and a sideshow.56 In fact, when Churchill came to write his memoirs, 
it was obvious that he still regarded the long-term reasons for the advent of war 
in the Far East as nothing more than an introduction to the event which he had 
been waiting for—Pearl Harbor. The long-term reasons why Japan went to war 
did not distract or concern Churchill either at the time or when he was recalling 
them a decade later. What really concerned Churchill were the short-term reasons 
for Japan’s entry to the war, and it was upon these that he concentrated in his 
memoirs. It was Deakin’s suggestion that the history behind Japan’s entry into 
the war should be placed as a stand-alone chapter in the third volume where it 
would serve as a tidy, and timely, ‘introduction to their entry into war’.57 
Commenting on an early draft of this chapter, Orme Sargent could not ‘help 
feeling that the average reader would be glad to have his memory refreshed’ as to 
why Japan had been aggressive over Indo-China.58 A career diplomat, civil 
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servant, and a man who, like Churchill, predicted a ‘communist avalanche over 
Europe and the reduction of Britain to a second-class power’ in 1945,59 Sargent 
advocated a summary of Japan’s relations with Great Britain and America and an 
explanation of the ‘deplorable cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty’ as 
useful to the reader.60 Considering that hardly any time or space had been 
directed towards this history, it is no wonder that Churchill thought it sound 
advice. But Churchill was more than willing to do this as it would lend more 
gravitas to several of his themes: the commonalities that Britain and America had 
shared at the beginning of their respective wars; the defeats which they turned 
into victory; and how this special relationship would and should continue in the 
postwar world, especially if Churchill were returned to 10 Downing Street.  
The long-term causes of the advent of war with Japan were portrayed by 
Churchill as attributable to the diplomatic and economic failings of interwar 
America. Considering that one of Churchill’s primary reasons for writing his 
memoirs had been to increase his stature in America, this literary strategy seems, 
at first, to be rather ill-planned. Yet what alternative was there? The only other 
plausible option was for Churchill to place equal, if not more, blame on the 
shoulders of the British Empire. To have made such an admission would have 
implied that the British Empire in the Far East had been weak and vulnerable. 
The image of the weary Titan unable to defend itself in the Far East if it were 
threatened at the same time in Europe or the Middle East was one which 
Churchill wanted to avoid, even if it meant wrongly blaming a country to which 
he owed so much and which in the post-war world he still had to court and woo. 
Without a doubt, Churchill cleverly made a virtue out of the situation he was 
faced with. In other words, to attribute the long-range causes of the war in the 
Far East to interwar American failings suited one of his overarching themes—to 
turn defeat into victory. It enabled him to enforce his portrayal of the symbiotic 
foundation of the so-called ‘special relationship’ between America and Britain 
which he had confirmed to the world at Fulton in March 1946. This portrayal 
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enabled him to misdirect the reader away from the British Empire’s role in 
provoking war with Japan, as well as his own.  
Churchill emphasised how Anglo-Japanese relations were (in 1939), ‘by 
no means friendly’; but also pointed out that there was little love lost between 
Japan and Germany either.61 He wrote:  
 
When, on the eve of the European war, Germany 
made her Non-Aggression Pact with Russia without 
consulting or informing Japan, her Anti-Comintern 
partner, the Japanese felt with reason that they had 
been ill-used.62 
 
Feeling ‘ill-used’ however, was not the sole reason for Japan’s imperial 
aggression. According to Churchill’s portrayal of a nation which he had 
previously described as ‘inscrutable’,63 the Japanese took advantage of the 
‘supreme convulsions’ that shook the world in September 1939.64 Despite the 
power struggle between the Japanese Army and the Japanese Navy, Japan saw an 
opportunity to gain imperial possessions from her imperial neighbours in the Far 
East (France, Britain and the Netherlands) when war in Europe broke out. 
Churchill appeared to excuse Japan for feeling such imperial jealousy: ‘was 
Japan to gain nothing ... ? Had not her historic moment come?’65 By signing the 
Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, Japan was bound to enter ‘the European 
war on the Axis side if America should enter it on behalf of Britain’.66 Although 
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Churchill implied that Japan was playing a waiting game,67 he also wrote that it 
was the potential combined strength of Britain and America, with ‘the two 
strongest navies afloat and with resources which, once developed, were 
measureless and incomparable’, which prompted the Japanese to seek a 
diplomatic compromise with America in early 1941.68 But before negotiations 
began in earnest, and before Churchill portrayed them as a failure of American 
diplomacy, there was the little matter of Churchill and his appeasement of the 
Japanese that he needed to conceal—the closure of the Burma Road. 
When Japan invaded and occupied Burma in January 1942, Churchill was 
humiliated. One reason for his humiliation was that he had previously acquiesced 
in Japanese demands, in July 1940, to close the Burma Road and thereby suspend 
supplies to China.69 That Churchill suffered humiliation was evident from his 
lack of reference to the closure of the Road.70 Churchill’s narrative silences tend 
to mask something, and this is certainly true regarding the closure of the Burma 
Road. His silence illustrated the ignominy he felt at having carried out what 
could be judged in the post-war world as an act of ‘appeasement’. In July 1940, 
closing the Road and therefore temporarily appeasing Japan may possibly have 
been the only solution; as Churchill said, had he ‘refused the Japanese demand 
things would immediately become extremely dangerous’.71 He also confirmed 
that whilst the Cabinet had agreed to this manoeuvre, it had been his doing—‘our 
decision was my doing’.72 Before Chamberlain waved that now infamous piece 
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of paper at Heston aerodrome on 30 September 1938, the term ‘appeasement’ 
had always had positive, or at least neutral, connotations. ‘Appeasement’ had 
implied an act of defusing conflict, but under the aegis of Churchill’s memoirs 
the term took on a negative slant where it was translated as ‘purchasing peace for 
one’s own interests by sacrificing the interests of others’.73 Whilst Churchill was 
happy to hold the anti-appeasement mirror up to others, he certainly did not want 
to look into it himself, especially over the closure of the Burma Road, and even 
more so when he was composing his memoirs. To apply his ‘critique of 
appeasement’ to his own action over the Road would have completely distorted 
the image he was building up of himself in the first two volumes,74 especially as 
he had cast himself as the main bulwark against appeasement, and had suggested 
that this had been one of the main reasons why he became Prime Minister in May 
1940.  
Churchill portrayed the re-opening of the Road as a measure which came 
from strength. Because Germany had not invaded Britain, and ‘the light of the 
British Empire burned brighter and fiercer’, world conditions were much less 
favourable to the Japanese.75 Churchill also revealed however, that reopening the 
Burma Road could have provoked the Japanese. He stipulated in his memoirs 
that he had suggested that if the President were to send ‘an American [naval] 
squadron, the bigger the better, to pay a friendly visit to Singapore’ then this, 
would have had a ‘marked deterrent effect upon a Japanese declaration of war 
upon us over the Burma Road reopening’.76 Reynolds noted that although 
Churchill had written ‘nothing’ about the closure of the Burma Road, he had 
made a ‘brief allusion’ to the road being reopened in October 1940.77 Perhaps 
Reynolds is being too generous when he states that this oversight of Churchill’s 
was merely ‘another example of hasty drafting and general inattention to the Far 
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East’.78 In July 1940, Churchill had declared that closing the Road had been an 
attempt ‘to stave off trouble for the time being in the hope and belief that our 
situation might become better in the future’.79 In reality it had left Burma 
vulnerable to invasion. His lack of comprehension of the extent of Japan’s 
imperial ambition, especially when coupled with his inability to see the potential 
weakness of British imperial rule east of Suez, was a stumbling block during the 
war. It became no less so when he was recounting the situation for his memoirs. 
This is possibly why Churchill was so eager to gloss over one of the short-term 
causes of the outbreak of war with Japan. By 1950, Churchill could do nothing 
but admit that his priorities in 1941 had been: 
 
first, the defence of the Island [Britain], including 
the threat of invasion and the U-boat war; secondly, 
the struggle in the Middle East and Mediterranean; 
thirdly, after June, supplies to Soviet Russia; and, 
last of all, resistance to a Japanese assault.80 
 
To have done otherwise would have roused the ire of his post-war critics.81 By 
quietly and quickly dealing with his part in provoking Japanese aggression, and 
by sandwiching it between his portrayal of American economic and diplomatic 
failings, Churchill hoped that his ‘appeasement’ of the Japanese would be 
overshadowed, especially by his continued narrative of the failings of American 
economic and diplomatic policy. Only it was updated to reflect its immediate 
short term effect—Pearl Harbor. 
As previously mentioned, Deakin had suggested that a chapter on the 
immediate pre-war situation in the Far East should appear in the third volume of 
the memoirs. Such a chapter would act as an introduction not only to Pearl 
Harbor, and America’s official entry into the war, but also to the Far East as a 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
79 Taylor (ed.), Off the Record, Churchill to Crozier, 26 July 1940, p. 176. 
80 Churchill, Grand Alliance, p. 522–23. 
81 Michael Foot (MP) was one such critic who noticed the ‘virtual omission of 
Japan from volume one’, cited by Reynolds, In Command of History, p. 142.  
Chapter III: Churchill’s Portrayal of the Advent of War with Japan 
100 
whole. The first glimpse of Deakin’s work was in the chapter entitled ‘The 
Japanese Envoy’.82 The title suggested that the chapter would be about the 
negotiations with Japan in the months before Pearl Harbor. It was meant to 
chronologically locate the advent of war with Japan in the memoirs, especially as 
Churchill had virtually ignored the Far East up to that point in his history. The 
overall impression which this chapter gave was that Churchill (on behalf of 
Britain and her empire) had done everything in his power to stop, or at least 
delay, the outbreak of war in the Far East. He created this illusion by reproducing 
parts of the records from his two meetings with Mamoru Shigemitsu (1887–
1957), the Japanese Ambassador in London from 1938 until he was recalled to 
Tokyo in June 1941.83 Reproducing these records gave the chapter an aura of 
veracity as they reinforced Churchill’s assertion that Britain had done everything 
in its power to avoid conflict with Japan. Indeed, Churchill had attempted to 
appease the Japanese by closing the Burma Road; this action could have been 
used by Churchill to illustrate how he and Britain had genuinely done whatever 
was in their power (in the short-term) to avoid conflict in the Far East. But as this 
act would have reflected badly on the post-war image that Churchill was building 
for himself, he referred to it only twice.  
Developing this train of thought, Churchill emphasised how it was the 
British territory in the Far East which had attracted special attention from the 
Japanese. He highlighted how the German High Command had encouraged 
Japan to ‘strike without delay’ at Malaya and Singapore rather than attack 
America.84 But Churchill was keen to point out that the Japanese naval and 
military leaders were ‘by no means convinced of this reasoning’ and that 
subsequent discussions amongst the Japanese hierarchy had led to one 
conclusion:  
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In their view an operation in South-East Asia was 
out of the question unless either a prior assault was 
made on the American bases or a diplomatic 
settlement reached with the United States.85 
 
Churchill was once again highlighting how fundamental America had been to the 
advent of war in the Far East. Japan had wished to negotiate and reach a 
settlement with America. It was American bases that the Japanese had attacked. 
According to Churchill’s account, Britain, her empire in the Far East, and 
Churchill himself, were peripheral. Churchill made impressive use of German 
documents which had been captured, and then published, by the Americans. His 
carefully-edited use of these documents helped him illustrate Japan’s uncertainty 
over which strategy to pursue with America in early to mid-1941: negotiation or 
attack. The fact that the Japanese strategy revolved around America was the 
central reason why Churchill used the opportunity to include this material, let 
alone because it acted as a review of the war from the Axis perspective. America 
was the key.   
Having placed the onus for the outbreak of war on America, Churchill 
possibly hoped to deflect attention from the lack of regard he had had for the Far 
East at the time. Churchill’s inclination to spend as little time as possible on the 
Far East was obvious, especially to the syndicate, but even the normally 
charitable Reynolds observes that Japan had been introduced to the memoirs ‘in 
an abrupt’ manner.86 One reason for this abruptness was simply because the Far 
East had appeared so infrequently up to this point, so any reasonable attention to 
it would have appeared incongruous or out of character, especially when 
compared to how Churchill covered the war in North Africa. There is no reason 
to suppose that Churchill would have wanted to expose his own weakness in the 
post-war world, so a short and perfunctory introduction to the Far East would 
have been one way of skimming over his lack of wartime attention. A more 
plausible reason, however, was the influence of the Cabinet Secretary, Norman 
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Brook, who wrote that ‘too many documents are textually quoted at length’ and 
that he was ‘glad to know’ that the text would be revised further and documents 
would be paraphrased instead.87 Although Brook directed his comments at the 
whole of the third volume, they were welcomed as they provided an excuse for 
the ‘veil’ to fall over Churchill’s mind regarding the Far East both during and 
after the war. 
The overall theme of the third volume was ‘how the British fought on, 
with hardship their garment, until Soviet Russia and the United States were 
drawn into the great conflict’.88 By the beginning of chapter 31, simply entitled 
‘Japan’, the reader was all too aware that on the horizon was America’s official 
entry into the war—the event Churchill depicted as the defining moment in 
Britain and America’s ‘special relationship’. This would be the moment when the 
fortunes of the war were shared, commiserated with, and then turned around. 
Churchill had made the reader aware of the growing tension in the Far East, 
albeit a tension that was primarily between America and Japan.89 Churchill 
continued to underplay Britain’s role in this escalating drama when he wrote that 
there ‘was no course for us’ but to ‘leave the United States to try diplomatic 
means to keep Japan as long as possible quiet in the Pacific’.90 He reiterated how 
American diplomatic efforts had been charged with finding a successful 
settlement with Japan in order to avoid war in the Far East. 
Churchill underlined how the few months before Pearl Harbor were 
solely under the control and jurisdiction of America and Japan. Before 
emphasising how he had no choice but to sit back and watch America and Japan 
enter into negotiations to prevent an outbreak of hostilities in the Far East, 
Churchill quite cleverly inserted three paragraphs from a speech he had given at 
the Mansion House in London, on 10 November 1941. In this speech, he had 
claimed that he had always been a ‘sentimental well-wisher’ as well as an 
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‘admirer’ of Japan.91 Ever since he had voted for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 
1902, Churchill continued, he had always done his ‘very best to promote good 
relations with the Island Empire’.92 By using an extract from this speech, 
Churchill was possibly hoping to emphasise how the prevention of war in the Far 
East was solely down to the ability of America and Japan to ‘find ways of 
preserving peace’.93 The extract he reproduced in his memoirs highlighted how, 
in late 1941, Japan was ill-equipped regarding steel production (‘the basic 
foundation of modern war’) thereby stressing the economic motives behind 
Japanese aggression.94 Using this speech as a springboard, Churchill once again 
emphasised how the economic and commercial nature of the negotiations 
between America and Japan reflected what he had said all along—the only 
reason why Japan had risked war was the economic sanctions which America 
had imposed.95  
Churchill emphasised that the British had been concerned with America’s 
economic sanctions when he narrated the events leading up to the signing of the 
Atlantic Charter.96 This chapter was going to present the syndicate with problems 
of interpretation. Emery Reves, Churchill’s literary agent since 1937, had bought 
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the rights to market Churchill’s memoirs outside Britain and, as an unofficial 
member of the syndicate, he was often invited to pass comment on draft chapters. 
As Reves was based in New York, he was naturally more in tune with American 
rather than British sentiment, and his observations helped Churchill and the 
syndicate tap into American sensibilities, and to envisage what expectations they 
had for what the memoirs might reveal. One such occasion was when Reves 
encouraged Churchill over the chapter on the Atlantic Charter. Reves wrote that 
the circumstances around its creation would be ‘one of the major events on 
which people will expect you to give all the information’.97 Since Roosevelt’s 
demeanour (when he and Churchill had parleyed in Placentia Bay) and the ‘way 
in which he manoeuvred the United States into an undeclared naval war in the 
Atlantic in 1941’, had already been focused upon in America, American eyes 
were going to be fixed on Churchill’s narrative.98 Churchill and the syndicate 
were aware that this chapter was going to be heavily scrutinized on the other side 
of the Atlantic. Pownall had commented beforehand, and in an exasperated tone, 
that the Americans had been ‘most inquisitive’ about the second volume of 
memoirs and that they seemed ‘to have a complete team of nit-pickers on the 
job’.99 Considering that the overall tone of the third volume of memoirs was 
narrating the climactic point of America’s official entry in the war, Churchill 
needed to present his version of events without affecting his post-war 
mythologizing of the so-called special relationship or his own post-war persona 
and ambition. 
Churchill was happy to emphasise the magnanimity of Britain and her 
empire in signing the Atlantic Charter because it suited his post-war purposes. 
Firstly, it enabled Churchill to accentuate the British Empire’s long-held notion 
of fairness and justice for all. This had a beneficial effect on the post-war view 
which Churchill forged, as it tied in closely with the post-war change of attitude 
towards empire. That is to say the empire may no longer have been considered 
viable, but a Commonwealth of Nations, which was founded upon a shared belief 
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in fairness and cooperation, could be the preferred and eagerly welcomed 
alternative. Secondly, with regard to the Far East, Churchill’s portrayal tried, 
once again, to deflect attention from British imperial trade concerns in China 
(which, after all, had been a sticking point with Japan for some time) as he 
reiterated how British pressure on American economic sanctions had always 
been undertaken with China’s ‘security in mind’.100 By highlighting these 
aspects of what can be described as a very selective recall of the meetings off the 
coast of Newfoundland, Churchill was able to portray the wartime and post-war 
British Empire in a favourable light whilst not taking the focus away from one of 
his main tenets of the third volume—the solid foundation upon which the Anglo-
American relationship had been built.101 The enthusiasm that Churchill conveyed 
when recalling the circumstances of the creation of the Charter was erroneous. 
Reynolds rightly notes that Churchill claimed the first draft of the Atlantic 
Charter proposal as his own—as ‘my text’.102 But Churchill’s portrayal of the 
reasoning behind the Atlantic Charter enabled him to illustrate how there had 
been ‘no need to argue the broad issues’,103 as both the British and American 
contingents were content with the resultant ‘Anglo-American solidarity’.104 
Up to this point, the whole volume resembled a slow building crescendo 
and for Churchill the climactic moment had finally arrived—‘Pearl Harbour!’105 
Given Churchill’s all too infrequent glances eastwards, why did he devote a 
significant amount of valuable space to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor? It is 
even more puzzling when considering how Churchill had been notified of Jay 
Gold’s wish to reduce the word length of the third volume. Kelly relayed to 
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Churchill how Gold had advised that Book I should be reduced from 128,200 to 
93,900 words, and Book II reduced from 128,000 to 92,700 words. A total of 
68,300 words were to be cut: the equivalent to one third of the total word 
count.106  
Reynolds suggests that it was because Pearl Harbor cast a ‘long shadow 
back’ over Churchill’s treatment of Asia in 1941.107 Churchill devoted valuable 
word space to Pearl Harbor in his narrative because it signified the official 
American entry into the then truly world-wide war. He wrote that he was grateful 
for America being dragged into the fray as it meant that ‘Hitler’s fate was sealed. 
Mussolini’s fate was sealed. As for the Japanese, they would be ground to 
powder’.108 This was a powerful image, and it was an image which Churchill 
nurtured as it suited his post-war rhetoric which was to mythologize the Anglo-
American bond which the war had cemented: the bond between the English-
speaking peoples. Another less obvious explanation for Churchill’s narrative on 
Pearl Harbor was that the attack had decimated American morale in the Pacific. 
The success of the Japanese attack had shown Roosevelt that American Pacific 
strategy was considerably weaker than it was thought to have been. It also 
illustrated how the Americans, like the British, had underestimated the Japanese. 
All of which contributed to Churchill’s postwar rhetoric: there was nothing 
which the Anglo-American special relationship could not face head-on. In fact, 
the shared circumstance which the twisted steel of Pearl Harbor had forged 
between America and Britain was essential to keeping the peace—especially as 
the world stumbled from a hot war to a Cold one.109  
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It was this shared identity, this common bond, of triumph over adversity 
which Churchill was to expound upon in his fourth volume of memoirs; but it 
hinged upon the third volume being successful in cementing the special wartime 
relationship. Portraying the almighty American eagle as equally vulnerable to 
Japanese attack as the British Empire in the Far East had been, allowed Churchill 
to pre-empt the sting which the loss of Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore and 
Burma would have in his narrative. Perhaps Churchill hoped to show how great 
the ultimate victory against Japan had been. If America, with all her might, could 
be temporarily defeated so quickly at the outset of her war what chance did an 
overstretched and already war-weary British Empire stand? By emphasising 
American powerlessness in the face of Japanese tactics, Churchill not only 
crafted a better tale of how defeat was turned into victory, but he could do so 
without drawing attention to his reluctance to look eastwards until it was too late. 
Placing the onus for the advent of war with Japan on American diplomacy, 
skimming over Britain’s lack of regard for Japan both diplomatically and 
imperially, not viewing a potential imperial rival with due care and attention—
these tactics enabled Churchill to gloss over his own lack of foresight. The 
immediate result of the attack on Pearl Harbor was that the ‘mastery of the 
Pacific had passed into Japanese hands, and the strategic balance of the world 
was for the time being fundamentally changed’.110 Such fundamental changes to 
Churchill, the British Empire east of Suez, and America required carefully- 
chosen words. 
The scene setting that Churchill engineered regarding how he first heard 
of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour remains worthy of partial citation here: 
 
It was a Sunday evening, December 7, 1941. 
Winant [the American Ambassador] and Averell 
Harriman [Roosevelt’s personal representative in 
London who was responsible for administering 
Lend-Lease] were alone with me at the table at 
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Chequers. I turned on my small wireless set shortly 
after the nine o’clock news had started. There were 
a number of items about the fighting on the Russian 
front and on the British front in Libya, at the end of 
which some few sentences were spoken regarding 
an attack by the Japanese on American shipping in 
Hawaii, and also Japanese attacks on British vessels 
in the Dutch East Indies. ... I did not personally 
sustain any direct impression, but Averell said there 
was something about the Japanese attacking the 
Americans, and, in spite of being tired and resting, 
we all sat up.111 
 
After Sawyers (Churchill’s butler) confirmed that the party of three had heard 
correctly, and urged by Harriman to seek clarification, Churchill telephoned 
Roosevelt for confirmation. Churchill continued his reaction to the events in 
Hawaii: 
 
In two or three minutes Mr. Roosevelt came 
through. ‘Mr. President, what’s this about Japan?’ 
‘It’s quite true,’ he replied. ‘They have attacked us 
at Pearl Harbor. We are all in the same boat 
now’.112 
 
The precision and detail behind the narrative describing how Churchill learned 
about the attack on Pearl Harbor reveals the depth of importance with which 
Churchill wanted to imbue the scene. A note entitled ‘Chapter XI—
Consequences of Pearl Harbor’ revealed that the syndicate even checked with the 
BBC the precise running order of the news bulletin which announced the 
Japanese attack.113 The bulletin had started ‘with a report of President 
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Roosevelt’s announcement’ about the attack on Pearl Harbor, which was then 
followed by reports on ‘Libya, Russia and RAF attacks on the enemy western 
front’. The lead item about Pearl Harbor was then read once more. As a result of 
this attention to detail, it was suggested that Churchill amend the first few lines 
of the chapter, so he replaced the words ‘we listened to the 9 o’clock news’, with 
‘I turned on my small wireless set shortly after the 9 o’clock news bulletin had 
started’.114 Such meticulous research revealed the importance which Churchill 
wanted to attach to this meaningful event.  
Churchill’s writing perfectly conveyed a scene of calm resignation to the 
momentous incident at Pearl Harbor. It was however his portrayal of the 
significance of the Japanese attack for Britain that still manages to sweep the 
reader up into a frenzy: 
 
No American will think it wrong of me if I 
proclaim that to have the United States at our side 
was to me the greatest joy. I could not foretell the 
course of events. I do not pretend to have measured 
accurately the martial might of Japan, but now at 
this very moment I knew the United States was in 
the war, up to the neck and in to the death. So we 
had won after all!115 
 
Churchill wrote that the ‘seventeen months of lonely fighting and nineteen 
months of my responsibility in dire stress’, had witnessed the events of Dunkirk, 
the fall of France, the necessary (so Churchill claimed) Battle at Mers-el-Kebir, 
the threat of German invasion, the U-boat war, and the Battle of the Atlantic.116 
With this one Japanese attack, all thoughts of doom were wiped away as he 
wrote that the American entry into the war meant one thing—‘we had won the 
war’.117 His emphasis portrayed America’s entry into the war as integral to 
                                                 
114 Ibid. 
115 Churchill, Grand Alliance, p. 539. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
Chapter III: Churchill’s Portrayal of the Advent of War with Japan 
110 
Britain’s survival. Churchill obviously believed that how the details were 
depicted could endear him to America all over again. After all, a man who had 
established the special relationship under wartime conditions would obviously be 
central to keeping this relationship going from strength to strength—or so 
Churchill doubtless thought. His exactness, relying as it always did upon the 
precision of the syndicate, was rewarded by the editor of the London office of 
Life magazine, Walter Graebner, who commented that the chapter on Pearl 
Harbor was ‘Magnificent. Same standard as the Bismarck chapter in Book 1’.118 
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor cannot be examined without 
reference to the earlier British attack on the Italian fleet on 11 November 1940 at 
Taranto—‘a total and unexpected success’.119 The spurious link which Churchill 
made between the two events is still visible in the historiography.120 With 
hindsight, it is all too easy to interpret the Battle of Taranto as ‘a miniature 
prototype of Pearl Harbor’;121 and it is surprising how many historians still 
emphasize how the Japanese paid close attention to the success of the element of 
surprise as well as the use of  torpedo-bombers.122 Churchill portrayed the 
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Japanese as being ‘profoundly impressed’123 with the Fleet Air Arm’s successful 
use of surprise torpedo-bomber attacks, despite the fact that luck had played 
quite a large part in the success of the operation.124  As Archibald Sinclair (the 
leader of the Liberal Party and Secretary of State for Air) commented in an 
interview six months afterwards, ‘well, you know, I think we were a bit lucky at 
Taranto’.125 There are two reasons why Churchill made the dubious link between 
Taranto and Pearl Harbor. First, he did it so that he could emphasise how the 
British Navy were ahead of the game, in that they saw the benefit of aerial 
torpedoes in the first place. And secondly, so that Churchill could build up 
another way in of not only how America officially entered the war but also the 
extent to which America, much like Britain, would eventually turn initial defeat 
into ultimate victory. In fact Arthur J. Marder persuasively argued that the link 
between Taranto and Pearl Harbor was bogus when he wrote that the strategists 
in the Japanese Imperial Navy ‘tended to underplay the successful British naval 
air attack’ as the Italian fleet had been ‘sitting-ducks,’ and as the naval air arm in 
Japan was considered to be inexperienced and therefore unlikely to achieve 
similar success.126 But, when recalling Taranto, Churchill painted a glorious 
canvas in which a British naval triumph was recreated by an enemy with 
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devastating success. Always an Admiralty man, Churchill ensured that the Royal 
Navy was always leading the way—even unintentionally! 
Churchill’s proclivity for the Admiralty did not always make for 
comfortable or satisfying reminiscences. One uncomfortable truth which he had 
to re-visit was the loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse.127 By August 
1941, and before entering into formal diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese, 
Churchill wrote that he had become ‘increasingly anxious to confront Japan with 
the greatest possible display’ of British and American naval strength.128 In an 
attempt to avert disaster, the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, along with four 
destroyers and the aircraft carrier Indomitable, set off for the Far East and let 
their presence in the Indian Ocean be known to the enemy. In his memoirs, 
despatching the Prince of Wales and the Repulse to the Indian Ocean Churchill 
deemed to be ‘the best possible deterrent’, as their presence was meant to force 
Japan to think of the severe consequences they would face as a result of any act 
of aggression.129 But as Pownall later commented, this manoeuvre was 
‘obviously a failure. It was a bluff that didn’t come off’.130  It was a deception 
that resulted in both ships being lost. A little over a week after the ships had been 
sunk, Harold Nicolson* noted that the ‘depressed’ public he was meeting in 
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Leicester that day ignored ‘the Russian victories, the Libyan advance and the 
entry of America’. Instead, they were ‘faced with the fact that two of our greatest 
battleships have been sunk within a few minutes by the monkey men, and that we 
and the Americans have between us lost command of the Pacific’. Nicolson 
concluded that he would ‘try to cheer them up’—he failed.131 
Churchill’s portrayal of the loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse 
was not as ‘grandiloquent’ as his prose on Pearl Harbor had been.132 His 
tendency for purple prose was not visible. His use of ‘masterful verbs’, as well as 
clipped, short phrases when describing his reaction upon hearing of the losses 
enforced the solemnity of the situation.133  
 
I was opening my boxes on the 10th when the 
telephone at my bedside rang. It was the First Sea 
Lord. His voice sounded odd. He gave a sort of 
cough and gulp, and at first I could not hear quite 
clearly. ‘Prime Minister, I have to report to you that 
the Prince of Wales and the Repulse have both been 
sunk by the Japanese—we think by aircraft. Tom 
Philips is drowned.’ ‘Are you sure it’s true?’ ‘There 
is no doubt at all.’ So I put the telephone down. I 
was thankful to be alone. In all the war I never 
received a more direct shock. ... As I turned over 
and twisted in bed the full horror of the news sank 
in upon me. There were no British or American 
capital ships in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific 
except the survivors of Pearl Harbor, who were 
hastening back to California. Over all this vast 
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expanse of waters Japan was supreme, and we 
everywhere were weak and naked.134 
 
Japan had become the supreme force in the Far East whilst Britain and America 
were undoubtedly struggling.135 The loss of one of his favourites, Admiral Tom 
Philips, as well as the loss of life had far deeper reverberations for Churchill, and 
his beloved British Empire. The moment that the two ships sank to the ‘bottom 
of the sea’, it could be argued, was the moment that the vulnerability of the 
British Empire east of Suez became fully exposed.136 When describing the actual 
circumstances which led to the ships being torpedoed, in which ‘Chance played 
so fatal a part’, Churchill’s narrative extolled the virtues of Tom Phillips.137 He 
declared that Phillips was a man of good experience and sound judgement who, 
whilst expecting some form of air attack from ‘shore-based torpedo bombers,’ 
was certainly not expecting long-range aerial torpedo bombers.138 No one was: 
the ‘efficiency of the Japanese in air warfare was at this time greatly under-
estimated both by ourselves and by the Americans’.139  
Churchill usually dictated his memories of key events to a throng of 
willing secretaries.140 These dictated reminiscences formed skeleton drafts of 
what each chapter, book, or volume would contain. Each skeleton would then be 
farmed out to the relevant syndicate specialist for fleshing out. It was a tried and 
tested method which worked well for Churchill. One draft contains Churchill’s 
reminiscences on Admiral Phillips and the Japanese use of torpedo bombers.141 It 
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was obviously intended for inclusion in the third volume of memoirs and the date 
(noted on the document in Kelly’s hand) is January 1950.142 The third volume of 
memoirs was published in America on 24 April 1950 and in Britain on 20 July 
1950. Only three or four months before the volume was due to be published in 
America then, Churchill was still dictating his reminiscences of key events. This 
reveals that the third volume was no different to any other volume, in that it was 
always a race to finish.143 But in this instance, it arguably reveals that Churchill 
was obviously still troubled by the loss of Phillips.144  
Although not specifically writing about Phillips, Churchill wrote that it 
was to be understood that ‘it is no part of my plan to be needlessly unkind to the 
men we chose at the time, who no doubt did their best’.145 Even after nine years, 
Churchill still felt responsible for the loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. 
According to Allen, Churchill had wanted the ships to ‘vanish into the ocean 
wastes and exercise a vague menace’, and Allen remembered precisely what 
Churchill had called them—‘rogue elephants’.146 Allen had been asked by 
Churchill to investigate and report on the air conditions in Malaya (the number of 
operations which were being undertaken in Malaya, Sumatra and Java at the 
time). Allen’s reply disappointed Churchill as he wrote that even though the 
original report by Air Vice-Marshal Sir Paul Maltby made ‘interesting 
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reading’,147 there was nothing in the report (a total of 69 pages) which shed any 
‘further light on the episode of the “Prince of Wales”, and “Repulse”’.148 
Reynolds notes that it was on the sinking of these ships that Churchill’s mind and 
heart were engaged despite his political situation, his ill health, and the usual 
rush to get the volume to the printers.149 This note from Allen proves this to be 
so. 
Churchill wrote that Admiral Phillips had been a great supporter of 
‘sending convoys through the Mediterranean and conducting other operations 
without being deterred by the air risks’.150 He recalled how it had always been a 
risk and that some ships had been ‘struck or damaged’ but ‘no ship’—although 
what Churchill meant was no ‘capital’ ship—‘had been sunk by bombing up to 
the end of 1941’.151 Whilst Churchill described Phillips as not being ‘unduly 
afraid of the air’, that is to say not being unduly afraid of aerial bombing attacks 
on ships, he was of course conscious that Phillips was transferring his knowledge 
of conditions in the Mediterranean onto other waters.152 But, Churchill recalled, 
‘the Japanese did not use bombs; they used torpedoes’.153 Churchill asked why 
the British did not know that the Japanese had acquired these long-range torpedo 
bombers, and whether Phillips would have known of their existence.154 But 
Churchill seemed almost exasperated when he wrote, 
 
How was it that the Japanese had the very thing that 
the world had not thought of, something so much 
more deadly, although by no means novel, 
something which had not been used, or had been 
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discarded by all the powers engaged in the 
European war.155 
 
Churchill’s questioning continued. In what appears to be a tangential thought 
which occurred as he dictated his recollections, Churchill declared that ‘we must 
know what information we had, or if it was a complete surprise that the Japanese 
had these long-range torpedo-armed squadrons’.156 He also noted how the 
syndicate were to look at the ‘origin of the torpedo seaplane’.157 But it is the 
incredulous tone which pervaded Churchill’s dictated note which is still so 
striking. It illustrated not only how much he had underestimated the Japanese, 
but also just how much he was still an Admiralty man fighting a Victorian-style 
war. ‘How is it’, Churchill quizzed, ‘that the Japanese were a stride ahead in the 
whole of this move of naval war?’158 As Reynolds has noted, Churchill, was ‘still 
living in the battleship era’.159 Although Churchill was not the only one who 
was, to some extent, fighting the Second World War using the paradigm of the 
Great War or even the Boer War, in this instance Phillips ‘paid for such 
complacency with his life and those of eight hundred seamen’.160 
The idea that Churchill was stuck in a Victorian mindset was evident to at 
least one member of the syndicate.161 When reminiscing about his time in the 
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syndicate, Denis Kelly wrote that Churchill had originally intended the Prince of 
Wales and the Repulse ‘to dash out, strike and vanish into the milliard 
archipelagos and inlets of the Indian Ocean’.162 A manoeuvre that Churchill 
remarked upon in his memoirs and one which he implied had been the consensus 
amongst the Admiralty men gathered before him at a late night meeting on 9 
December 1941.163 Kelly went on to note how Churchill had forgotten how 
easily the British had cornered the Graf Spee and that this, along with his lack of 
geographical knowledge,164 had led to the ships becoming no more than ‘a 
hostage to fortune’ once they had reached Singapore.165 Churchill wrote that 
‘Chance’ had played a part in the fate of the ships, but he did not allude to the 
extent of his own role in giving ‘Chance’ a helping hand. Churchill obviously felt 
guilty over the loss of the ships—as Kelly noted, Churchill did indeed blame 
himself ‘for sending Tom Philips and his crews to their death’.166 Churchill’s 
guilt could account for the short, staccato phrasing and clipped sentence structure 
which Reynolds noted, and for the highly factual and almost clinically cold 
manner in which the circumstances surrounding the attack on both ships was 
written in the memoirs. In his drafted note, Churchill appeared almost desperate 
to absolve Phillips of any blame. He thought that the Admiralty should be 
consulted over whether this type of attack had ever happened before as, if not, it 
would prove to be ‘a great defence of Tom Phillips’.167 Almost a decade after the 
loss of the ships (and as the publication date for his third volume of memoirs 
loomed ever closer), Churchill was still reluctant to acknowledge (even in 
private) that his decision to send the Prince of Wales and the Repulse to 
Singapore and beyond had not been a sound one. Whilst not exactly side-
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stepping blame privately, Churchill would do little more than absolve himself of 
anything but collective blame in his memoirs. 
By presenting the long road to Pearl Harbor as he did, Churchill 
attempted to create a shared identity between the English-speaking peoples—
between Britain and America. The defining moment at which the ‘special 
relationship’ became cemented was certainly mythologised by Churchill, but his 
historical narrative tended to portray it as providential. America was officially 
brought into the Second World War and despite the grave disasters which Britain 
had endured, Churchill wrote that the ‘accession of [the] United States makes 
amends for all, and with time and patience will give certain victory’.168 When it 
came to re-asserting the shared identity in his memoirs, it had to be created all 
over again. The problem was that creating it over the Far East (when compared 
to other theatres such as the Atlantic, or the Mediterranean) meant that Churchill 
had to be interested in the Far East when he clearly was not. In fact, he was only 
ever interested in the Far East when it ‘affected the struggle for power’.169 The 
easiest way in which he could hold onto what had turned out to be a fragile 
‘special relationship’ was to forge the shared identity through one of his favourite 
concepts—turning defeat into victory. In short, Britain and America would be 
indelibly linked not just by democracy and language but by triumph over 
adversity. 
The areas upon which Churchill had little impact, and the subjects to 
which he had paid little attention during the war, certainly posed a problem for 
him when he came to recount them almost a decade later in his memoirs.170 It 
was not simply a case of his memoirs mirroring his wartime concerns,171 it was 
that his memoirs mirrored the concerns which he believed appeared more 
relevant to the Cold War world. This explains why Churchill’s portrayal of the 
advent of war with Japan was so scattered and so scant even after several years 
had passed. He had not cared about the circumstances or causes behind the long 
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road to Pearl Harbor and he had ignored the British Empire’s role in antagonising 
Japan since the Anglo-Japanese alliance had ended. What Churchill wished to 
accentuate was the way in which Pearl Harbor had meant that ‘England would 
live; Britain would live; the Commonwealth of Nations and the Empire would 
live.172 However by the end of the 1940s, Churchill had to find a way to turn his 
lackadaisical approach to the Far East before 1941 into a narrative which did not 
reflect badly upon either his own personal role, or that of a chastised and 
punished British Empire.  
Jay Gold commented that Churchill should perhaps have thought about 
‘giving only one chapter to Japan in the whole volume’.173 To Churchill’s credit 
he agreed with Kelly, who wrote that such a move would be ‘undesirable and 
difficult’.174 But Churchill, one suspects, did not agree to just a single chapter on 
Japan in the third volume of memoirs because it would have left him open to 
criticism over his general lack of attention eastwards. As Pownall in his diary, 
‘Winston ... didn’t believe the Japs would come into the war—not yet at any rate. 
For once his long range vision was at fault, and badly’.175 More importantly, if 
the advent of war with Japan had been introduced to the reader through only a 
single chapter, it would not have enabled Churchill to achieve his overall aim: to 
create a shared identity between America and Britain which had been born in 
wartime but had become of greater importance in the Cold War world. To have 
only one chapter show the lustrous beginnings of such a bond, as well as how 
efficient America had been at turning defeat into victory was not enough for 
Churchill—hence almost three chapters on Japan in the third volume. It was 
Churchill’s post-war desire to reinforce what he mythologized into a solid special 
relationship (myth making in action), which led him to place the onus for the war 
in the Far East on America.176  
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In his speech to the Commons on 16 August 1945, Churchill arguably 
started to cultivate this myth when he said that justification for the use of the 
atom bomb at Hiroshima, and then Nagasaki, was due to the ‘utterly unprovoked 
attack made by the Japanese war lords upon the United States and Great 
Britain’.177 This is why Churchill portrayed the long road to Pearl Harbor as one 
in which the American-led economic sanctions, and the failure of American 
diplomacy both in the long and short-term, had led not only to the Japanese 
internal political crisis but also to the subsequent quest for imperial expansion.178 
Until Churchill and his government actually fixed their gaze eastwards, too much 
had already occurred east of Suez. It was, for Churchill, definitely a case of too 
little, too late. As one historian notes, ‘Japan and events in the Far East ... played 
little part in his thinking and virtually none in his contemporary speaking and 
writing’.179 When it came to his memoirs, he had to then recount the ‘severe 
punishment’ which the Japanese had inflicted upon the British Empire.180 His 
depiction of this punishment was so successful that it is arguably the most used 
phrase in any history which examines what Churchill famously called the ‘worst 
disaster and largest capitulation in British history’—the ‘fall’ of Singapore.181 
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Illustration III 
 
 
American Isolationism was depicted by the cartoonist Philip Zec as ‘The First 
American Casualty’, Daily Mirror, c. 15 December 1941. 
 
Chapter IV: Churchill’s Portrayal of the Losses of Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore. 
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Chapter IV: Churchill’s Portrayal of the ‘Losses’ of Hong Kong, Malaya, 
and Singapore. 
 
Singapore has got to be held, for to lose it may well mean 
losing Australia, if not New Zealand. I don’t mean losing 
them to the Japanese, but to the Empire. ... That would 
lead to quite unpredictable results.1 
 
Writing these remarks in his diary five days before Hong Kong surrendered, Sir 
Henry Pownall (who became one of the syndicate’s military consultants) was 
aware that whilst losing Singapore to the Japanese would be a dire wartime loss, 
it would have significant and far-reaching consequences for the integrity of the 
British Empire. Almost a decade later, when Churchill was drafting his memoirs, 
he was confronted by these ‘rude shocks’ once again.2 Churchill had already 
faced his own profound sense of guilt and sadness when recounting the loss of 
the Prince of Wales, the Repulse and of Admiral Tom Phillips, in his memoirs. 
He had tried to avoid ‘the repercussions and the feelings aroused’ when editing 
his memoirs,3 and he found himself in the same situation when recalling the 
‘terrible forfeits’ which the British Empire in the Far East had endured during the 
war.4 So much so, that Pownall was assigned the task of writing the majority of 
the narrative about the loss of Singapore.5 After examining Churchill’s portrayal 
                                                 
1 Brian Bond (ed.), Chief of Staff: The Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry 
Pownall: Volume II (London: Leo Cooper, 1974), 20 Dec. 1941, p. 67. 
2 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume IV: The Hinge of Fate 
(London: Cassell, 1951), p. 81. 
3 CHUR 4/233B/240: Allen to Churchill, 23 Feb. 1949. 
4 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume III: The Grand Alliance 
(London: Cassell, 1950), p. 540. 
5 CHUR 4/258/23–4: Deakin to Churchill, ‘The Fall of Singapore’ chapter 
structure with assignment details, 27 July 1949. Deakin noted that ‘some 
reconstruction’ would ‘have to be done in the Far Eastern story’ and that Pownall 
would be responsible for four out of the five sections of the chapter. 
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of the losses of Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, and Burma, this chapter will 
illustrate not only what Churchill attempted to hide (his role in the weakening of 
the British Empire in the Far East) but also how successful he was in shaping 
‘the story of the British war effort for a generation’6 so that his personal role was 
far less visible or obvious.7 
Hong Kong first appeared in the third volume of Churchill’s memoirs, in 
the chapter on the ‘Japanese Envoy’.8 As previously mentioned, Deakin had 
suggested that this chapter be inserted into the volume in order to act as a way of 
chronologically locating the pre-war situation in the Far East within the wider 
history of the Second World War—especially as Churchill’s account had 
virtually ignored the Far East up to that point. The overall impression which this 
chapter gave was that Churchill, on behalf of Britain and her empire, had done 
everything in his power to stop, or at least delay, the outbreak of war in the Far 
East. Hastily written by Deakin himself, this chapter was part of the entire rush to 
‘finish the race’ to the publishers due to Churchill’s health and the Labour 
government—both of which were failing.9 Churchill wrote that the volume had 
to reflect the widening of the war and this, in turn, would mean that not only 
would the narrative be altered but also it would ‘become more general’, 
operational details would be ‘cut’, and the ‘broader issues’ would dominate.10 
Accordingly therefore, Churchill willingly prioritized his wish to cement the 
postwar union of the English-speaking peoples (whilst mythologizing its wartime 
origins) in favour of any spasmodic wartime eastward glances. This now all-too-
familiar occurrence enabled Churchill to ignore how he had commented, in an 
                                                 
6 Raymond Callahan, ‘Churchill and Singapore’, in Brian Farrell and Sandy 
Hunter (eds), Sixty Years On: The Fall of Singapore Revisited (Singapore: 
Eastern Universities Press, 2002), p. 156. 
7 See Leslie Illingworth’s cartoon, ‘Fun While It Lasts’, on p. 154. 
8 Churchill, Grand Alliance, ‘The Japanese Envoy’, pp. 156–72. 
9 David Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the 
Second World War (London: Allen Lane, 2004), p. 223. 
10 Ibid. 
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uncensored moment in 1941, that if the British were to ‘do badly’ in Europe the 
‘the Japs will be down on us like a ton of bricks’.11  
The job of compiling Churchill’s reference guide regarding operations in 
the Far East in December 1941 fell to Pownall. He wrote that the guide would 
provide Churchill with the ‘operational background for the last few chapters of 
Book 6’ but that he had ‘kept it entirely factual’ as Pownall understood that 
Churchill would ‘not propose to go deeply into these matters until Book 7’.12 
Pownall clinically presented the facts regarding the US troops at Wake Island13 
and the situation in the Philippines.14 The syndicate often used contemporary 
situation reports in order to ascertain facts, figures and statistics. The situation 
report for Hong Kong of December 1941 totalled eleven lines and 101 words—
half the amount Pownall used to describe the US troops on Wake Island, and a 
third of the amount that Pownall used to describe the situation in the Philippines. 
In these eleven lines of typescript, the available troops at the British garrison 
‘were far too few to be able to offer effective resistance’, and after ‘a week of 
severe fighting the whole garrison was forced to surrender’.15 It could be argued 
that Churchill needed more material on the American operations so he could 
better weave it into his own narrative. Perhaps a lengthy reference to Hong Kong 
was not needed because Churchill already knew the facts and the tale he would 
tell about them. This however, is supposition. The fact remains that Hong Kong 
warranted only eleven lines in Churchill’s reference guide which illustrated that 
Hong Kong, as far as Churchill was concerned, was an ugly sister when 
compared to the belle of the ball—Singapore.  
According to Churchill’s portrayal, Hong Kong had been weak and 
vulnerable for at least a year before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. It was 
even remarked at the time that ‘nobody’ pretended that the position of the 
                                                 
11 A.J.P. Taylor (ed.), Off the record: W.P. Crozier, Political interviews, 1933–
1943 (London: Hutchinson, 1973), c. before 8 June 1941, p. 225. 
12 CHUR 4/233A/123: Pownall to Churchill, 21 Dec. 1948. 
13 CHUR 4/233A/125: Pownall’s notes on Wake Island, c. Dec. 1948. 
14 CHUR 4/233A/126–7: Pownall’s notes on the Philippines, c. Dec. 1948. 
15 CHUR 4/233A/128: Pownall’s notes on Hong Kong, c. Dec. 1948. 
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Colony was ‘strong’.16 His narrative implied that the garrison and colony at 
Hong Kong had been thought of as weak and vulnerable; about which the British 
Empire, nor the General Staff and War Cabinet, could do little to counter. 
Churchill wrote that despite the ‘several telegrams’ he received from the 
Commander-in-Chief in the Far East which had urged the ‘reinforcement’ of 
Hong Kong,17 he had thought it ‘unwise to increase the loss’ that Britain would 
suffer and he wanted to ‘avoid frittering away’ British resources.18 In other 
words, Churchill portrayed Hong Kong as ‘untenable’—so much so that the 
wartime loss of Hong Kong to the Japanese was depicted as one of 
overwhelming inevitability.19 As Churchill had remarked in January 1941, ‘if 
Japan goes to war with us there is not the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong 
or relieving it’.20 Churchill’s portrayal of the situation in the Far East, at least the 
indefensible nature of the British garrison at Hong Kong, was not unique as he 
had not been the only MP to hold this view of Hong Kong. As Churchill was 
beginning to come out of the political wilderness in March 1939, and he was 
becoming an increasing thorn in the government’s side, he wrote a letter to 
accompany his ‘Memorandum on Sea-Power, 1939’ which he sent to the Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain.21 Chamberlain suggested that Lord Chatfield, the 
First Sea Lord, should read the memo and assess its relevance.22 In essence, 
Chatfield agreed with Churchill’s observations which centred primarily (at least 
as far as the Far East was concerned) upon one premise: if a war in the Far East 
                                                 
16 Kent Fedorowich, ‘‘Cocked Hats and Swords and Small, Little Garrisons’: 
Britain, Canada and the Fall of Hong Kong, 1941’, MAS, 37/1 (2003), citing Ian 
Morrison’s ‘A Letter from Hong Kong’, Aug. 1939, p. 112. 
17 Churchill, Grand Alliance, p. 157. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Churchill to Ismay, 7 Jan. 1941, in Churchill, Grand Alliance, p. 157. 
21 PREM 1/345/6: Churchill to Neville Chamberlain, accompanying letter to the 
‘Memorandum on Sea-Power, 1939’, 27 Mar. 1939. 
22 PREM 1/345/7–14: Churchill, ‘Memorandum on Sea-Power, 1939’, 25 Mar. 
1939. 
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were to run concurrently with a war in Europe, Britain would have to ‘take some 
risk in the Far East’ whilst ‘settling the Mediterranean’.23  
Churchill thus portrayed the overall weakness of the British Empire in the 
Far East, at least as far as Hong Kong was concerned, in its correct light.24 After 
all, Hong Kong’s position had been shown to be somewhat precarious since the 
Japanese had occupied Canton in 1938 and Hong Kong had become surrounded 
by Japanese held territory. Nonetheless this was still a surprising admission of 
Churchill’s, as such a bleak depiction of the British Empire’s lack of assuredness 
implied that the hold it had on the Far East was not as strong as once portrayed. 
But as the view that Hong Kong would inevitably be lost to an imperial enemy, if 
war in Europe ran concurrently, was widely acknowledged at the time, Churchill 
had little choice but to honestly narrate Hong Kong’s strategic precariousness.25 
Churchill hoped that by distracting the reader with such a succinct and pithy 
admission of Hong Kong’s hopeless position, he would be able to also gloss over 
his own part in its vulnerability.  
Churchill’s sagacity over the fall of Hong Kong was simply expressed 
when he wrote that he had harboured ‘no illusions about the fate of Hong Kong 
under the overwhelming impact of Japanese power’.26 In one sentence he had 
shown himself to be prescient of the inevitability of Hong Kong whilst reasoning 
that it had fallen to the Japanese due to their huge numbers and power. He 
narrated how the ‘desperate resistance’ of the British troops, whose ‘tenacity was 
                                                 
23 PREM 1/345/4: Chatfield to Neville Chamberlain, 29 Mar. 1939. 
24 See Kent Fedorowich, ‘Decolonization Deferred? The Re-establishment of 
Colonial Rule in Hong Kong, 1942–45’, JICH, 28/3 (2000), in which he explores 
the ‘tortuous wartime discussions’ between Britain, China and America over 
Hong Kong’s post-war future: ‘over the future of this imperial pearl’, p. 25. 
Fedorowich provides further evidence of Churchill’s post-war mythologizing of 
the ‘special relationship’ as these discussions are not referred to by Churchill 
within his memoirs. 
25 Whilst the rapidity with which Hong Kong would fall had always been subject 
to speculation, especially amongst the Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff since 
the early 1930s, the inevitability of the loss itself had been presumed all along. 
26 Churchill, Grand Alliance, p. 562. 
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matched by the fortitude of the British civilian population’, meant that the colony 
had ‘fought a good fight’.27 As in all his glances eastwards, the actual defence 
and battle for Hong Kong is only briefly mentioned by Churchill.28 Reynolds 
suggests that Churchill’s lack of attention to India and Burma in his memoirs was 
possibly explained due to the hollow-sounding nature of anything he could write 
in the post-war and post-independence era.29 But this argument does not apply to 
Hong Kong as it arguably became the prestigious face of the declining British 
Empire-Commonwealth in the post-war world.30 Why did Churchill pay such 
little attention to Hong Kong in his memoirs when he could have portrayed its 
loss as a prime example of a defeat into a victory (a favourite and recurring 
theme through the memoirs). What was Churchill attempting to hide? 
Churchill’s editing of original documents was hurried along so that he not 
only looked as if he was attempting to hit his deadlines, but also so that he could 
subtly mould his wartime utterances into what appeared to be benevolent 
understanding. In the two pages he allocated to the battle and defence of Hong 
Kong, he included two lengthy extracts of telegrams which he had sent to Sir 
Mark Young (the Governor of Hong Kong) on 12 and 21 December 1941 
respectively. In the 21 December telegram, Churchill was ‘greatly concerned’ 
about the landings made by the Japanese.31 His pragmatic yet tenacious manner 
was highlighted by including that Whitehall and the War Cabinet could not 
‘judge from here the conditions’ in which they were fighting but that there was to 
be ‘no thought of surrender’.32 Yet Churchill omitted three sentences from his 
original telegram: 
  
                                                 
27 Ibid., p. 563. 
28 Ibid., pp. 562–3. 
29 Reynolds, In Command of History, p. 336. 
30 Hong Kong was officially restored to China on 30 June 1997 after having been 
part of the British Empire (and the later Commonwealth) for over 150 years. 
31 Churchill, Grand Alliance, p. 563. 
32 Ibid. 
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The eyes of the world are upon you. We expect you to 
resist to the end. The honour of the Empire is in your 
hands.33 
 
These sentences may have been reminiscent of his imperial rhetoric of the 1930s, 
but they also illustrated the lack of knowledge, foresight and care Churchill had 
for the situation in Hong Kong. To include these sentences in his memoirs would 
have been detrimental to the tale he was telling to the post-war world. The 
‘honour of the Empire’ in the Far East would face ruin within four days of 
Churchill sending this telegram to Young, but this in itself was not solely what 
Churchill wished to conceal. It was his role in appointing Young in the first 
place, and the fact that Hong Kong’s Governor had surrendered while Churchill 
was at the helm. But Churchill possibly portrayed Hong Kong’s surrender in a 
succinct manner so he could distance himself from one of his own mistakes, 
which centred upon the differences between appointing civil or military 
Governors. 
 The military authorities questioned the competence of the acting 
Governor, N.L. Smith (who was providing temporary cover for Hong Kong’s 
Governor, Sir Geoffrey Northcote, who had taken leave following his Doctor’s 
advice). Smith had been appointed acting Governor twice before the likelihood 
of a Japanese attack on Hong Kong began to escalate in 1940. According to one 
historian, Smith was ‘unfitted to the demands of such an emergency’.34 Even the 
Commander-in-Chief of the China station wrote that he and the General Officer 
Commanding were  
 
in agreement that there is grave danger to ... Hong Kong 
if the present acting governor remains in office. He lacks 
decision and drive and things are muddling along. If [the] 
Colonial Office cannot spare a first class man in [the] 
very near future, we recommend [that] a Military 
                                                 
33 CHAR 20/47/63: Churchill to Sir Mark Young, 21 Dec. 1941. 
34 Norman Miners, Hong Kong under Imperial Rule, 1912–1941 (Hong Kong: 
OUP, 1987), p. 144. 
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Governor be appointed and that a senior soldier should be 
sent from India.35 
 
Churchill accepted Lord Lloyd’s advice and approved the War Office’s 
appointment without questioning it.36 This appointment was made at a time when 
France had just fallen, when the British Expeditionary Force had been evacuated 
from Dunkirk, and when the threat of British shores being invaded by German 
forces was at its zenith. But Churchill’s almost casual tacit approval meant that 
Major-General C.F. Norton took over from Smith until Northcote was due to 
arrive back in Hong Kong in March 1941. However, Northcote retired in 
September 1941 and was ‘immediately succeeded’ by Sir Mark Young, just 
twelve weeks before the Japanese invasion.37 This was a dizzying change in the 
chain of command in Hong Kong, and one which was not helped by the 
confusion within the colony itself. Churchill’s lack of awareness, or even his lack 
of care, over who would be best positioned in Hong Kong was another instance 
of too little, too late; as well as one example of a wartime error of judgement 
which Churchill later wished to gloss over. After all, admitting such errors 
detracted from the postwar mythologizing which Churchill was intent on 
nurturing through his manipulation of history. 
Another aspect of the battle for Hong Kong which Churchill’s all too 
brief narrative enabled him to sweep aside was the extent to which the Hong 
Kong garrison was so poorly manned. Already present in the garrison were four 
regular battalions: two British, the 2nd Royal Scots and 1st Middlesex; and two 
Indian, the 5/7th Rajput and 2/14th Punjab.38 With the arrival of the ‘unlikely 
                                                 
35 Ibid., Miners citing CO 129/583/19: Commodore, China Station to Admiralty, 
24 June 1940, p. 145. 
36 See John Charmley, Lord Lloyd and the Decline of the British Empire 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), pp. 251–60. 
37 Miners, Hong Kong under Imperial Rule, p. 145. 
38 Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan: Volume I, The 
Loss of Singapore (Uckfield, East Sussex: Naval & Military Press, 1957; edn, 
2004), p. 113. 
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commitment’ of a Canadian contingent battalion39 (2000 men of the Canadian 
Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers) in November 1941, having being 
transferred from their garrison duties in Newfoundland and the West Indies and 
arriving six weeks before the Japanese attacked,40 the Hong Kong garrison 
totalled nearly 12,000 men.41 In a conversation with Crozier, whilst Churchill 
was in America, Anthony Eden said that he could not understand why  
 
the soldiers have been wrong about events. Hong Kong, 
for instance, had held out for two weeks only, whereas all 
the plans had been made on the assumption that the place 
would hold out for four months.42  
 
Eden’s comment suggested that Whitehall was both disappointed and surprised 
by the short length of time for which Hong Kong had held out. According to the 
numerous Governors of Hong Kong, the likelihood of a Japanese attack on the 
colony had steadily increased since 1940. Thinking a Japanese attack might be 
likely, and knowing how indefensible Hong Kong would be meant the British 
garrison was kept comparatively light.43 It was sufficient for local duties, but to 
expect the garrison to commit to defensive duties was unrealistic, even when 
swelled by an influx of Canadian troops. And yet, according to Eden, little effort 
had been made to fight for as long as it had been presumed was possible. This 
was certainly not the impression that Churchill gave of the fighting itself but the 
reader suspects that by exalting the battle for Hong Kong in such brief terms (and 
                                                 
39 Ashley Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War (London: 
Hambledon Continuum, 2006), p. 65. 
40 Ibid., p. 66.   
41 Kirby, The War Against Japan: 1, p. 115. 
42 Taylor (ed.), Off the Record, Crozier recounting a conversation with Eden, 15 
Jan. 1942, p. 267. 
43 Oliver Lindsay, The Battle for Hong Kong, 1941–1945: Hostage to Fortune 
(London: Spellmount, 2005; edn, 2007) especially pp. 47–83. Based on the 
memories of John E. Harris, this confirms the extent to which the expectations of 
the Hong Kong garrison were unrealistic from the outbreak of war in Europe.  
Chapter IV: Churchill’s Portrayal of the Losses of Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore. 
 
132 
by singling out a few individuals for specific mention—an old stylistic trick of 
Churchill’s) he was able to distract the reader from the fact that it had been his 
decision to deliver the Canadian troops there. To admit this strategic error would 
have contradicted his previous assertion that he had thought it ‘unwise to 
increase the loss’ that Britain would suffer there and he wanted to ‘avoid 
frittering away’ British resources.44 Canadian troops had indeed been ‘frittered 
away’ and Churchill needed to hide this.  
During the First World War, Hong Kong had not been actively involved 
in hostilities and had ‘suffered few hardships apart from commercial 
dislocation’.45 After the Great War there was evidence of the deep distrust 
between the British rulers and the Chinese in Hong Kong.46 Norman Miners 
commented that during the early to mid-1930s Hong Kong had turned from a 
once-prosperous outpost of the British Empire into a troublesome, jaded, and 
subsequently less financially viable colony.47 Hong Kong’s downward economic 
turn had obviously been subject to the world-wide effects of the Great 
Depression, but colonial rule had added to the sense of unease within the colony 
itself. Hong Kong had come under the so-called protection of the British Empire 
in 1842 and was thought to be a shining example of ‘one of the cardinal 
principles of British colonial administration’ in that it was thought ‘imprudent 
and dangerous to disturb the native inhabitants of the colonies by any attempt to 
change their traditional social customs and arrangements’.48 Hong Kong 
subsequently acquired a symbolism which was of paramount importance to the 
British Empire in the Far East. Not only was Hong Kong the trade flagship of the 
British Empire in the Far East (it revealed the extent of the bluff and bluster 
which was involved in imperial holdings so far away from the mother country’s 
shores), but it also supposedly symbolised how the British Empire’s system of 
                                                 
44 Churchill, Grand Alliance, p. 157. 
45 Miners, Hong Kong under Imperial Rule, p. 7. 
46 Ibid., p.10. 
47 Ibid., pp. 12–24. 
48 Ibid., p. 153. 
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rule was morally better for the local population.49 By ruling in conjunction with 
local collaborators, the power structure was, at least in the case of Hong Kong, 
unobtrusively Chinese. The so-called ‘absent mindedness’ of the British 
imperialists fooled no one, as they proved themselves to have been sure of mind 
from the outset.50  
Having portrayed Hong Kong as a prime example of the benevolent and 
non-intrusive nature of the British Empire at its best, Churchill’s narrative 
implied that, despite the colony’s status, the British Empire was willing to 
sacrifice it (albeit temporarily) to the Japanese imperial war machine, in order to 
hold on to other imperial territories. Churchill capitalised on how the precarious 
wartime Hong Kong represented the imperialist nightmare of local sacrifice for 
the greater imperial good. An invaded Hong Kong however, allowed Churchill 
the poetic license to reinforce his postwar twist on the connection with wartime 
America. The fact that Hong Kong had been attacked and invaded within hours 
of Pearl Harbor gave Churchill something else with which to cement the Anglo-
American alliance.51 Churchill barely paid attention to the battle for Hong Kong 
as it served his purpose to blithely gloss over it and to hide how he had written in 
March 1939 that, should the Japanese attack, ‘they will take Hong Kong and 
                                                 
49 See Nadzan Haron, ‘Colonial Defence and British Approach to the Problems 
in Malaya, 1874–1918’, MAS, 24/2 (1990), for why Churchill’s portrayal was so 
erroneous regarding local populations and how the garrison in Hong Kong was 
manned. ‘In Hong Kong, the Hong Kong regiment was not raised from the local 
population, but from Sikhs and Pathans.’ See p. 279. 
50 Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society and Culture 
in Britain (Oxford: OUP, 2004).  
51 See Tony Banham, Not the Slightest Chance: The Defence of Hong Kong, 
1941 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005); John R. Harris, The 
Battle for Hong Kong, 1941–1945 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 
2005); and Philip Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the 
Japanese Occupation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003; edn, 2004), for 
compelling accounts of the battle for Hong Kong. 
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Shanghai, and clean us out of all our interests there’.52 Although Churchill 
believed that Britain would be able to rectify the situation ‘if we are still alive’, 
his lack of regard for Hong Kong was evident.53 The boundaries and limitations 
that Churchill set upon the battle for Hong Kong was evident in the official 
history of the war against Japan, as less than a tenth of the first of five volumes 
was devoted to the invasion and battle for Hong Kong.54 
On the day that the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and those ‘impudent 
little yellow men’ began ‘the real stuff even before they let their declaration be 
known’, they launched a simultaneous attack on Malaya.55 Seven days later 
Burma too was being invaded. Churchill cited the Russian entry into the war on 
the Allied side as one reason why Malaya fell to the Japanese. He claimed that 
the ‘entry of Russia into the war was welcome but not immediately helpful’ as 
the burden fell upon Britain to provide the Russians with the American supplies 
of which Britain itself had desperate need.56 Churchill wrote that  
 
in order to make this immense diversion, and to forgo the 
growing flood of American aid without crippling our 
campaign in the Western Desert, we had to cramp all 
preparations which prudence urged for the defence of the 
Malay peninsula and our Eastern Empire and possessions 
against the ever-growing menace of Japan.57 
 
Despite Churchill not wishing to ‘challenge the conclusion which history’ would 
affirm, ‘that the Russian resistance broke the power of the German armies and 
                                                 
52 PREM 1/345/12: Churchill to Neville Chamberlain, ‘Memorandum on Sea 
Power, March 1939’, 25 Mar. 1939. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Kirby, The War against Japan, Vol. I, pp. 119–52. 
55 Sandra Koa Wing (ed.), Mass Observation: Britain in the Second World War 
(London: Folio, 2007), Edie Rutherford (39-year-old, housewife, Sheffield), 8 
Dec. 1941, p. 115. 
56 Churchill, Grand Alliance, p. 350. 
57 Ibid., p. 351–2. 
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inflicted mortal injury upon the life-energies of the German nation’, he 
maintained that Britain had regarded the Soviet Union as a ‘burden and not as a 
help’.58 Two points of interest emerge from this passage. Firstly, Churchill 
distanced himself from any blame for the inadequate supplies for Malaya as, he 
claimed, they were needed to bolster Russia’s defence. Secondly, by assigning to 
the Western Desert offensive primacy over any other strategy further eastwards, 
Churchill revealed his preoccupation with events which would have a direct 
affect on the Mediterranean theatre. 
The chapter which narrated the Japanese advance on Singapore and 
Malaya was originally entitled ‘Shock at Singapore’.59 However within seven 
months the title was changed to ‘Penalties in Malaya’—as it would appear in the 
memoirs.60 A change to the chapter title was suggested by Kelly who thought 
that reverting to the chapter’s original title, ‘Retreat in Malaya’,61 was a better 
idea as it was ‘something which does not clash with Chap. 6 ‘Fall of 
Singapore’’.62 But this mention of the word ‘retreat’ was obviously not 
welcomed. Eventually Churchill plumped for ‘Penalties in Malaya’, as it implied 
that whilst such penalties were inevitable, they were merely temporary. Although 
Kelly, Pownall, and Allen were mainly responsible for this chapter, it was 
Churchill’s love of language, his proven ability to build up anticipation through 
his florid literary style, which brought about the change in title. After all, the 
                                                 
58 Ibid., p. 352. 
59 CHUR 4/255A/24: Front piece to chapter proof, ‘proofed out’ on 5 Jan. 1950. 
Word count marked by Kelly at 7,100 words. 
60 CHUR 4/255A/73: Front piece to chapter proof, dated 19 Aug. 1950 by Kelly; 
word count marked by Kelly at 7,600 words. See Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 
32–52. 
61 CHUR 4/255A/128: Front piece to chapter proof, ‘proofed out’ on 3 Aug. 
1949. Chapter title: ‘Retreat in Malaya’. A handwritten note states that this 
chapter had been ‘now merged in Fall of S’ [fall of Singapore chapter] and a 
second handwritten note indicated the intention to ‘add perhaps further in 
Burma’. 
62 CHUR 4/255B/153: Front piece to chapter proof, ‘proofed out’ on 24 Mar. 
1950. 
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1950 reader already knew of the ‘worst disaster and largest capitulation in British 
history’ so why spoil the effect?63 Why dilute the impact of the traumatic picture 
that Churchill was determined to paint, especially if it meant that he could 
conceal his own role in Singapore’s downfall. 
On the front cover of one of the chapter proofs for ‘Penalties in Malaya’ 
there are several notes in Churchill’s writing.64 The sub-headings for the chapter 
suggest that he clearly wanted to emphasize three points. The first was Wavell’s 
pivotal role in the retreat to the naval base on the island and how Wavell was 
‘pessimistic’.65 Churchill’s depiction of Wavell remained unaltered in the 
published chapter. The second noticeable emphasis was revealed by the way in 
which two sub-headings were crossed out. The first sub-heading deleted on this 
proof was entitled ‘Naval Failure to Protect the West Side of the Peninsula’.66 In 
the published edition, this sub-heading was replaced with ‘My Complaint of the 
West Coast Naval Defence’.67 A chapter front page proof therefore contains 
evidence that Churchill was already subtly twisting his portrayal of his role in the 
events leading up to the surrender of Singapore. The second sub-heading which 
Churchill scrubbed out was that which read ‘Question of Evacuating Singapore 
Garrison to Burma’. This sub-heading did not appear in the published version, 
nor did any watered-down version of it appear anywhere in print. To have 
included it would have implied that the garrison could possibly have been 
evacuated to Burma which, in turn, would have meant that these troops could 
have been deployed elsewhere and fewer British troops would therefore have 
surrendered to the Japanese. Sacrificing British imperial territory was one thing, 
but to be seen to have sacrificed the troops themselves would have damaged 
Churchill’s reputation.  
                                                 
63 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 81. 
64 CHUR 4/255A/73: Front piece to chapter proof, dated 19 Aug. 1950 by Kelly; 
word count marked by Kelly at 7,600 words. 
65 Ibid. 
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67 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 32. 
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The third and final emphasis on this front piece is how Churchill inserted 
a sub-heading: ‘Emphasis on the Keeping Open of the Burma Road’.68 This sub-
heading appeared in the published version as it allowed Churchill to divert 
attention away from the far-reaching consequences to the British Empire that 
Pownall had hinted in his diary five days before Hong Kong surrendered. It also 
enabled Churchill to accentuate the way in which he had followed the American 
preference for keeping links with Chiang Kai-Shek open. Saving British imperial 
‘face’ was of paramount importance to Churchill in the post-war world. His 
imperialism was confronted with Attlee’s watering down of the empire into a 
Commonwealth, and he was hoping to work closely again with America. 
Churchill appeared to believe that if he narrated how he had given preference to 
American wartime strategy in the Far East, at the cost of the British Empire, this 
would hold him in good stead. One consequence of Churchill’s personal 
motivation behind his portrayal was that his narrative influenced subsequent 
official histories, as Hong Kong and Malaya were deemed to be inevitable 
inconveniences and mere side-shows to the main event—the fall of Singapore.69 
It was Churchill’s portrayal of this ‘fortress of character’ that entranced the 
historical psyche and became truly mythologized.70  And all because he 
misdirected the reader away from his part in its downfall. 
It was sometime between the summer of 1949 and April 1950, that a 
reluctant Churchill finally recorded his thoughts about the ‘fall’ of Singapore.71 
By mid-1950 the fourth volume of Churchill’s memoirs had already gone 
through several proofing stages as both the American and British publication 
                                                 
68 CHUR 4/255A/73: Front piece to chapter proof, dated 19 Aug. 1950 by Kelly; 
word count marked by Kelly at 7,600 words. 
69 Major-General Stephen Woodburn Kirby, The War against Japan: Volumes I–
V (London: HMSO, 1957–69; Uckfield: Naval & Military Press edn, 2004). 
70 PREM 1/345/9: Churchill to Neville Chamberlain, ‘Memorandum on Sea 
Power, March 1939’, 25 Mar. 1939. 
71 Reynolds believes CHUR 4/255A/118 to date from the summer of 1949, see In 
Command of History, p. 295–6. However, a discussion with the Director of the 
Churchill Archives indicated that the document could date from as late as April 
1950. See Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 81. 
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deadlines loomed.72 The fact that Churchill, at so late a stage in the editorial 
process, was still reluctant to record his thoughts about Singapore indicated that, 
although almost a decade had passed, he was still affected by episodes that 
continued to nag ‘at his conscience’.73 But the loss of Singapore is a prime 
example of Churchill wanting to hide his own cumulative responsibility for the 
‘worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history’,74 as he omitted how, as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1924 to 1929, he significantly reduced 
government spending on the base in its crucial developmental stages.75 As 
Reynolds noted, whilst Churchill ‘hammered away at the naval estimates’ he was 
also determined to slash the budget for the base at Singapore.76  
There is not room in this thesis to delve into the fascinating offensive and 
defensive manoeuvres made by the Japanese and the British troops. Nor is there a 
need, as these matters have since been discussed and debated at great length.77 
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With every major anniversary of the fall of Singapore, further publications jostle 
for room on already crowded bookshelves.78 Churchill’s (or rather Pownall’s) 
historical narrative was indeed quite accurate as it acknowledged the lack of 
planning (regarding the placement of the guns), the lack of cover from what was 
deemed to be the most unlikely landward attack, the supposed impenetrable 
nature of the jungle, and the ill-timed blowing of the causeways—to name but a 
few strategic and logistical sticking points.79 By concentrating on the minutiae of 
the battle for Singapore, for example by going into great detail about the ill-timed 
destruction of a causeway, Churchill was trying to divert the reader’s attention 
away from the pivotal role he played in the actual pregnability of the fortress 
itself. By emphasising the catastrophic nature of the surrender, Churchill was 
hoping to divert attention from the manner in which the surrender symbolized the 
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overall weakness of the British Empire in the Far East—not  just in wartime and 
against the Japanese, but also during the interwar period.80 Finally, Churchill 
wished to avoid the criticism that his ill-informed perception of Singapore, as an 
‘impregnable fortress’,81 had in fact been his ‘cardinal mistake’.82 
Churchill distanced himself from the loss of Singapore, not only in the 
short term (by blaming Percival and Wavell rather than himself and the Chiefs of 
Staff back in London) but also in the long term. At the very beginning of his 
fourth volume, which contains the chapter on the fall of Singapore,83 the reader 
is confronted with the ‘Australian Anxieties’ over the looming Japanese threat.84 
By giving short shrift to John Curtin (1885–1945), the Australian Prime Minister, 
and by quoting from the telegrams which they exchanged, Churchill took great 
pains to show that he had not been responsible during the 1930s for ignoring the 
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warnings from the Dominions about the potential Japanese threat.85 Churchill 
deftly attempted to remove himself from the debate about the conception, and 
subsequent building, of the Singapore naval base by writing that he had not been 
in a position to influence any governmental decisions about the base for a period 
of eleven years before he became Prime Minister.86 By distancing himself from 
any responsibility for how the Singapore base had been financed, staffed and 
supplied in the decade before he became Prime Minister, Churchill was 
attempting to answer Curtin’s criticism—that Australia had made Britain aware 
in 1933 that in the event of a Japanese attack, unless a naval presence was 
permanently installed at Singapore, the ‘fortress’ would crumble away. When 
Curtin had requested that the 7th Australian Division not go to Rangoon and be 
diverted back to Australian shores, Pownall had predicted in his diary that 
‘Winston has certainly got a big stick to beat the Australians with now, and he’ll 
do it’.87  
Churchill’s very deliberate ordering of documents enabled him to 
distance himself from the causes of the ‘Australian anxieties’ throughout the 
fourth volume’s first book—entitled ‘The Onslaught of Japan’.88 Although he 
was not denying a shared responsibility, Churchill was setting the scene so he 
could avoid sole responsibility for the loss of Singapore—for what Pownall 
described as ‘these evil happenings’.89 Churchill was careful not to offend those 
whom he hoped to have as contemporary world leaders should he return to 
Downing Street. In one dictated draft he wrote that the Secret Sessions speeches 
would prove useful regarding the Australian warnings of the weaknesses at 
                                                 
85 Churchill could have pointed out that the Dominion’s anxiety over the way in 
which the Far East was reinforced and staffed had been a matter for concern for 
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88 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 3–367. 
89 CHUR 4/255A/110: Pownall to Churchill, 26 May 1949. 
Chapter IV: Churchill’s Portrayal of the Losses of Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore. 
 
142 
Singapore, but they would have to be used carefully as ‘one must avoid all 
squabbles with the Australians and their beastly general (Bennett) about it’.90 
Within, and around, his correspondence with Curtin, Churchill carefully placed 
the blame for the inadequate Australian protection of their own shores on party 
disunity within the Australian government.91  
Churchill wrote how he had pressed for an inquiry as to how Singapore 
could have fallen into Japanese hands but ‘we could not spare the men, the time, 
or the energy’.92 Logistically, and practically, this may have been true in 1942 
but it is more likely to have taken on a more euphemistic and concealed nature in 
the postwar years. An enquiry into why the fortress had fallen would doubtlessly 
have had to include Churchill’s own responsibility for the weakening of the 
defences at Singapore during the 1920s when he was Baldwin’s Chancellor. An 
inquiry would have highlighted how Churchill had not heeded Percival’s warning 
about the likelihood of Japan invading Malaya. It would also have highlighted 
Churchill’s (and Whitehall’s) continued insistence that this was just not going to 
happen—after all, as Churchill wrote, Japan would not consider conquering 
Singapore as ‘it is as far from Japan as Southampton from New York’.93 And 
finally, an inquiry would have reflected poorly on the British Empire as it would 
have highlighted the sheer folly of a naval base which did not have an adequate 
fleet and few modern planes to protect and accompany it. As it was, there ‘were 
no modern aircraft in Malaya when the Japanese invaded on 8 December 1941’ 
and, as the RAF’s most northern airfield at Kota Bharu was ‘abandoned the next 
                                                 
90 CHUR 4/258/68: Churchill dictated draft on Singapore, undated, c. summer 
1949–April 1950. See also, Lieutenant-General H. Gordon Bennett, Why 
Singapore Fell (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1944), in which Bennett concluded 
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93 PREM 1/345/10: ‘Memorandum on Sea-Power, 1939’, Churchill to Neville 
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day’, there was no hope of protecting Singapore.94 If an inquiry into Singapore 
had taken place in the aftermath of the war it may well have concluded all of the 
above. It may also have concluded that the ‘imperial disasters of 1941–42 had 
been obscured’ as there had been ‘no imperial Dunkirk moment, or imperial 
Blitz, no surge of imperial unity’.95 And if the question as to why Singapore’s 
importance had been obscured it may well have been answered by citing how 
little attention had been paid to it before, during and after the war. Churchill’s 
misplaced belief in Singapore’s unassailability, the way in which ‘when the war 
came in 1939 there were no resources to plug the holes’ that had been found in 
the defences,96 Churchill’s (and Whitehall’s) failure to listen to Percival’s 
warning, and his own role in the paucity of the budget for four years of 
Singapore’s early life meant that, by 15 February 1942, Singapore was lost to 
Japan and the prestige of the British Empire suffered a huge and devastating 
blow.  
A Dardanelles-style inquiry, either during the war or in its immediate 
aftermath, could have placed some of the blame for Singapore at Churchill’s feet 
and this could have proved detrimental to his attempt to be elected as Prime 
Minister in 1950 to 1951. In a dictated draft of his reminiscences on Singapore, 
Churchill even went so far as to write that he ‘did not intend to pass judgement 
on the behaviour of generals or troops at Singapore. Forgive us our trespasses’.97 
Here, Churchill attempted to lay the blame for the fall of Singapore as far away 
from himself as possible, and he wanted to avoid at all costs a situation in which 
his own judgement was called into question. In a conversation with Crozier in 
May 1942, Churchill said that he was not in favour of an enquiry ‘into all that led 
up to the Singapore disaster’ as he could not possibly spend anyone’s ‘energies at 
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this moment on enquiring into all that led up to it, and anyway I have got enough 
on to do without it’.98  Turning the tables on Crozier, Churchill asked him what 
he thought would be gained by holding an enquiry: ‘What good is the country 
going to get out of it?’99 When Crozier reminded him that an enquiry had been 
held over the Dardanelles, Churchill ‘spoke with an air of humorous 
understatement’ and said that, 
 
Who or what gained by that Commission? I did, and I 
alone. Before it reported I could not get a place in the 
Government at all, but after it had reported and 
exonerated me, I went back into the Government. I 
gained but no one else!100 
  
When Churchill was drafting his reminiscences of the fall of Singapore in 1949–
50, the cock-sure confidence he had exhibited in front of Crozier had definitely 
waned. No report, no Dardanelles-style enquiry, meant there would be no 
outright apportioning of blame which was obviously convenient for Churchill, as 
well as for Attlee’s already strained Labour Government, yet Churchill still side-
stepped Singapore as much as he could as he was all too aware of his own 
‘trespasses’. As he wrote, possibly warning the syndicate and Pownall in 
particular, although it had been his plan to have an enquiry, he was ‘not going to 
go into details at all on this subject’.101 
The first way in which Churchill could avoid being confronted over 
Singapore was by allowing Pownall free rein over the chapter. When Pownall 
began to collect material for the chapter on the fall of Singapore, he wrote to 
Churchill and informed him that, as Percival’s despatches on Singapore had been 
published at the time, ‘there was a good summary of it in The Times’102 which 
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Churchill would possibly find ‘convenient for reference’.103 This presented 
Churchill with a problem: how would he portray the fall of Singapore to a 
readership which already knew the circumstances of its fall without drawing 
attention to his own role in the disaster? Churchill eased this direct responsibility 
by having Pownall write the chapter. In fact, the first name to appear in the 
acknowledgements to volume four was Pownall’s,104 and Churchill made a rare 
accreditation within the text itself when he wrote that Pownall had ‘set forth in 
full the policy followed in the years before the war about the Singapore fortress’ 
and that Pownall’s memorandum, which had been written in 1949, was ‘a 
balanced account’.105  
On the question of whether the defences of Singapore island’s north shore 
had been adequate or not, Pownall wrote that he had tried to be as objective as 
possible and that he had attempted to present Churchill with ‘reasons rather than 
excuses’.106 Pownall’s brief paper, the ‘Defence Works of Singapore’ was duly 
sent to Churchill.107 The final paragraph of Pownall’s report is worth quoting in 
full as it illustrates perfectly how Singapore was neglected as, in reality, it was 
nothing more than imperial bluff and bluster.  
 
Percival has pointed out, and with truth, that the Malayan 
defence scheme was reviewed by the War Office and the 
Committee of Imperial Defence. If there was lack of 
foresight the Commanders on the spot were not the only 
ones to blame. In this I do not exclude myself, as I was in 
the War Office in 1938/39 and again in 1941. I do not 
recall that defences on the North Shore were ever mooted 
whilst I was there. In those years there were so many 
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1942 ; and CHUR 4/255A/101: ‘Potential Significance of Singapore: British 
Bluff Called’, The Times, 27 Feb. 1942. 
104 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. viii. 
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more urgent and dangerous problems nearer home that 
Singapore did not, I fear, get a high priority in our 
thoughts or on our working time.108 
 
There was undoubtedly a lack of preparedness for war in the Far East which was 
attributable to not only Churchill’s mistaken long-range view but also to strategic 
factors. For example, there were no trained Photographic Interpreters (PIs) in 
Singapore and ‘it was only when the Buffalo and Blenheim prints started to come 
in that the Air Ministry decided to form a Far East Interpretation Unit at 
Seletar’.109 The first PIs left Britain in February 1942 but it was too little too 
late—in two weeks Singapore surrendered.  
Despite such strategic shortcomings, Pownall did not give excuses but 
reasons as to why it had been so and he displayed a brutal honesty in his chapter 
on the fall of Singapore. His honesty can be attributed to his expert knowledge of 
the Far East but a discernable sense of relief can also be seen in his account. 
After all, as Churchill pointed out, it had to be remembered that had Pownall not 
become Wavell’s Chief of Staff he would have ‘been called upon to bear the 
terrible load which fell upon the shoulders of General Percival’.110 When he later 
became Mountbatten’s Chief of Staff, Pownall wrote that:  
 
I had no option but to take it on. ... What I did NOT want 
to do was to have anything connected with the war in 
Asia! ... I have never liked the look of the anti-Jap 
campaign to be carried out on their very strong western 
defensive flank. ... This last four years has been for me a 
game of Snakes and Ladders anyway. I gather the P.M. 
warmly seconded the idea of my appointment—he seems 
quite reasonably disposed towards me provided I am not 
near him!111 
                                                 
108 CHUR 4/258/29–30: Pownall, ‘Defence Works of Singapore’, 30 Dec. 1948. 
109 Andrew J. Brookes, Photo Reconnaissance (London: Ian Allen, 1975), p. 155. 
110 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 82.  
111 Bond (ed.), Chief of Staff: Vol. II, 14 Sept. 1943, p. 108. 
Chapter IV: Churchill’s Portrayal of the Losses of Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore. 
 
147 
 
Despite Pownall’s feelings towards the Far East and the way in which the war 
against Japan had been prosecuted, he managed to attain some distance from his 
wartime feelings even though he was an integral member of the syndicate. He 
and Ismay frequently wrote to each other as members of the syndicate and whilst 
it is doubtful that Pownall would have shown his diary entries to Churchill 
personally, perhaps Ismay did not reveal his pronouncements at the time to 
Churchill either. Dismayed by the fall of Singapore, Ismay wrote that it had been 
‘good to learn that some of the troops at any rate put up a desperate fight’ which 
suggested that perhaps Percival’s men and the troops who surrendered at 
Singapore were indeed much-maligned by their own side.112 Pownall wrote to 
Churchill extolling the virtues of Percival’s despatch on Malaya.113 He wrote that 
the despatch was ‘very comprehensive, much more so than an ordinary despatch’ 
as Percival had surveyed ‘the various changes in defence policy before the war’ 
and included ‘considerable detail’ on the operations in Malaya themselves.114 
Pownall commented that Percival had attributed the ‘lack of defence works on 
the landward side of Singapore Island’ to a ‘shortage of funds (from Home) 
before December 1941’ and a ‘shortage of labour after that date’.115 Pownall 
reassured Churchill that whilst Percival had been ‘quite entitled to say all he has 
said’, Percival’s tone had in fact been ‘moderate’ and he had ‘dealt lightly with 
the Australians’.116 Intrigued by Pownall’s interpretation of Percival’s despatch, 
a concerned and curious Churchill scribbled a brief note to Pownall: ‘Gen. P., 
Please speak to me about this’.117  
In another letter to Churchill, Pownall wrote that he had thought it 
‘important to bring out that the whole problem of Malayan defence in 1941 had 
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been cast into the melting pot by the events of the previous two years’.118 If 
Churchill did not explain this to his readers then the ‘disaster to our arms will 
remain a puzzle’119 which implied (although Pownall did not write this) that it 
would decidedly harm Churchill’s prospects of getting back into Downing Street. 
Pownall wrote that he had ‘not tried to embellish the language’ which had been 
used in the reports on the ‘operations in Malaya and Singapore Island in January 
and February 1942’,120 and maintained that these notes were for Churchill’s use 
as reference material only, which explained why Pownall had not given a 
commentary. Pownall had merely presented Churchill with references in note 
form so that Churchill could explain ‘if only in part, how these evil happenings 
came to pass’.121 
Churchill’s dictated draft on Singapore is surprisingly blunt and honest 
especially when it is placed against his overwhelming desire (especially in 1950) 
to oust Attlee’s Labour government and romp back to Downing Street during 
peacetime.122 Churchill wrote that: 
 
it must be admitted I did not attempt to turn my mind on 
to the situation until after the Japanese had declared war 
and the Americans were our Allies. Then I did, and it was 
too late, but even if it had not been too late, it would have 
been right not to do it.123 
 
His prophetic ability, one of the myths he had built up over the first three 
volumes of memoirs, was deeply shaken by this admission; but even more 
surprising was his blatant and continuing disregard for the Allied troops left 
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behind in Singapore at the time of surrender. This is evident in the note, as 
Churchill had crossed out the sentence which read ‘but even if it had not been too 
late, it would have been right not to do it’ and replaced them with five words: 
‘The major dispositions were right’.124 The only major dispositions on 
Churchill’s mind at the time were defining and refining a combined Anglo-
American policy for the defeat of Japan and protecting the heart of the British 
Empire—India. Churchill’s lack of regard for the Far East equated with its 
willing sacrifice. Sacrificing Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore were necessary 
evils so long as Burma could still act as a geographical protector to India. 
The publication of the Secret Wartime Sessions had caused a furore in 
Australia in 1946. The resulting international enmity felt between the motherland 
and Australia had only just begun to settle when Pownall was beginning to write 
the chapter on Singapore. The neutrality of the chapter was essential to how 
Churchill’s wartime self would be depicted in a post-war world—a world in 
which Churchill thought he could still serve King and, if not Empire, at least 
Commonwealth. By stirring the reader’s sense of defeat and humiliation 
Churchill actually exaggerated the emotional memory of the fall of Singapore. 
Some did feel distressed at the suffering brought about by the greatest defeat and 
humiliation at the time, but in reality the fall of Singapore was not a subject 
which emotionally crippled the general public in Britain. The Mass Observation 
archive entries, between February and March 1942, suggest that whilst the fall of 
Singapore was noted with some regret, it was not uppermost in British people’s 
thoughts. They were more concerned with the two German battleships, the 
Scharnhurst and Gneisenau, and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen making a clear 
run for it through the English Channel. As one of Mass Observation’s 
correspondents wrote, 
 
I had been expecting the fall of Singapore. I’m feeling 
very hopeless about the war situation. The Far East is bad 
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enough but when you hear the English Channel is a clear 
passage to three German battleships ... well!125 
 
Although Churchill announced the fall of Singapore on the BBC at 9 pm 
on 15 February 1942 it was presented as only a small part of the whole world 
war.126 According to one contemporary, Churchill ‘spoke for about 35 minutes 
and, as usual, spoke well’ but his appeal for loyalty and calm was ‘uncalled for’ 
and could have been ‘misinterpreted as an appeal to stick to him’.127 The 
nervousness of the general public did not go unnoticed by one politician, the 
ubiquitous diarist Harold Nicolson, who wrote that Churchill’s ‘broadcast last 
night was not liked. The country is too nervous and irritable to be fobbed off with 
fine phrases’.128 Churchill may have admitted in his skeletal dictated notes that 
he had not paid enough attention to Japan, or indeed to the Far East as a whole, 
but this was no different to how he had been in 1942. Churchill felt the need to 
impose a new and reasonably false heightened reaction to the ‘worst disaster and 
                                                 
125 Kao Wing (ed.), Mass Observation, Henry Novy (conscript who became a 
paid investigator for MO and one of the first trustees appointed at the MO 
archive in the 1970s), 15 Feb. 1942, p. 126. 
126 Jock Colville noted how he had been on duty in Pretoria when he heard 
Churchill’s announcement on the radio of the fall of Singapore. Colville wrote 
how the ‘nature of his words, and the unaccustomed speed and emotion with 
which he spoke, convinced me that he was sorely pressed by critics and 
opponents at home. All the majesty of his oratory was there, but with a new note 
of appeal, lacking the usual confidence of support’. John Colville, The Fringes of 
Power: Downing Street Diaries, Volume II, October 1941–April 1955 (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1985; Sceptre edn, 1987), 15 Feb. 1942, p. 46. 
127 Stuart Ball (ed.), Parliament and Politics in the age of Churchill and Attlee: 
The Headlam Diaries, 1935–1951 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1999), 15 
Feb. 1942, p. 295. See also Nicolson (ed.), Nicolson Diaries, where Nicolson 
noted that Churchill appealed for national unity  in an unfortunate manner which 
recalled Neville Chamberlain (a barbed insult indeed), 15 Feb. 1942, p. 258. 
128 Nigel Nicolson (ed.), The Harold Nicolson Diaries, 1907–1963 (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2004), 16 Feb. 1942, p. 258. 
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largest capitulation in British history’ to avoid personal criticism.129 After all, 
any detailed examination of his pre-war and wartime record could damage his 
future political aspirations which, in 1950, looked close to becoming a reality. 
Surprisingly, the galleys and proofs for the chapter on Singapore are less 
revealing than other chapters. Normally the positioning of the actual chapter 
itself changed repeatedly, as did the sub-titles, but compared to other chapters, 
such as the ‘Penalties in Malaya’ chapter proofs, little was changed. Annotations 
and notes were made on the proofs, and facts were checked and verified. When 
compared however, to the habitual re-structuring of sub-titles and the seemingly 
endless and sometimes inconsistent positioning and then re-positioning of other 
chapters, very little re-arranging was carried out. Churchill felt that his wartime 
errors of judgement should be underplayed in order to preserve his postwar, 
almost mythic-like, reputation of being omnipotent and omnipresent. As he was 
so appalled by the loss of imperial prestige which the fall of Singapore had 
caused, especially the way in which the ‘manner of this defeat was its worst 
consequence’,130 Churchill tried to misdirect the reader by giving strategic 
accounts of flaws and poor happenstance. It was hoped that this brave-faced 
admission of such a grievous defeat would be enough to maintain his wartime 
reputation and his post-war ambitions.  
Pownall had recorded in his diary that the loss of Singapore would have 
far-reaching consequences for the British Empire. Nicolson elaborated on this 
sentiment when he wrote that the surrender had been ‘a terrific blow to all of us’. 
Not merely, Nicolson continued, due to the ‘immediate dangers which threaten 
the Indian Ocean and the menace to the communications with the Middle East’, 
and not because it appeared that the British were ‘only half-hearted in fighting 
the whole-hearted’.131 Nicolson felt most aggrieved by the way in which the 
disaster of Singapore had completely knocked the confidence out of the empire. 
Whilst the surrender at Singapore had dented the military egos of the Chiefs of 
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Staff and threatened to hamper the war effort in both the Middle and Near East, it 
was once again the wider connotations which concerned Nicolson (just as they 
had done Pownall). It was the wider threat to the entire empire being destabilized 
which concerned Nicolson. The prospect of being accused of fighting half-
heartedly would have hit Churchill hard, especially as the battle-fresh, anti-
imperialist Americans had only recently started their war. To be seen to be 
fighting half-heartedly for an empire which supposedly meant so much to the 
British, made a mockery of Churchill’s imperialism. This was why he tried to 
distance himself from having to confront those realisations all over again when it 
came to editing his memoirs.  
Churchill attempted to hide his role in the underlying reasons for the 
weakness of imperial prestige in the Far East and to downplay what he had 
thought would be ‘merely a passing phase’.132 Although it was accepted that 
Hong Kong and Singapore were formally back under the control of the British 
Commonwealth in the postwar world, the truth of the matter was that, despite all 
of his contrary prevarications, Churchill willingly sacrificed the Far Eastern arm 
of the British Empire in order to protect what he saw as the heart of the empire—
the British Raj in India. It was not simply a matter of having turned his mind to 
the situation in the Far East when ‘it was too late’.133 It was that Churchill had 
known that this was a risk he and Britain would willingly take. As he had written 
to Chamberlain in March 1939:  
 
On no account must anything which threatens in the Far 
East divert us from this prime objective. ... If Japan joins 
the hostile combination, which is by no means certain, for 
she has her hands full, all our interests and possessions in 
the Yellow Sea will be temporarily effaced. We must not 
be drawn from our main theme by any effort to protect 
                                                 
132 Churchill, Grand Alliance, p. 540. 
133 CHUR 4/258/58: Churchill, skeleton draft, undated. 
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them. ... we must bear the losses and punishment, 
awaiting the final result of the struggle.134 
 
In a letter to Martin Gilbert, Dennis Kelly wrote that he had once asked Churchill 
‘what were the biggest mistakes in the War?’ Churchill’s ‘immediate answer’, 
according to Kelly’s recollection, was ‘losing Singapore and letting the Russians 
into Europe’.135 Churchill may have dictated a note which read that he wanted ‘to 
tell about the awful losses not only in Singapore but in Java. A complete cataract 
of disaster’, but this did not stop him from portraying the losses of Hong Kong, 
Malaya, and Singapore as inevitable, unfortunate, and debilitating, 
respectively.136 At the time however, none of the losses were anticipated as being 
more than temporary sacrifices—made only to secure India’s safety. Churchill’s 
imperial rhetoric had to be toned-down in his memoirs. After all, Attlee’s Labour 
government had clawed back Hong Kong as well as the strategically important 
Singapore naval base. They had also secured Malaya (at least for the time being). 
Whilst Churchill had been prepared to lose face during the war and to concede 
territory to an imperial enemy, he was not however prepared to concede territory 
to a British imperial subject—to Gandhi. This Churchill would never do. The 
following chapter will examine his portrayal of his reactions to the series of 
crises in India, from 1942 to 1943—the failure of the Cripps Mission, the ‘Quit 
India’ campaign, the search for a new Viceroy, and the Bengal famine. 
                                                 
134 PREM 1/345/9: ‘Memorandum on Sea-Power, 1939’, Churchill to Neville 
Chamberlain, 25 Mar. 1939. 
135 DEKE 1: Denis Kelly to Martin Gilbert, 11 Oct. 1988. 
136 CHUR 4/261/197, ‘Burma’, notes by Churchill, undated. 
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Illustration IV 
 
 
 
Leslie Illingworth, ‘Fun While It Lasts’, Daily Mail, 18 Feb. 1942.  
 
Illingworth depicted Japanese Commander-in-Chief General Hideki Tojo 
trying on the jacket of Malaya and a hat with Singapore plumage—in an 
Australian bedroom no less (the hat on the bed gives this away). The 
coats of Burma, New Zealand and India are in the wardrobe waiting to be 
tried on for size and on the boots (to the left of the chair) are the names of 
Java and Sumatra. 
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How great the temptation is in such circumstances to look 
for shortcuts, or easy solutions ... But we have got to the 
point ... in the Indian situation in which shortcuts are no 
good and ... we have to face the hard facts.1 
 
Writing in November 1942, an exasperated Lord Linlithgow (the longest-serving 
Viceroy of India), lamented how he had been unable to implement shortcuts and 
easy solutions regarding the Cripps Mission, ‘Quit India’, and the search for a 
new Viceroy. The ‘hard fact’ which confronted Churchill was that the issue of 
Indian self-government was not only back on the table but, in 1942, the allied 
war effort and American sentiment ensured that it could no longer be ignored. In 
effect, the wartime struggle for power east of Suez was no longer against the 
Japanese—it was a struggle against the left in Britain, against American anti-
imperialism and against Indian nationalism. Churchill’s views on India were 
notorious, and had ‘chained him to the back benches’ in the 1930s,2 but when it 
came to his memoirs, the question was not whether his ‘curious complex about 
India’ would taint his portrayal of the Cripps Mission, the Quit India campaign, 
the search for a new Viceroy, and the Bengal famine of 1943, but how could 
Churchill stop his past from affecting his present and his future? 3 
In Churchill’s Second World War, there remains a discernible and, at 
times, highly distinct difference between Churchill the wartime leader and 
Churchill the post-war statesman. Considering that Churchill wanted to be Prime 
Minister of peacetime Britain it is no surprise that Churchill the post-war 
                                                 
1 Nicholas Mansergh and E. W. R. Lumby (eds), Transfer of Power: Volume III, 
Reassertion of Authority, Gandhi’s fast, and the succession to the Viceroyalty, 21 
September 1942–12 June 1943 (London: HMSO, 1971), Linlithgow to Amery, 1 
Nov. 1942, p. 183. 
2 Robin James Moore, Churchill, Cripps, and India: 1939–1945 (Oxford: OUP, 
1979), p. 1. 
3 Penderel Moon (ed.), Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal (Karachi: OUP, 1974),  
p. 3. 
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statesman is, by far, the loudest voice. But whenever India featured in his 
narrative, the wartime and post-war Churchill became so intertwined that it still 
proves difficult to separate one from the other. This difficulty is not helped by 
the way in which the series of crises which affected India in 1942 to 1943 either 
led into each other, or occurred concurrently. Arguably the Quit India campaign 
was a result of the failure of the Cripps Mission, and the search for a new 
Viceroy preceded the origins of the Mission itself. John H. Plumb noted how 
Churchill had the ability in his memoirs to drive roads through the chaos and 
confusion of the Second World War.4 But when Churchill attempted to narrate 
the circumstances of this critical period in the allied wartime story, the chaos and 
confusion enabled him to ‘bury his mistakes’,5 and diffuse the impact that this 
period of ‘shocks and change’ had had upon his post-war reputation.6 Whilst 
Churchill’s narrative mirrored the seesawing of the chaotic episodes themselves, 
the already confused narrative became further muddled due to the large amount 
of material that Churchill included about this period and especially about his 
portrayal of the background to the Cripps Mission. Although a welcome contrast 
to the rare and infrequent glances he generally made east of Suez, this increase in 
volume became part of the overall attempt at misdirection. 
The scene that Churchill set for the failure of Cripps’s Mission to India 
was long-ranging. It began in the third volume of memoirs, and focused on 
Cripps* himself and what Churchill deemed to be his ineffectiveness as British 
Ambassador to Moscow from June 1940 till January 1942.7 Churchill’s account 
                                                 
4 John H. Plumb, ‘The Historian’, in A.J.P. Taylor (et al), Churchill: Four Faces 
and the Man (London: Allen Lane, 1969), p. 149. 
5 Harry C. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower: The Personal Diary of 
Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR Naval Aide to General Eisenhower, 1942–
1945 (London: Heinemann, 1946), 31 May, 1943, p. 270. Cited by David 
Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second 
World War (London: Allen Lane, 2004), p. 40, fn. 11.   
6 CHAR 20/99B/172: Churchill’s speech at the farewell dinner in honour of 
Wavell before leaving to take up his post as Viceroy of India, 6 Oct. 1943. 
7 See Peter Clarke, The Cripps Version: The Life of Sir Stafford Cripps 1889–
1952 (London: Allen Lane, 2002), pp. 183–241, for a nuanced yet brief account 
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of Cripps in Russia was quite damning as well as inaccurate, and it laid the 
groundwork for his portrayal of Cripps’s failure to solve the political deadlock in 
India in April 1942.8 Put simply, Churchill distanced himself from the lack of 
resolution achieved in India in 1942 by using Cripps as a scapegoat.9 
Unsurprisingly Churchill judged it far less a folly to pillory Cripps (who was 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in Attlee’s Labour government and known as 
‘Austerity Cripps’ at the time of publication of the third volume of memoirs), 
than it was to jeopardise his own political future—especially since the prospect 
of a general election was looming. Churchill made no mention of how Cripps had 
to be constantly on guard in Moscow. Nor did Churchill mention Cripps’s 
unenviable task of interweaving and satisfying the demands, mentalities and egos 
of two of the most challenging leaders that Britain and Russia had ever had—
Churchill and Stalin. Churchill ended his initial diatribe on Cripps’s behaviour in 
Moscow by writing that he could not ‘form any final judgement upon whether 
my message, if delivered with all the promptness and ceremony prescribed, 
would have altered events’. But the damage was done, and it was nonetheless a 
damning indictment upon Cripps.10 It was also an indication as to how Churchill 
                                                                                                                                    
of Cripps in Moscow; and Gabriel Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps’ Mission to 
Moscow, 1940–1942 (Cambridge: CUP, 1984), for a fuller analysis of Cripps in 
Moscow.  
8 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume III, The Grand Alliance 
(London: Cassell, 1950), pp. 315–52. Churchill’s account was inaccurate in that 
Cripps replied to him explaining why he delayed delivery of the telegram on the 
5 April and not, as Churchill maintained, on 12 April 1941. 
9 Clearly not everyone thought of Cripps as a failure in Moscow: ‘We ally 
ourselves with the USSR at last! Cripps must have been doing excellent work’. 
Maggie Joy Blunt (writer), who kept a sporadic diary for Mass-Observation from 
1939–50, in Sandra Koa Wing (ed.), Mass-Observation: Britain in the Second 
World War (London: Folio Society, 2007), entry dated 22 July 1941, p. 100. 
10 Churchill, Grand Alliance, p. 323. 
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would portray, or rather manipulate, the history of Cripps’s role in the Mission to 
India.11 
Considering how lackadaisical Churchill’s glances eastwards were, the 
chapter he dedicated to the Cripps Mission is comparatively lengthy.12  The 
overall theme of the fourth volume was ‘How the power of the Grand Alliance 
became preponderant’.13 Perhaps Churchill was being intentionally ironic, as it 
was mainly pressure from American anti-imperialists that ensured he could no 
longer prevaricate over the Indian Congress, the rise of nationalism in India, and 
the supposed lack of wartime spirit and energy coming from India—the ‘central 
bastion’.14 In order to placate wartime American sensibilities about the 
questionable nature of British imperialism (especially the Raj in India), Churchill 
had no alternative but to despatch Cripps to India. Churchill admitted in his draft 
notes on ‘1942’ that Cripps, having ‘come home from Russia with such left-wing 
prestige’, was the right man for the Indian mission.15 But he also wanted in his 
forward-looking post-war memoirs to solidify the Anglo-American alliance in 
the English-speaking national consciousness. This presented Churchill with a 
problem as the Cripps Mission (and India in general) revealed the true nature of 
the wartime ‘special relationship’—a mutually convenient yet temporary and 
relatively volatile amalgamation of two world powers. Considering how much 
Churchill needed to coddle American support in 1951, and after having devoted 
                                                 
11 See H. Hanak, ‘Sir Stafford Cripps as Ambassador to Moscow, May 1940–
June 1941’, English Historical Review, 94/370 (Jan. 1979), pp. 48–70: and ‘Sir 
Stafford Cripps as Ambassador to Moscow, June 1941–January 1942’, English 
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Officers and Men (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. 471. 
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almost a whole volume to the burgeoning wartime Anglo-American alliance, he 
was positively vituperative when dealing with Roosevelt’s 1942 opinions on the 
Indian problem. As Reynolds remarked, ‘Churchill’s harshest words about 
Roosevelt ... are reserved for the President’s interference in the affairs of the 
British Empire over India’.16  
The grounds for the despatch of the Cripps Mission were subtlety twisted 
by Churchill in his account written in the post-war, post-Indian independence 
world. He attributed the reasoning behind the Cripps Mission to the ‘staggering 
blow’ of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor which, in turn, had increased the 
‘stresses latent in Indian politics’.17 Churchill claimed that it was the Indian 
political leaders—especially Gandhi (who was supported by a ‘powerful body of 
articulate opinion’)—who believed that ‘India should remain passive and neutral 
in the world conflict’.18 He attributed the increased rancour and division between 
Hindu and Muslim Indian political leaders to the visit by the Chinese 
Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-Shek* and his wife, to India in February 1942.19 
Although the ‘object of their journey was to rally Indian opinion against Japan’, 
Churchill wrote that the visit had actually increased the Indian party leaders 
‘pressure upon the British Government ... to yield to the demands of Congress’.20 
Churchill acknowledged that whilst there had been some attempt to create a 
‘common front’ by a handful of Congress leaders,21 it was ultimately ‘Indian 
politics and the Press’ who ‘echoed the rising discords between the Hindu and 
the Moslem communities’.22 By emphasising how he wanted to avoid ‘dealing 
                                                 
16 Reynolds, In Command of History, p. 336. 
17 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 182. 
18 Ibid., p. 182–3. 
19 See Jonathan Fenby, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and the China He Lost 
(London: Free Press, 2003; Simon and Schuster, edn, 2005); and Jay Taylor, The 
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20 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 183. 
21 Ibid., p. 183–4. 
22 Ibid., p. 183. 
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only with party politicians’,23 Churchill’s benevolent instance of equal treatment 
for all imperial subjects shone through the pages of his memoirs, or so he hoped. 
He was ostensibly being dutiful and thinking of the lower castes and the 
untouchables, who had no political representation in Congress. If these reasons 
alone were not enough, Churchill then turned westwards. 
America, or rather Roosevelt, loomed large in Churchill’s account of the 
origins of the Mission.24 The ‘increasingly direct interest in Indian affairs as the 
Japanese advance into Asia spread westwards’ concerned Americans who, 
despite having ‘little experience’ on imperial responsibilities ‘began to express 
views and offer counsel on Indian affairs’.25 Churchill almost proudly boasted 
that, in December 1941, he had ‘reacted so strongly and at such length’ when 
Roosevelt had first ‘discussed the Indian problem’ that ‘he never raised it 
verbally again’.26 Yet it was raised again, and Churchill reiterated how important 
the balance in Indian politics between Muslim and Hindu was to the Indian 
Army.27 In the original message to the President, Churchill attempted to illustrate 
that constitutional change would come after the war, and he demonstrated how 
he had not been the main stumbling block by sending Roosevelt ‘full statements 
of the Indian position from Indian sources’.28 
Churchill reprinted Roosevelt’s reply, which he introduced as the 
President’s ‘private views about India’.29 Roosevelt proceeded to give Churchill 
                                                 
23 Ibid., p. 184. 
24 Roosevelt was not the only American who attempted to persuade Churchill to 
approach the situation in India differently. American Liberal intellectuals had 
been agitating during the interwar years with the same aim in mind. Although not 
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25 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 185. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., Churchill to Roosevelt, 4 Mar. 1942, p. 185–6. 
28 Ibid., p. 186. 
29 Ibid., p. 188. 
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a history lesson which, in this instance, Churchill printed in its entirety.30 
Roosevelt suggested that a ‘central temporary governing group’ be set up and 
have ‘certain executive and administrative powers over public services, such as 
finances, railways, telegraphs and other things that we call public services’.31 
Roosevelt wrote that this 
 
might give a new slant in India itself, and it might cause 
the people there to forget hard feelings, to become more 
loyal to the British Empire, and to stress the danger of 
Japanese domination, together with the advantage of 
peaceful evolution as against chaotic revolution.32 
 
Whether Roosevelt intended to insult Churchill’s anachronistic view of empire is 
unknown, but he succeeded when he wrote that ‘such a move’ would be ‘strictly 
in line with the world changes of the past half-century’,33 and that he hoped that 
whatever Churchill did, ‘the move will be made from London and that there 
should be no criticism in India that it is being made grudgingly or by 
compulsion’.34  
By printing Roosevelt’s private thoughts in full, Churchill was arguably 
illustrating to the post-war world that American pressure had left him with little 
choice but to send Cripps. Although Churchill described Cripps as a man who 
was ‘deeply versed in Indian politics and had close relations with Mr. Gandhi 
and Mr. Nehru’, it is hard at this juncture in his memoirs not to remember how 
Churchill had berated Cripps for being his very own turbulent priest in 
Moscow.35 Despite the intervening years, Churchill’s passion about Indian 
affairs had neither moderated nor become more temperate. Finally, in the long 
lead up to the actual Mission itself, Churchill quoted Roosevelt as writing that 
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32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid.  
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although India was ‘strictly speaking none of my business’ it was ‘part and 
parcel of the successful fight that you and I are making’.36  
Immediately after this telegram, Churchill launched into his tirade against 
‘the dangers of trying to apply any superficial resemblances which may be 
noticed to the conduct of war’.37 In other words, Churchill did not believe that 
Roosevelt had a realistic grasp of the Raj’s situation in early 1942. Churchill 
reiterated his opinion against the American anti-imperialist attitude when he 
wrote that: 
 
for seventy or eighty years we kept our colonies 
absolutely open to the trade of the whole world ..., and ... 
it was Americans, by their high tariff policy, who led the 
world astray, it is pretty good cheek of them now coming 
to school-marm us into proper behaviour.38 
 
Churchill portrayed American anti-imperialist sensibilities as having no grasp 
upon the nature of imperial power, especially during wartime. Finally, with all 
these reasons for a political deadlock spewing forth, Cripps set out for Delhi and 
Churchill wrote how he felt that ‘an offer of Dominion status after the war must 
be made in the most impressive manner to the peoples of India’.39 
Churchill was not the only one to see how American opinion was so 
detrimental to the origins of the Cripps Mission and how it was criticised in light 
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Chapter V: Churchill’s Portrayal of India, 1942 to 1943. 
163 
of its failure. As Viscount Halifax*, Churchill’s long-serving British Ambassador 
in Washington, remarked, ‘a great deal always turns upon the actual phrasing 
employed in any statement about India, and from the American point of view this 
has not always been happy’.40 Halifax continued to write that he hoped Amery 
would ‘not allow this aspect to be underrated’ whilst acknowledging that the 
British Government was in a very tricky situation regarding the political 
deadlock in India.41 Finally, regarding American perception of India, he wrote 
that Amery would have to ensure that ‘all those who speak with authority about 
India need to put the right label on the bottle all the time for American 
patients’.42 In light of the failure of the Cripps Mission, Roosevelt sent William 
Phillips (1878–1968), a career diplomat, to Delhi to help ease the situation and 
rally a quick and positive outcome.43 Whilst Linlithgow accepted Phillips as a 
‘personal representative of the President’ and recognised the ‘compliment 
implicated in this’, he believed that an American presence in Delhi implied 
British imperial weakness.44 Amery confirmed that Phillips’ presence was ‘likely 
to cause speculation in India regarding American mediation’ and that Linlithgow, 
if the matter arose, was to strenuously state that ‘there is no question of external 
mediation’.45 Linlithgow wished the matter to be referred to Churchill who, so 
Linlithgow advocated, ought to ‘bring strong pressure on Halifax to stand up to 
the State Department over this’.46  
Amidst the crises in India, the ‘febrile agitation’ from America, and the 
Japanese invasion of Burma, Churchill’s preoccupation with victory in Europe 
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46 Linlithgow to Amery, 25 Nov. 1942, Ibid., doc. 214. 
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was still paramount.47 But Cripps finally set out on what Churchill described as a 
‘thankless and hazardous task’.48 Yet in his message to Linlithgow, Churchill 
revealed that although Cripps was ‘bound by the draft declaration’, the most 
important part of the Mission was that the British Government’s ‘sincerity will 
be proved to the world’ irrespective of whether the Mission itself was a success 
or not.49 The ultimate aim of the Cripps Mission, as Churchill portrayed it was 
‘to prove our honesty of purpose and to gain time’.50 Finally, in Churchill’s long 
pre-amble to the Mission, he wrote that as far as he was concerned ‘nothing 
matters except the successful and unflinching defence of India as a part of the 
general victory’.51 This seemingly innocuous phrase revealed Churchill’s 
genuine and deepest desire: for India to remain within the bounds of the British 
Empire, both for the duration of the war and after. He was undertaking the Cripps 
Mission only to calm American anti-imperialist fears and to bolster the European 
war effort. This is seen more clearly when he wrote that the ‘essence of the 
British proposal was that the British Government undertook solemnly to grant 
full independence to India if demanded by a Constituent Assembly after the 
war’.52 The key was not ‘full independence’, but ‘if’. Churchill was hoping that 
by continuing to play the Indian leaders off against each other no such demand 
would be made. 
Churchill employed his usual tactic of using the words of others to narrate 
what he could not, for fear of exposing himself. Regarding the failure of the 
Cripps Mission he wrote that the ‘result’ could not have been ‘better stated than 
in Sir Stafford Cripps’s telegrams’.53 Cripps’s two explanatory telegrams54 were 
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followed by Churchill writing that he was ‘able to bear this news’ as he had 
thought it ‘probable from the beginning’.55 Whilst Churchill probably wrote this 
to highlight his omniscience at the time, when the volume was published, it 
questioned why, since he had thought the Mission would probably fail, had he 
not made a more robust effort to solve the deadlock. Did he undertake the 
Mission solely to appease American agitation? Was his supposed concern over 
Indian self-government and Indian independence merely smoke and mirrors? 
Churchill wrote that he ‘sought to comfort’ Cripps whom he thought would 
bitterly ‘feel the failure of his Mission’.56 Churchill had already cast aspersions 
on Cripps’ character and effectiveness when he had implied that Cripps had been 
a troublesome ambassador in Moscow. There had been a small backlash against 
Churchill’s treatment of Cripps’ tenure in Moscow when it had been published in 
1950, not least from Cripps himself as the two wartime colleagues harangued 
each other on the electioneering platforms.57 When portraying the failure of the 
Cripps mission to India, Churchill knew he had to be far more guarded in his 
responses; if he were not, his own role in the failure would be laid bare. Even 
though Churchill wrote that he had solaced Cripps over the failure to break the 
political deadlock in India at the time, his consolation had been like the mission 
itself—done for appearances rather than out of genuine concern. 
Cripps was a direct contrast to Churchill, whose opinion on the need to 
advance towards a day of Indian self-government had been bandied about since 
the early 1930s. As Churchill’s political star was descending, Cripps’ was rising. 
By July 1938, Cripps was one of the main speakers at the Conference on Peace 
and Empire (organised by the India League and the London Federation of Peace 
Councils) under the chairmanship of Jawaharlal Nehru. Cripps spoke of how the 
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British needed to give themselves a ‘mental shaking’58 and needed to wake-up to 
the ‘responsibilities and implications of Imperialist domination’.59 The point 
which Cripps stressed was that he wanted to encourage British imperialism to 
prepare itself and  
 
to face up to the very real question of the future 
development of the British Dominions, colonies, 
protectorates, mandated territories and spheres of 
influence, especially in their relationship to world 
problems, and above all in their reaction to the problem 
of peace and war.60  
 
Whilst this was a problem of ‘great difficulty,61 its resolution revolved around 
how to ‘devise the most rapid and effective means’ by which those who were 
exploited under the British Empire – the ‘victims of capitalism and imperialism’ 
– would not ‘by their very victimisation add to the world dangers of war’.62 From 
this speech it appears that Cripps was far more knowledgeable than Churchill 
and, with the benefit of hindsight, far more prophetic about the crises which 
would befall Anglo-Indian relations in the first half of the Second World War. 
Cripps was not against the British Empire. He was, however, against its 
exploitative nature which was in stark contrast to Churchill’s ostensibly 
benevolent and paternalistic imperialism. As Churchill’s physician observed, 
they were ‘two men ... not designed by nature to run in double harness’.63 When 
Cripps returned to Britain on 21 April he declined to talk to the Press about the 
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Mission.64 He had been quoted before as saying that even though the outcome 
had not been a resolution of the political deadlock, the Mission itself had not 
wholly failed as the ‘failure to succeed’ would have been ‘a lesser evil than 
failure to make the attempt’. This was the general perception of the Mission by 
the Press.65 Churchill could have lifted this line about retrieving the setback 
straight from The Times. 
Churchill’s portrayal of Cripps as the wrong man for the Mission was 
severe.66 Amery thought that it had ‘obviously [been] a great mistake sending 
Cripps out’, but it was the timing of the Mission, ‘when we were being defeated 
right and left by the Japanese’, and not Cripps himself that had in Amery’s 
opinion led to the Mission’s failure.67 Churchill and Amery had once had what 
Jock Colville referred to as a ‘blood row’ over the August Offer of 1940.68 This 
‘offer’ was an intermediary attempt to persuade the Indian National Congress to 
back the war effort in India; promising the expansion of the Viceroy’s Executive 
Council to include Indian representatives, and to create an advisory body (upon 
which both British and Indian princely state members would sit) that would draw 
up the principles of a post-war Indian constitution. Rejected by Congress as an 
insincere carrot on a stick, the August offer revealed the difference in attitude 
between Amery and Churchill towards India. 
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Two years later, in 1942, Amery still thought that Churchill’s image in 
India was one of the main hindrances to successfully brokering a political deal—
so much so that Amery suggested that by ‘associating himself personally’ with 
the 1940 declaration it would have possibly helped ease the way for successful 
negotiations.69 Amery repeated his concern regarding Churchill’s image and 
perception in India when he concluded that any response Churchill made should 
be both positive and measured as the situation needed to be handled in a tentative 
and sensitive manner.70 According to Amery, the ‘whole Cripps business 
developed as an alternative to a reply by telegram to Sapru & Co’ which he had 
drafted for Churchill.71 It appeared to his contemporaries that Churchill’s 
reluctance to enter into parleys and tangled factions (in the period before the 
reasons behind the Cripps Mission became imperative) was one of the reasons 
why it failed.72 This idea, that Churchill should have listened to Amery in 1941, 
was expressed most succinctly by Nicolson in his diary, when he wrote that the 
Cripps Mission was done ‘under threats from the Japanese’ of which there was 
only one conclusion: ‘our whole Eastern Empire has gone. ... Poor little 
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England’.73 Perhaps if Amery had offered the proposal it may have been 
‘regarded as less sensational’ and there may have been ‘a much better chance of 
acceptance’.74 In itself this indicates that from the outset Churchill had set the 
Mission to fail by choosing Cripps as mediator and broker.75 By 1942 the Raj 
needed to have collaborative powers and leaders on their side in India in order to 
underline the sincerity of the promise of constitutional change in the immediate 
postwar era. But as collaborative powers and leaders were necessary, especially 
at this juncture of the war, it implied how weak the British Raj had become. No 
wonder then, that Churchill preferred to risk the wrath of Cripps, and possibly 
Attlee, rather than admit his own failings in his memoirs to a post-war world. 
Churchill often relied upon the opinion of one of his loyal friends and 
confidants, Jan Christian Smuts.* Churchill wrote that he ‘found great comfort in 
feeling that our minds were in step’, and he was always interested in Smuts’s 
opinion on the progression of the war.76 With the Cripps Mission having been 
universally acknowledged as a failed ‘expensive experiment’,77 Smuts warned 
Churchill that whilst Egypt was ‘the nodal point of our whole Empire strategy’,78 
it relied upon the problem of ‘holding’ on to the Middle East which, in turn, 
meant ‘the mastery of the Indian Ocean’ and ‘the holding of India’.79 It was the 
‘holding of India’ with which Churchill wrestled. On 7 August 1942, the All-
India Congress Committee met in Bombay. On the following day, they adopted 
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the ‘Quit India’ resolution.80  The Raj’s hold on India appeared to be irrevocably 
slipping away. 
Searching for any mention of ‘Quit India’ in Churchill’s memoirs is a 
hard task as he neither mentioned it by name, nor did he allocate more than two 
pages of text to it.81 Churchill reverted to type in that he preferred to highlight  
how pivotal to the war effort his trip to Cairo (in August 1942) had been to the 
changes in the Middle and Far Eastern command, as well as how valuable his 
visit to Moscow had been.82 Once again, his overwhelming bias towards the war 
in the Middle East was visible, (whereas India and the Far East received 
comparatively little coverage) and his forward-looking political eye remained 
truly in focus.83  
Churchill began his brief account of ‘Quit India’ by writing that during 
his ‘absence from London a crisis had arisen in India’.84 In itself this sentence 
reveals a great deal about how Churchill saw his mighty influence over India, not 
only during the war but also when narrating its history in India’s post-
independence period, as it suggests that had he been present in London the crisis 
would not have occurred. Holding Congress solely responsible for the 
‘aggressive policy’ of sabotage, riots and disorder which ‘became rampant over 
large tracts of the countryside’, Churchill wrote that it was this ‘most serious 
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rebellion’ which ‘threatened to jeopardise the whole war effort in India in face of 
the Japanese invasion menace’.85 He claimed that despite there being ‘only one 
Englishman’ on the Viceroy’s Council, it nonetheless came to the ‘unanimous 
decision to arrest and intern Gandhi, Nehru, and the principal members of the 
Congress Party’.86  
Commenting on the subsequent ‘voluminous protests’ from Chiang Kai-
Shek and Roosevelt regarding the disturbances in India, Churchill wrote that he 
not only ‘resented this Chinese intervention’ but also that he had reassured 
Roosevelt over Britain’s ability to ‘maintain order and carry on government with 
efficiency, and secure India’s maximum contribution to the war’.87 Roosevelt’s 
reply comforted Churchill slightly, in that the President confirmed that it was 
‘wiser’ to have Chiang Kai-Shek ‘feel that his suggestions sent to me receive 
friendly consideration’ rather than have him ‘take action on his own initiative’.88 
Churchill sent the ‘strongest assurances of support’ to Linlithgow,89 but the 
Viceroy’s reply, included by Churchill in these passages, illustrated that he was 
not confident that the worst was over. Nonetheless, Linlithgow continued to 
write that he had ‘good hope we may clear up the position before either Jap or 
German is well placed to put direct pressure on us’.90 By using Linlithgow’s 
exact words Churchill downplayed how little effect ‘Quit India’ had on the war 
effort. In fact his overall portrayal of ‘Quit India’ was reduced to one 
conclusion—it had been quashed easily and quickly, and that although it had 
been feared that it would turn into a rebellion similar in scale to the ‘Sepoy 
Mutiny of 1857’, it nonetheless ‘fizzled out in a few months with hardly any loss 
of life’.91 
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The telling of the tale was of paramount importance to Churchill. He was 
more concerned with how history ‘sounded’ rather than with how accurate a 
narrative he produced—his portrayal of ‘Quit India’ was no different.92 But the 
impression gained from Churchill’s version of the ‘Quit India’ campaign is 
erroneous and was one of his attempts at mis-direction. Firstly, he held Congress 
solely responsible for the implementation of ‘Quit India’ which, in itself, was 
inaccurate.93 He depicted all the Congress leaders to be of the same view as 
Gandhi. In fact for a long time, Nehru had advocated full and total Indian 
cooperation with Allied forces in fighting the Axis and destroying both the Nazi 
threat and the Japanese menace.94 Although Nehru had become ‘profoundly 
depressed’ when he had read Cripps’s proposals for the first time, especially as 
he had expected ‘something more substantial’, he nonetheless realised the 
implications for India of increasing its war effort—when peace came, India 
would be guaranteed to be awarded her freedom.95 As a consequence of his 
belief, Nehru was reported as saying that even though the Cripps mission had 
failed it was still ‘the duty of every Indian to serve and defend India to the 
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uttermost’.96 During and immediately after the First World War, this had been 
the prevailing view and Gandhi had been one of its main proponents. It was in 
the aftermath of the Great War, especially with the Rowlatt Acts not being 
repealed and the horror of the events perpetrated by General Dyer at Jallianwala 
Bagh, that this view came to be seen as not only naive but also utterly fruitless.97 
The attempted concessions, starting with Morley-Minto (1909) and then ten 
years later Montagu-Chelmsford, had re-established the potential such a view 
had. In light of India’s ever-increasing contribution to the Second World War, 
American anti-imperialist opinion, and the lean to the Left of Churchill’s recently 
shuffled War Cabinet of February 1942, Nehru once again grasped this naïve 
hope and helped it turn into a reality. Unsurprisingly, Churchill made no mention 
of this in his memoirs as he preferred to highlight how his own steadfastness had 
enabled Britain to maintain order and quickly put down anything which had 
impacted on the war effort. Churchill hoped to show how dependable he had 
been, and could still be, under pressure and during adverse times. 
Churchill portrayed the decision to arrest and intern Gandhi, Nehru and 
the principal leaders of Congress as one which was taken not only unanimously 
but also quickly.98 Whilst the full extent of the failure of the Cripps mission was 
not officially admitted to the Commons until the end of July 1942, it was widely 
speculated about upon Cripps’ return to Britain.99 This meant that a period of 
three months elapsed before the Quit India campaign was launched on 8 August 
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1942. Churchill made no mention of how contingency plans for dealing with 
such an inevitability as Quit India, were already in place. Linlithgow had been 
warned, as early as January 1942, by Sir George Cunningham (the Governor of 
the North-West Frontier Province)100 that although some local members of 
Congress had supported Gandhi’s relinquishment of his leadership of Congress, 
‘as they think this will at least keep the door open for a settlement between 
Government and Congress’, he did think that Gandhi was concealing his real 
motives for this action. Cunningham continued that even though Gandhi was no 
longer the official leader of Congress, Cunningham did ‘not believe that 
Congress will go seriously against his wishes’.101 Although it is speculation to 
suggest that the ‘Quit India’ campaign was the motive behind Gandhi’s 
resignation, it did reveal (especially to Linlithgow and Amery) the need to have 
counter-measures in place to deal with any attempts at scuppering the Raj’s 
wartime ‘hold’ on India.  
Linlithgow had received news less than a month after Cripps’s return to 
Britain which indicated that Gandhi was planning something. Sir Maurice Hallett 
(Governor of the United Province) informed the Viceroy of a ‘certain amount of 
interesting information’ about the All-India Congress meeting in Allahabad 
which he was receiving.102 Predictably Churchill made no mention of the fact 
that intelligence had been gathered and contingency plans made as a 
precautionary measure. When the All-India Congress met on 7 August, furtive 
enquiries were made as to where the most suitable place would be to intern 
Gandhi—perhaps in Aden, or even in Nyasaland. Aware that such plans would 
be more problematic than imprisoning him in India, alternative arrangements 
were made.103 As it took four months for the Quit India resolution to finally be 
                                                 
100 Sir George Cunningham (1888–1963) joined the Indian Civil Service in 1911 
and served as Governor of the North-West Frontier Province three times: 1937–
39; 1939–46; and 1946–48. 
101 Cunningham to Linlithgow, 9 Jan. 1942, Transfer of Power, vol. I, doc. 8. 
102 Hallett to Linlithgow, 10 May 1942, Ibid., vol. II, doc. 43 
103 Cranborne to Sir Hathorn Hall (Governor of Aden), 8 Aug. 1942, Ibid., vol. 
II, doc. 463; and Cranborne to Officer Administering the Government of 
Nyasaland, 8 Aug. 1942, Ibid., doc. 464. 
Chapter V: Churchill’s Portrayal of India, 1942 to 1943. 
175 
adopted by Congress this suggests that Nehru, particularly, was hoping that an 
alternative would present itself and that maybe a further attempt at resolving the 
political impasse would be brokered. None of this was recorded in Churchill’s 
portrayal of events. 
Perhaps one reason as to why Churchill’s portrayal of ‘Quit India’ 
diverged so greatly from the reality was his reluctance, both during and after the 
war, to face the reality of growing internal pressure from within India herself. In 
his version of the Cripps mission he had been vituperative about American 
(namely Roosevelt’s) anti-imperialist opinion and advice. He had been highly 
critical of the Left within his own Coalition Government which, according to his 
events, was embodied by Cripps himself. Both pressures he thought he had dealt 
with. But the most humiliating blow for Churchill was the betrayal he felt 
emanating from India itself. The first substantial omission in Churchill’s account 
was one of the later messages from Linlithgow which recorded how the ‘mob 
violence’ of ‘Quit India’ was so ‘rampant over large tracts of the countryside’ 
that Linlithgow was ‘by no means confident that we may not see in September a 
formidable attempt to renew this widespread sabotage of our war effort’.104 
Churchill may have paraphrased Linlithgow’s message within his memoirs but 
he omitted the sentence in which Linlithgow had written that the ‘gravity and 
extent’ of the ‘Quit India’ campaign had been ‘so far concealed from the world 
for reasons of military security’.105 Little wonder that Churchill did not repeat 
this in his memoirs, as it would have highlighted how vulnerable India had 
actually become as a result of the internal unrest associated with ‘Quit India’. 
Furthermore, Linlithgow continued by warning Churchill that: 
 
if we bungle this business we shall damage India 
irretrievably as a base for future  allied operations and as 
a thoroughfare for U.S. help to China.106 
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Paramount in Linlithgow’s text was the gravity of the unrest which was 
spreading apace throughout India. Fear of hampering the allied war effort was 
also evident, as was his annoyance with the ‘flow of well meaning 
sentimentalists from the U.S.A. to India’.107 But what is most striking is the 
phrase ‘if we bungle this business’. In other words, if those responsible for the 
actual violence and sabotage were not dealt with swiftly, India would not only be 
lost to the war effort but possibly to the British Empire. This may not have been 
explicitly written, but it was nonetheless implied. Even as Churchill edited his 
memoirs, he could not bring himself to admit that Britain had been so close to 
losing hold of India between August and September 1942.  
Another aspect that Churchill’s account of ‘Quit India’ glossed over was 
the threat of German and Japanese invasion which so troubled some of those who 
were taking part in the campaign.108 It was not generally a fear of subjugation to 
another imperial power that found an outlet in ‘Quit India’, but the anti-British 
stance. Churchill had always prized the imperial Victorian belief of imperial 
protection which, in Churchill’s mind, worked both ways (from mother land to 
colony and back again), but ‘Quit India’ confronted his concept of the British 
duty to India and illustrated how fragile, and practically worthless, it had 
become. Perhaps this is one reason why he does not include this side of ‘Quit 
India’—the pressure from within India was something he could not express. 
Another aspect of ‘Quit India’ which Churchill could not express was the British 
‘ruthless use of force’ on the rural communities which had been part of the 
uprising.109 Although he concluded that the campaign had hardly registered,110 it 
comes as no surprise to learn that ‘more than a thousand deaths and over three 
thousand serious injuries were directly attributed by official account to the riots 
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that followed the Quit India satyagraha’.111 Whilst the number of deaths was low 
when compared to the deaths which occurred during Partition, a thousand deaths 
and three thousand injuries illustrate not only the influence that Gandhi exerted 
but the extent to which the Raj was hated. Naturally Churchill would not mention 
this motive behind ‘Quit India’.  
Considering Churchill had been so damning of Roosevelt’s opinions on 
the British in India, he was uncharacteristically even-tempered in this small 
section. Churchill quoted snippets from a telegram he had sent to Roosevelt on 
30 July 1942 in which he wrote that the ‘Government of India ... have no doubt 
of their ability to maintain order’.112 Churchill wrote that Roosevelt should stress 
to Chiang Kai-Shek that London did not agree with his assessment of the 
situation in India.113 He asserted that as Congress represented ‘mainly the 
intelligentzia of non-fighting Hindu elements’ it could neither ‘defend India nor 
raise revolt.’114 Churchill was at this juncture in the war highly aware of 
Roosevelt’s pro-Chinese, or at least his pro-Chiang Kai-Shek, leanings. With the 
Japanese attacks on Burma increasing Churchill was also aware that should he 
ever have to display gratitude towards Chinese troops assisting Allied forces 
within Burma he would possibly be adding to the possibility of Chiang Kai-Shek 
claiming China’s ancient rights to Upper Burma. Yet Churchill was also aware 
that if Chiang Kai-Shek attributed more power to Congress than they actually 
had, it would not ease the task of combating the crisis. By placing it at this 
juncture in his narrative on the Quit India campaign, Churchill was able to bury 
how weak the Raj actually was. After all, what if Congress (buoyed up by 
Chiang Kai-Shek’s impression of them) and Japanese forces entered into 
negotiations? The jewel in the British Empire’s crown would be lost forever and 
this was an outcome which Churchill definitely wished to avoid. Excluding the 
majority of this exchange with Roosevelt meant that Churchill was able to hide 
his underestimation of the force and influence that Congress, as well as Gandhi, 
actually had. In this same telegram Churchill wrote that Congress ‘in no way’ 
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represented the majority of Indians and that to give in to Congress demands 
would be a dereliction of the British duty to the majority of Indians and would 
have a direct and harmful effect on the numbers volunteering for the Indian 
Army.115 Once again Churchill exploited the opportunity to persuade Roosevelt 
that the root cause of the British no-parley during wartime policy in India was the 
Indian Army and how unreliable and volatile it would possibly become if  
constitutional issues were forced at the time.  
This telegram showed Churchill being forceful and authoritative 
regarding British policy towards India and especially towards Congress, but it is 
quite calm and relatively emotionless, on what was always thought to be 
Churchill’s weak spot. This is particularly visible as it ended with Churchill 
‘earnestly’ hoping that Roosevelt would do his best to right Chiang Kai-Shek’s 
opinion and would not lend countenance to them by ‘putting pressure’ on the 
British Government to resolve the issue.116 One reason, perhaps, why Churchill 
seemed almost conciliatory over the crisis in India, with which Chiang Kai-Shek 
had been so concerned, was due to the fast approaching first anniversary of the 
Atlantic Charter. Not wanting to rock an already unstable boat, Churchill asked 
the President to send him, before it was published, ‘the text of any message you 
are thinking of sending me’. Churchill continued that as they had gone through 
the wording of ‘that famous document’, ‘line by line together’, he would not be 
able ‘to give it a wider interpretation than was agreed at the time’.117 A year later 
the Atlantic Charter – or the ‘fluffy flapdoodle’ as Amery had called it – still had 
the potential to inflame tensions in London, let alone India, even further.118  
With the Quit India campaign subject to ruthless control, and supposedly 
fizzling out, the concurrent saga of the search for a new Viceroy reared its head 
once more. The need to replace Linlithgow had been brought to Churchill’s 
attention within a month of him becoming Prime Minister, as the increasingly 
tired Viceroy was ‘getting very desperate’ as he ‘felt he could do nothing and 
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wanted to resign and come home’.119 A month after the arrest and internment of 
Gandhi, Nehru, and the majority of the leaders of Congress in August 1942, 
Linlithgow wrote that Churchill would be ‘wise not to press me to go on’ after 
April 1943, and he even listed possible candidates for his replacement—such as 
Cranbourne, Ormsby-Gore, Lumley, and Sinclair.120 Despite Linlithgow’s pleas 
to Amery to remind Churchill to make a decision, ‘for pity’s sake continue’,121 
Amery could not get Churchill to decide.122 Whilst Churchill prevaricated, 
Linlithgow was approached by others who encouraged him to remain as Viceroy 
beyond his already extended term. The Nizam of Hyderabad, Mir Usman Ali 
Khan, wrote that whilst it was no business of his to make suggestions as to who 
should be the next Viceroy, whomever his successor was, he would not have as 
equally a ‘wide experience and deep insight into the affairs’ of India as 
Linlithgow, and that any ‘new man’ would almost definitely be ‘a stranger to 
Indian conditions’.123  
The fourth and fifth volumes of Churchill’s memoirs cover this period so 
one might expect some reference to the weighty question of who would replace 
Linlithgow. Yet in the fourth volume Churchill made no mention of the quandary 
he found himself in over this matter. The first mention that Churchill made to 
either the need to replace Linlithgow, or even the decision to appoint Wavell as 
his successor, appears in the fifth volume, when he wrote how he had informed 
Linlithgow of the decision to ‘set up a South-East Asia Command, with 
Mountbatten as Supreme Commander’ and that Wavell’s appointment to the 
Viceroyalty was going to be publicised on 25 August 1943.124 India, like all 
issues east of Suez, was virtually ignored by Churchill in his memoirs if it would 
have a detrimental affect on his post-war reputation and standing. It therefore 
comes as no surprise that Churchill favoured directing the reader towards ‘what 
the Western Powers may justly regard as the supreme climax of the war’—
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Operation Overlord.125 In private, Churchill claimed that he had never ‘had to 
solve a more puzzling appointment’.126 Yet in his memoirs he was 
uncharacteristically silent.  
A year after Pearl Harbor Churchill maintained that, although it was still 
the most inopportune moment to replace Linlithgow, he would ‘try to come to a 
decision’.127 But not until after he had wondered whether Linlithgow, having 
already extended his tenure in April 1941, would ‘be willing to stay on for 
another year, or at least for another six months’.128 Churchill emphasised that ‘it 
would be better not to have a new man feeling his feet at such a juncture’ and 
that ‘this is a singularly bad moment from every point of view to have to make a 
change’.129 Churchill commented that he would need time, if Linlithgow would 
not carry on as Viceroy for another six to twelve months, ‘in order that all 
alternatives can be weighed’.130 Linlithgow’s decision to extend his term had not 
been an easy one, but he understood why it was necessary.131 The King’s 
approval for yet another extension to Linlithgow’s term as Viceroy was granted, 
this time until October 1943, and the quest for a new Viceroy had to begin in 
earnest.132  
Although Churchill was the ultimate arbiter of Linlithgow’s successor, it 
was Amery who was ‘preoccupied’ with this task which was complicated ‘by the 
close interest being taken in the new appointment by the Prime Minister 
himself’.133 For instance, on 18 November 1942, Amery and Churchill travelled 
together to Harrow to attend the annual School Concert. One historian notes how 
the  
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conversation in the car on the way down centred, as it had 
done between them for some weeks, on the appointment 
of a New viceroy for India, Churchill surprising his 
Secretary of State with a new name, that of Dick Law, 
himself the son of a former Conservative Prime 
Minister.134 
 
Churchill was not only aware of the increasing need to replace Linlithgow, but 
was also surprising Amery with his seemingly random suggestions. In reality, 
Churchill was struggling to find a replacement that would be as amenable as 
Linlithgow.135 He continually prevaricated over who was the most suitable 
replacement to such an extent that, at times, Amery was almost reduced to 
begging him to make up his mind: ‘May I urge you most earnestly not to 
postpone any longer a decision on the succession to Linlithgow?’,136 and, ‘we 
really must come to a decision’.137 Amery suggested that the choice was between 
Anderson and Attlee and that he (Amery) was ‘increasingly disposed to urge the 
latter’.138 Attlee, as far as Amery could see, was well versed in Indian matters 
(Attlee had been part of the Simon Commission) and had ‘no sentimental 
illusions as to any dramatic shortcut to its solution’.139 Appointing Attlee as 
Viceroy would mollify the Labour contingent in the British Government, as well 
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as illustrate how seriously Britain was taking the Indian problem and finally, 
Amery thought that Attlee could be more easily spared than Anderson.140 
The search for a new Viceroy was a long and, at times, desperate one. By 
the end of 1942, Churchill had begun to ‘question’, but not make ‘definite 
proposals’ towards, various candidates.141 One such candidate was Sir Miles 
Lampson, who replied that, whilst he fully appreciated that this was just a 
question rather than an offer, he was ‘greatly flattered’ and that there was 
‘nothing I should like more’.142 His questioning of Lampson revealed how 
desperate Churchill had become as, in the previous month, he had written to 
Smuts and commented that he doubted ‘the suitability of Lampson on grounds of 
physical vigour, age, and [his] long stay in [the] Egyptian climate’.143 In the 
same communiqué to Smuts, and possibly without realising it, Churchill 
accurately summed up his problem—since his own attitudes towards India were 
well known throughout India (let alone the empire) he needed the potential 
Viceroy to be ‘free from any political past as regards India’, and to act as a 
Churchillian counterbalance.144  
The list of suitable candidates had to be shorn of those men who were not 
physically up to the task, and those who had no political past regarding India. 
Other names included Colville, Cranborne, Lumley, Wilfrid Greene, Lyttelton, 
Anderson, and Eden but, considering the criteria, the list of suitable candidates 
was naturally quite short.145 Amery believed that the solution to the ‘supreme 
problem’ of India, 
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depends enormously on personality, ... on a Viceroy who 
is equally determined to keep India within the Empire 
and to show that he genuinely sympathises with Indian 
nationalism.146  
 
Amery even went on to suggest that he himself had the ‘essential qualification’ 
for the post should all other alternatives be dismissed.147  Churchill quickly 
rejected Amery’s offer and wrote that although he appreciated, and understood, 
Amery’s ‘public-spirited motive in making it’, he was needed in London.148 This 
vital criterion became Churchill’s stumbling block. He was not prepared to send 
anyone whom he either needed in London or relied on in the field to replace 
Linlithgow as he was ‘loth to disturb the smooth-running poise of the War 
Cabinet’.149 Such a list of necessary qualifications meant that one of the final two 
candidates was Lampson, whom Churchill had already partially discounted. 
Linlithgow agreed to a final extension, although he encouraged Amery to ‘open 
fire at No. 10 not a moment later than May 1st, and keep shooting till you get 
what we all so much want’.150 After further consultations with Linlithgow and 
Amery, Churchill agreed that there was one man who was suitable as he had a 
‘great name, knows the situation on your Council, and has a much broader 
outlook than most soldiers’—Field-Marshal Archibald Wavell.151  
Churchill had previously written that Wavell was, above all, a soldier. 
The question is why make a soldier a Viceroy? Did Churchill believe that India 
was going to become even more troublesome to him and the Allied war effort? 
Did his experience of ‘Quit India’ and its violence suggest that a military hand, 
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adept at fulfilling military commands, needed to be on show at the very top of the 
Raj in India? Was this why he needed to put a soldier into a diplomatic position? 
If so, this possibly explains why Churchill would certainly have needed to hide 
his reasoning behind the long search for a new Viceroy as it would have tainted 
the image he had cultured of being a benevolent imperial master. There is 
however, another reason as to why Churchill omitted the reasoning behind his 
choice of Wavell from his memoirs. 
As early as June 1941, Churchill had become disillusioned with Wavell. 
He wanted Auchinleck to go to Egypt as he believed that only Auchinleck would 
‘infuse a new energy and precision into the defence of the Nile Valley’.152 Whilst 
Churchill described Wavell as ‘our most distinguished General’, he immediately 
followed this with ‘nevertheless I feel he is tired’.153 Although Churchill had 
praised Wavell in February 1942 after the collapse of the defence of Java and the 
A.B.D.A. Command and had ‘admired the composure and firmness of mind’ 
with which he had ‘faced the cataract of disaster which had been assigned to 
him’, this admiration had turned, by the following September, into impatience 
and annoyance.154 Churchill was obviously highly irritated by Wavell as his 
minute to Brendan Bracken (Minister of Information) revealed. He questioned 
what the arrangements for ‘controlling broadcasts by British Service Officers in 
the overseas Empire, such as that ... by Wavell?’155 Churchill’s annoyance with 
Wavell was clear: 
 
a speech by a Minister not in the War Cabinet on such a 
topic would not be broadcast without reference to me, 
and I cannot agree to any lesser control outside this 
country.156 
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Churchill repeated his concern over Wavell’s so-called tiredness when he 
wrote that, ‘in the opinion of Brooke and Ismay, Wavell has aged considerably 
under the many strains he has borne during this war’.157 Typically Churchill was 
expressing his own opinion, albeit in a watered-down form, by using someone 
else’s words. Churchill wrote that he would be ‘very sorry to leave Wavell 
unemployed, as he has justly acquired a high reputation’.158 But this appears to 
be disingenuous of Churchill’s true opinion of Wavell as he immediately 
followed this sentence with, ‘it would be best for all interests if Wavell could 
succeed ... as Governor-General of Australia’.159 In short, Churchill wanted 
Wavell as far away as possible and had a ‘desire to dispense with Wavell, who ... 
[was] tired and lacking drive’.160 Attlee advised Churchill that moving Wavell to 
Australia would cause difficulties. MacArthur would think it ‘an attempt to 
infringe on American control in that sphere’ and it would ‘in effect be a shelving 
of Wavell from active service in the war’.161 Yet Churchill’s decision was made 
and Wavell was told to pack. In his diary, Wavell acknowledged that whilst he 
was surprised by the appointment he would nonetheless treat it as a military 
posting, and ensure that he did the job to the best of his abilities.162 Even though 
Churchill wrote that he was sure that ‘His Majesty’s choice will be acclaimed, 
and that his affairs will not suffer in your hands’, 163 Wavell supposed that this 
was nothing more than the usual political niceties. Wavell realistically noted that 
as he was preparing to depart for India, he was sure Churchill had regretted 
making him Viceroy as ‘he has always really disliked me and mistrusted me, and 
probably …  regrets having appointed me’.164 
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The regret that Wavell had detected was obvious when Churchill wrote to 
Amery that ‘no exceptional limitation should be placed upon Sir Archibald 
Wavell’s tenure as Viceroy’.165 What needs to be questioned is whether 
Churchill thought that sending a military man (Wavell) into a political situation 
(India) would cause further chaos, or perhaps calm matters. Although this point 
is speculative, one fact is not—Churchill wanted Wavell as far away from 
himself as possible. Even though Churchill commented that Wavell’s 
appointment had ‘been so well received’, it was, for Churchill, a radical 
departure from the relationship he had with Linlithgow.166 In Linlithgow, 
Churchill had almost an extension of his self in India. Linlithgow’s policy of 
lying back and not making the first move, echoed Churchill’s preferred stance 
regarding India.167 The same could not be said of Churchill and Wavell, and the 
difference between the two men became obvious at the farewell dinner that was 
held in honour of Wavell’s imminent departure as the new Viceroy of India.168 
Churchill was the first to speak. He acknowledged the ‘long and arduous 
tour of duty’ that Linlithgow had made.169 He then insidiously warned Wavell 
that as air travel had progressed it meant the Viceroy could now ‘come home 
almost in a few hours’ which would ‘put himself into the closest contact with the 
Executive Government here’.170 In short, Wavell would be kept on short, tight 
reins. Having ‘picked a great soldier’ whose ‘name will live in the history of this 
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war’, Churchill recalled how Wavell’s generalship had filled a grim period of the 
war with ‘a series of brilliant episodes’.171 He talked of the ‘overwhelming 
blows’ which Wavell had faced as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the 
short lived ABDA command, and how Wavell had ‘faced his task with the 
greatest courage and tenacity’ and had born his lot ‘in a manner which enhanced 
the respect his fellow-countrymen felt for him’.172 Churchill spoke of the ‘time 
of crisis’ in India into which Wavell was being plunged, and spoke of the hope 
he had for Wavell being able to ‘wield his pen with almost equal effort to the 
way in which he wields the sword’.173  
Only two of the five pages of Churchill’s speech are given over to 
Wavell. Churchill sandwiched three pages of his views on India, the current 
situation in India, and the history of British achievement in India in between his 
complimentary (albeit perfunctory, as well as cautionary) comments towards 
Wavell. He realised that he had to be circumspect on what he had to say about 
India, as his ‘views on the subject are no more fashionable than were my views 
on the dangers we encountered before the war’.174 Although Churchill 
acknowledged that he had to pick his steps ‘with reasonable caution’, it did not 
stop him from airing how he harboured ‘subdued resentment about the way in 
which the world has failed to recognise the great achievements of Britain in 
India’.175 The audience obviously agreed with him as cries of ‘hear, hear’ were 
forthcoming.176 Churchill described India, under British rule, as a ‘great calm 
area’ where ‘teeming people have not suffered the evils which have been almost 
the common and universal lot of man’.177 He claimed that ‘famines have passed 
away – until the horrors of war and the dislocations of war have given us a taste 
of them again’.178 But what caused Churchill ‘so much vexation and sorrow’ was 
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that the ‘great achievements’ of the British in India (a rising population, a 
lessening of famine and pestilence, an un-corrupt judiciary, an un-biased court 
system, increased industry and transport links) were ‘not understood’ in many 
parts of the world.179 In short, he called for a ‘truer recognition’ of what the 
British had achieved.180  He prayed that if the day should come when Britain 
relinquished her Indian responsibilities and ‘vanish[ed] from the scene’, then the 
history of the Raj would be viewed as a ‘Golden Age’ and one of which Britain 
ought to be proud.181  
Considering that the dinner was being held in Wavell’s honour before his 
departure to become the new Viceroy of India, his speech contained 
comparatively little about his appointment. He spoke of how Churchill’s 
leadership had given a ‘tang and a savour that no ordinary leadership could have 
done’.182 Wavell did ‘not pretend that the Prime Minister’ was ‘an easy man to 
serve’, nor did he pretend that Churchill had not doubted his ability at the 
beginning of the war.183 Wavell praised Churchill’s dynamism and, possibly in 
an attempt to lighten the mood, wondered whether ‘anyone had made a 
calculation of the Prime Minister’s energy in terms of man power per cigar’.184 
Wavell declared that when the history of the war was recounted it would say that 
‘no better or bolder use of [the] ... limited resources could possibly have been 
made’.185 He also mentioned the ‘courage of my troops, British, Dominion and 
Indian’, something which set him apart from Churchill (both at the farewell 
dinner and later) and something which emphasized how he was first, and 
foremost, a military man and one who knew his troops.186 Perhaps this partly 
answers why Wavell, out of the limited names put forward for the post of 
Viceroy, was chosen for the post. Not as a ‘stopgap’ Viceroy but because he was 
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a military man, who knew the mentality of the troops under his command; 
especially the Indian and Dominion troops.187 Upon his being offered the 
Viceroyalty, Wavell jocularly referred to Churchill having ‘mastered the tactics 
of the ‘Blitzkrieg’, and knew how to apply them’.188 This suggested that Wavell 
really had been given no choice. It was the Viceroyalty or nothing. 
Wavell spoke of his ‘three difficult but most extraordinarily interesting 
years’ and predicted that his forthcoming time in India would be no less 
difficult.189 However, he emphasised his time in India would be ‘just as 
important … for the future of our Commonwealth and for the peace of the 
world.’190 This set Wavell apart from Churchill in that it directly opposed 
Churchill’s antiquated belief that the British Raj would continue to rule in India 
for many years to come. (Throughout Churchill’s lyrical waxing over India and 
the Golden Age he had made no mention of self-government or independence for 
India.) In fact, Wavell clearly talked of the ‘goodwill towards India’ and of the 
‘general desire to see Indians managing their own affairs’.191 
Wavell likened the greater responsibility of Indian self-management to 
climbing a mountain. When approaching a treacherous summit ‘choosing 
footholds and handholds’ and ‘cutting steps in slippery ice’ become ever more 
important.192 The ice, to which Wavell was referring, was the political climate in 
India and this could not have gone unnoticed by the Prime Minister and his 
fellow diners. Wavell said that he totally agreed that the first aim was to ‘defeat 
the enemy’, and to maintain law and order within India itself.193  He recognized 
that whilst ‘some quarters’ believed that ‘political progress in India during the 
war should not be attempted’, he did ‘not think that that should necessarily bar 
political progress if progress is possible’.194 However, he quickly added that 
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whilst the Government of India was capable of maintaining law and order and 
had proved itself to be so, it did ‘not necessarily mean that it [was] the only or 
even the best possible Government’.195 Wavell said that the British had to be 
‘prepared to take risks if necessary, and possibly to resort to unorthodox 
mountaineering methods’. 196 Finally he concluded with his vision of India:  
 
an India at peace within herself, a partner in our great 
Commonwealth of Nations, mother of a prosperous 
people, a shield for peace in the East, [and] a busy market 
trade.197 
 
With these concluding remarks, the new Viceroy set himself even further apart 
from Churchill and the old-school vision of India as the jewel in the British 
Empire’s crown. For Wavell, India would be better served, by herself as well as 
by Britain, if she was part of the Commonwealth, but he said that this was his 
vision and a ‘far-distant vision’ at that.198  
Wavell’s impression that Churchill regretted appointing him proved to be 
correct. On the day of his departure for India, Wavell wrote that Churchill had 
not only been ‘menacing and unpleasant’, but had also ‘indicated that only over 
his dead body would any approach to Gandhi take place’.199 Both Linlithgow and 
Amery had issued warnings about the problems the new Viceroy would face. 
Linlithgow warned that Wavell would find himself in ‘an intolerable position’,200 
not just from within India, where his ‘previous experience will not be of great 
assistance to him’, but from external forces such as Churchill.201 Amery warned 
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that over the problem of sterling balances with India, Churchill would 
doubtlessly ‘preserve his right to be able to raise the matter again’ but he could 
not imagine ‘a new Viceroy being prepared to take on the business of poking the 
animal into life on top of all the trouble he is going to inherit’.202  
Churchill’s choice of Wavell for the Viceroyalty led only to further 
confrontations: not only between Churchill and Wavell, between the Viceroyalty 
and Whitehall, but also between Congress and the Muslim League (as Wavell 
inadvertently attempted to resolve their conflicts which, in turn, pitted him 
against London).203 Wavell already had an extensive knowledge of the 
personalities and politics of India, and whilst he tried to be an effective 
communicator and conciliator he was, first and foremost, a soldier. Amery once 
remarked that the success of the new Viceroy depended upon his personality and, 
since Wavell was not ‘easy to serve’ as his ‘silences were hard to interpret’ and 
he was ‘so reserved’, it appeared that Wavell’s success was therefore not 
assured.204 Churchill made no mention of this reality within his memoirs and he 
also failed to mention the real reason why he wanted Wavell so far away. In a far 
less overt way than he dealt with the troublesome Cripps, Churchill dealt with 
Wavell. In the same breath that he used to confirm that he would put forward 
Wavell’s name to the King, Churchill confirmed that Auchinleck would become 
Commander-in-Chief in India ‘with the clear intention of forming a separate East 
Asia Command of the highest importance’.205 The reality behind Churchill’s 
appointment of Wavell as Viceroy was clear: Churchill had become impatient 
and disillusioned with Wavell, and believed that he was hindering operations in 
the Far East which, for Churchill, reinforced the American criticism of British 
strategic policy in Burma. Churchill’s first reference to this re-shuffle of 
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command was when he wrote that it was due to the ‘profound dissatisfaction’,206 
both in Washington and in London, about the ‘lack of vim in the recent 
operations in Burma’.207 Churchill hid behind the reality of the situation as he 
wished Wavell removed from command and his portrayal of the reshuffle 
allowed him to hide behind the American pseudo-encouragement of it. Even 
though it was thought that Wavell, ‘time and time again’ had ‘been handed out a 
raw deal ... without a golden wand to wave’, Churchill’s quixotic and mercurial 
favouritism of some generals and commanders over others was apparent.208 He 
wanted Wavell out of the way and he wanted Auchinleck, one of his favourites, 
in the lead.  
Another radical explanation as to why Churchill omitted to make 
reference to his long and hard decision on who should become Viceroy, was to 
hide his own role in the steady erosion of British power in India. By giving 
Wavell another impossible task to perform, he had inevitably set the ball rolling 
for a quick and hasty imperial retreat from India. After all his machinations in the 
re-shuffling of command posts, so that a tired and troublesome Wavell would be 
posted far away from him, and no matter whether he viewed Wavell’s 
Viceroyalty as nothing more than a stop-gap solution,209 it was Churchill’s fatal 
and least imperially conscious decision.210 Only one man could replace Wavell 
as Viceroy—Mountbatten. And he managed to do what Wavell could not: he 
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hastened the timetable of the British withdrawal from India, and ‘wound up the 
British Raj with the full agreement of all parties’.211  
The differences between the two men, which had already been voiced at 
Wavell’s farewell dinner, became even more pronounced when Wavell’s efforts 
to relieve the effects of the Bengal famine set him on a collision path with 
Churchill. When Churchill had been a subaltern in India at the end of the 
nineteenth century, he began to refine his political opinions by annotating old 
copies of the Annual Register. One of the subjects in the Annual Register of 
1874, was that of the Indian famine of 1873 to 1874, The then Viceroy, Lord 
Northbrook,* had refused to stop exporting Indian grain even though it was 
desperately needed to sustain its own population.212 Churchill wrote that 
Northbrook ‘was right in refusing to prohibit grain exports’ as he was ‘opposed 
to any interference by Government with private trade’.213 He went on to note that 
Government interference could only be justified if there were ‘distinct proof that 
prices were artificially raised by an association of merchants’.214 Writing to his 
mother two years later, Churchill noted that the autumn crops in Bangalore had 
failed as the rains had ‘been inadequate’ and that the winter crop too looked as if 
it would also fail.215 But these observations were just that—observations. 
Churchill seemed to be more preoccupied with the way that the inevitable famine 
was liable to be accompanied by ‘riots and discontent’.216 He appeared 
indifferent to the starvation, but not to the way that rioting and discontent would 
reflect badly on the imperial prestige of the British Raj. Churchill’s indifference 
to a starving population was still evident not only under the pressure of wartime 
conditions but when he came to write his memoirs. He had undoubtedly been 
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aware of the prospect of famine in India from mid-1942 onwards. The area most 
affected was Bengal where, during the ‘terrible summer and autumn of 1943’, 
between one and a half to three million people died of starvation.217 It comes as 
no surprise to discover that Churchill made little to no mention of the Bengal 
famine within the main text of his memoirs. The handful of instances which refer 
to it are tucked away in the appendices to volumes four and five.  
Two days after Wavell’s name had been submitted to the King, Sir John 
Herbert, the Governor of Bengal, had informed Linlithgow of his ‘chief worry’ 
over the ‘question of food supplies’.218 He noted that whilst a ‘food drive’ had 
increased stock levels he needed a ‘further influx of rice and paddy to start a 
general decline in prices and thus bring further supplies on to the market’.219 By 
September Linlithgow warned that there was liable to be a ‘net domestic cereal ... 
deficiency of about 1 ¼ million tons’ for the year and an even greater deficiency 
for the following year.220 The Japanese occupation of Burma had cut off what 
were once plentiful supplies of Burmese rice to India. The logistical problems 
long associated with war, such as problems with transport and distribution 
systems (let alone the added requirement of feeding the troops) only exacerbated 
the situation. Normal market forces turned into wartime market forces, and were 
accompanied by stockpiling and ever-increasing prices.221  
Upon his arrival in Delhi, there seemed little that Wavell could do to 
solve or at least alleviate the ‘widespread distress and suffering’ that was caused 
by the famine.222 Wavell was shocked by these conditions, but he was equally 
shocked by the apparent ‘gross mismanagement and deliberate profiteering’ of 
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the Bengal government.223 He remarked in his diary that, whilst the famine was 
‘not as gruesome’ as Congress had led him to believe, it was ‘grim enough to 
make official complacency surprising’.224 The diary entries that Wavell made, 
during his first year as Viceroy, were overwhelmingly concerned with his efforts 
to increase shipping levels of cereal and grain supplies to India.225 Increasingly 
concerned by the distinct lack of ‘extreme urgency’ about the famine which he 
encountered in various British officials in India, he requested that Amery 
despatched a ‘first class man’ whose leadership was ‘inspiring’ and who had the 
‘drive of a first class administrator of wide experience’.226 Amery estimated to 
the House of Commons that in Calcutta alone, the death rate from the famine was 
approximately 1,000 people a week.227 Two weeks later it was suggested that the 
India Office should ‘use Rutherford’s estimated figure of two thousand deaths a 
week’.228 Wavell repeated his calls for an increase in shipping. 
Churchill virtually ignored the Bengal famine in his memoirs. Possibly 
because, as with all Indian matters, he held strong opinions—opinions which 
would not be conducive to his post-war persona. On the day that Wavell was 
sworn in to the Privy Council, and after lunching with the King and Queen, he 
attended a Cabinet meeting at which Churchill spoke ‘scathingly’ about the 
Indian food crisis.229 According to Wavell, Churchill thought that it was ‘more 
important to save the Greeks and liberated countries from starvation than the 
Indians’ and that he exhibited a distinct ‘reluctance either to provide shipping or 
to reduce stocks in this country’. The Indian war effort was paramount, in both 
Churchill’s and Wavell’s eyes, but whereas Churchill differentiated between 
those who were in rural districts and those ‘actually fighting or making munitions 
or working some particular railway’, Wavell did not.230 Churchill could not 
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reveal this as it directly contradicted the image he had been nurturing of himself 
as the benevolent imperial ruler. During his period in the ‘political wilderness’ in 
the 1930s, Churchill had exaggerated his imperialism and had vaunted the notion 
of the British imperialists ‘duty’ to the weak and vulnerable subjects in the 
empire, let alone in India. Although India was independent by the time the fifth 
volume of memoirs was published (in 1952), his image of a benevolent 
imperialist had to be maintained if he were to secure the existence of the British 
Commonwealth. He had once said that the India Act of 1935 was a ‘monstrous 
monument of sham built by pygmies’.231 He needed to ensure that his own 
criticism could not come back to haunt him and the new Commonwealth. 
In his memoirs Churchill recalled how there had been ‘a world shortage 
of many important foodstuffs’, and how anxious he had become over the possible 
shortfall.232 But he had not been referring to food supplies for the British Empire, 
least of all India—he was concerned with post-liberation European food 
supplies.233 He also suggested that Lord Woolton (the Minister of Food) and 
Lord Leathers (the Minister of War Transport) should ensure that ‘shipping space 
in vessels returning from North Africa’ should be used to bring back ‘oranges 
and lemons from the Mediterranean area’ to Britain.234 A sensible use of 
shipping but one which reveals his preoccupation with British food supplies 
rather than those of other, far more desperate, imperial subjects. This is further 
evidenced when he mentioned the surplus of grain in Britain, with which he 
advised the Lord President of the Council to, 
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do a little more for the domestic poultry-keeper. He can 
usually provide or collect scrap to balance the grain, so 
that we could get more eggs for a given amount than if it 
were handed to the commercial producer.235 
 
Churchill argued that by increasing domestic egg production it would ‘save 
shipping and labour’.236  
Time and time again Churchill justified to Roosevelt why he was not 
prepared to discuss constitutional change for India during wartime. He claimed 
that it would have a detrimental effect on the Indian Army’s ability to fight. 
Nothing was to hamper the war effort. Similarly he used the horrific 
circumstance of the Bengal famine to explain why the lack of progress in the 
South-East Asian theatre had been so slow. Churchill recommended that the 
‘draft Order of the Day would be a very good text’ for Mountbatten to read when 
visiting troops and that he himself would refer to it when he next spoke to the 
Commons ‘in terms like these: “The climactic conditions, the famine and the 
floods, have greatly set back all possibilities in this theatre”’. 237 For a man who 
portrayed himself as a benevolent imperialist—one who looked after those who 
had no representation—this was a damning indictment of how low Churchill’s 
opinion of India had become by the end of 1943. Its inclusion in the memoirs can 
arguably be judged as an editorial oversight. 
Apart from the above instance, Churchill’s indifference towards the 
general Indian population is completely absent from his memoirs. One possible 
reason is that as he had always referenced how the war effort, especially the 
Indian Army, would be radically affected if India’s future status were to be 
discussed during wartime, it would have shown how insincere he actually was. 
Mountbatten offered 10 percent of naval shipping in order to bring in the 
desperately needed supplies of grain and cereals, but Churchill vetoed this and 
redeployed the proffered 10 percent of shipping elsewhere. This was not revealed 
                                                 
235 Ibid., Churchill to Attlee (Lord President of the Council), 11 Nov. 1943, 
Appendix C, p. 597 
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid., Churchill to Mountbatten and Ismay, 2 Oct. 1943, Appendix C, p. 587. 
Chapter V: Churchill’s Portrayal of India, 1942 to 1943. 
198 
within his memoirs as it would have illustrated how he himself jeopardised the 
loyalty of the Indian soldier. Wavell had called in Indian troops to help distribute 
what rations were available, as well as to sort out distribution centres and 
transport deficiencies.238 Such Indian troops were undoubtedly disturbed by what 
they witnessed and, upon returning to their regiments, would have been possibly 
more susceptible to Japanese propaganda and would have questioned their 
loyalty and will to fight.239 How could an Indian soldier who was ‘eroded by 
anxieties about whether his wife and children had enough to eat’ continue to be 
loyal, or continue to fight and defeat the enemy?240 Had Churchill revealed how 
his indifference towards the Indian population had jeopardised the loyalty of the 
Indian Army, it would have shown that his reasoning to Roosevelt (over why he 
had placed an embargo on raising the Indian constitutional issue during the war 
so as not to affect the loyalty or effectiveness of the Indian Army) had merely 
been a pretence.  Since Churchill wanted to return to power, and the Cold War 
necessitated that Anglo-American relations run smoothly, he needed to 
downplay, if not completely omit, the reality of his role in the Bengal Famine.241 
The years 1942 to 1943 were a ‘period full of shocks and change’ for 
Churchill.242 The ‘storm over India’ which had arguably been brewing since the 
end of the First World War, and Dyer’s perpetration of the massacre at Amritsar, 
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had broken.243 All Churchill wanted, as Gopal observed was for ‘India ... to be 
kept quiet for the duration of the war’.244 When Churchill wrote ‘the fact that a 
number of crises break out at the same time does not necessarily add to the 
difficulty of coping with them’, he did so in attempt to downplay the shocks and 
changes he had been confronted by and his inability to deal with them.245 The 
struggle for power in the East, which he had thought was only against the 
Japanese, became a struggle against the left in Britain and against American anti-
imperialism.246 The resulting Cripps mission may have ‘marked a significant 
advance in imperial policy’, but the advance was instigated by sources other than 
Churchill, or even for that matter the British Left.247 The mission was destined to 
fail, and it opened the post-war floodgates for an independent India. Following 
the loss of Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore, and the invasion and occupation 
of Burma, the Quit India campaign emphasised how vulnerable the Raj (and 
therefore the foundation of the empire itself) had become to both overwhelming 
external and determined internal forces. His appointment of Wavell proved to be 
anything but easy, and Wavell’s pursuance of aid for the Bengal famine merely 
illustrated the mistake Churchill had made in appointing him—hence these 
episodes are barely acknowledged within Churchill’s memoirs. Churchill realised 
how instrumental India had been to the nuances behind wartime Anglo-American 
relations becoming strained. In the post-war world, these tensions needed to be 
down-played so that the perceived strength and longevity of the ‘special 
relationship’ was not questioned.  
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The bitterness he felt over these power struggles, both internal and 
external, tainted his regard for what he had once believed to be the jewel in the 
British Empire’s crown. Nor did his bitterness diminish in the post-war, post-
independence years. In fact, his bitterness infected how he would portray the 
Indian Army. An army whom he praised and lauded, but only when justifying 
why constitutional redress for India was impossible during wartime. Churchill 
directed so much scorn towards Roosevelt’s opinion on the Raj that he hoped to 
distract the reader from the reality—that the rapid and successful Japanese 
advance from Hong Kong through to Burma meant that Roosevelt could ‘no 
longer remain a passive spectator’ and this, in itself, had dire ramifications for 
the life span of the British Empire in the Far East.248 When Churchill signed the 
Atlantic Charter, he had said that America and Britain not only spoke the same 
language but also ‘very largely’ had ‘the same thoughts’.249 As this chapter has 
shown, the divergence of opinion between America and Britain became 
undeniably visible over India. The aim of the next chapter is to illustrate how this 
divergence of opinion became magnified over Burma and how the series of crises 
which gripped India from 1942 to 1943 merely exacerbated Churchill’s postwar 
bitterness and tainted his portrayal of the Indian Army and their role in what was 
arguably one of the most gruelling and vicious theatres of the Second World 
War—the reconquest of Burma.   
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Illustration V 
 
 
 
This example of anti-British Empire Japanese propaganda was found in India. 
The American flag is entwined with the British in the far left corner and 
Churchill is depicted as the anchor to which the chains of imperial domination tie 
the Indian subjects. Churchill’s image as the imperial John Bull worked against 
him as far as India was concerned—a point he admitted when searching for a 
new candidate for the position of Viceroy of India. 
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Chapter VI: Churchill’s Portrayal of the Indian Army, and the Reconquest 
of Burma. 
 
For Churchill the seemingly endless defeats that the Japanese had inflicted on the 
British Empire in the Far East were a national and racial humiliation. But the 
Japanese invasion and occupation of Burma was also a personal indignity for 
Churchill as his father, Lord Randolph Churchill, had been responsible for the 
annexation of Upper Burma by the British Empire when he was Secretary of 
State for India (1885–1886). In fact, Churchill often recalled how his father 
frequently declared ‘I annexed Burma’.1 As work on the fifth volume of his 
memoirs progressed, Churchill wrote a note to the syndicate (originally drafted 
as a ‘directive’)2 which stated that he would not ‘spare more than 3,000 words ... 
on the struggles in Burma’.3 Churchill may have described Burma as ‘a flower 
on a long and slender stalk’,4 but the relative ease with which Japanese troops 
had invaded and occupied it illustrated how the arrangements for Burma’s 
defence had been ‘sketchy, to put it mildly.’5 The series of crises in India from 
1942 to 1943 had revealed a discernible tension in the wartime Anglo-American 
relationship; and over Burma, the relationship between the two allies became 
comparably acute. When it came to his memoirs therefore, Churchill not only 
had to sooth the mass of raw nerves that Burma had exposed regarding the 
‘special relationship’, but also hide his chagrin that victory over the Japanese had 
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been ‘won by the Indian Army’6—an army that Churchill thought was inept, 
disloyal and nothing more than an armed ‘Frankenstein’s monster’.7 
This chapter will examine Churchill’s portrayal of the Indian Army 
throughout his Second World War, and will suggest reasons why he almost 
ignored the role the Indian Army took in the reconquest of Burma.8 David 
Reynolds has written that Churchill’s famous phrase (about how he had ‘not 
become the King’s First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the 
Empire’) did not appear in his memoirs as it ‘sounded very hollow in 1950, after 
India, Pakistan and Burma had become independent and after Britain had 
withdrawn in chaos from Palestine’.9 Indeed, but was the advent of Indian 
independence so painful an experience for Churchill that when the time came to 
compose his post-war narrative, it tainted his portrayal of the Indian Army, an 
army which had been pivotal in the reconquest of Burma?  
Churchill did little more than briefly acknowledge the role the Indian 
Army had played in the trenches of Northern France during the First World War, 
when he wrote that, ‘the steadfast Indian Corps in the cruel winter of 1914 held 
the line by Armentieres’.10 In reality, Indian troops had distinguished themselves 
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not only in the trenches in France but also in Mesopotamia, and each of the other 
major theatres of the First World War.11  Churchill was well aware of the Indian 
Army’s record on the Western Front as he had, after all, written about the Indian 
Army in his World Crisis.12 In his narrative of the First World War, the first 
impression Churchill gave of Indian troops was that their mobilization primarily 
created a logistical problem. Troops from New Zealand, Australia and Canada 
needed safe ocean-bound transportation, but so too did the Indian troops destined 
for Europe.13 But Churchill also specified that troops removed from India, 
whether British or ‘native’, would have to be replaced by Territorial troops in 
order to maintain India’s internal and frontier security. As September 1914 
dawned, Churchill wrote that ‘two British Indian divisions with additional 
cavalry (in all nearly 50,000 men) were already crossing the Indian Ocean’. He 
did not mention how those ‘native’ Indian troops were going against caste 
doctrine by crossing the Ocean in order to fight for their King-Emperor—a point 
which he would make later in the final volume of his History of the English-
Speaking Peoples.14  
                                                                                                                                    
‘The Indian Army in the First World War, 1914–1918’, in Daniel Marston and 
Chandar S. Sundaram (eds), A Military History of India and South Asia: From 
the East India Company to the Nuclear Era (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2008), pp. 74–87. 
11 See Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development 
of a Nation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), especially pp. 68–
76; Mason, A Matter of Honour, pp. 412–43; Hugh Tinker, ‘India in the First 
World War and after’, JCH, 3/4 (Oct. 1968), pp. 89–107; and Charles C. Trench, 
The Indian Army and the King’s Enemies, 1900–1947 (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1988), pp. 75–90. 
12 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis: Volumes I–V (London: Thornton 
Butterworth, 1923–31). 
13 Churchill, The World Crisis: Volume I, 1911–1914 (London: Thornton 
Butterworth, 1923), pp. 186–245. 
14 Churchill wrote that Indian troops ‘lost caste’ once they crossed the high seas. 
Winston S. Churchill, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples: Volume IV, 
The Great Democracies (London: Cassell, 1958), p. 67. The research for these 
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His knowledge of India’s role in the First World War meant that 
Churchill would have been aware of India’s capacity to be an immense supply 
depot in terms of manpower, raw materials and food—a ‘central bastion’.15 He 
would have been aware of India being a ‘permanent strategic reserve and the 
principal means by which British interests were secured throughout Asia’.16 But 
his unwillingness to deviate from his opinion of Indian troops stopped him from 
recognising the potential of the Indian Army. Churchill’s low opinion of Indian 
troops started when he had been a subaltern in the Queen’s Fourth Hussars 
stationed in Bangalore between 1896 and 1899. Throughout his time in India, 
Churchill had been more concerned with the prestige this position offered (horses 
and polo playing being the outward trappings of wealth and the likelihood that 
his army experience would lead to a political career), than with what he could 
learn about the Indian Army, or India itself. He refused to learn Hindi, as he 
thought it ‘quite unnecessary’ since ‘all natives here speak English perfectly and 
I cannot see any good in wasting my time acquiring a dialect which I shall never 
use’.17 Although this meant that he could not ‘enter very fully’ into the ‘thoughts 
                                                                                                                                    
volumes and the bulk of the writing was carried out by a team of researchers in 
the 1930s—primarily Bill Deakin and George Young. The war and Churchill 
becoming Prime Minister in 1940 meant the work was shelved until a more 
suitable time allowed for its completion. What this illustrates is that Churchill 
had the knowledge about the Indian troops but, when it came to his Second 
World War, he chose to gloss over it.  
15 See Mason, A Matter of Honour, p. 471. 
16 Keith Jeffery, ‘“An English Barrack in the Oriental Seas”? India in the 
Aftermath of the First World War’, MAS, 15/3 (1981), p. 369.  
17 Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume I, Part 
2, 1896–1900 (London: Heinemann, 1967), Churchill to Lady Jennie Churchill, 
18 Nov. 1896, p. 703. However it should be noted that Churchill was not alone in 
his refusal to learn Hindi, nor was this situation unusual especially as his unit 
contained no Indian ranks. Furthermore, he was stationed in Bangalore where the 
local language would have been either Kannada or Tamil. Finally, the lingua 
franca of the colonial Indian Army was Urdu and not Hindi. (These points were 
made by Dr Chandar Sundaram in personal correspondence with the author). 
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and feelings’ of the Indian troops which he encountered,18 it did not stop him 
from presuming that 
 
there was no doubt they liked having a white officer 
among them when fighting. ... They watched him 
carefully to see how things were going. If you grinned, 
they grinned. So I grinned industriously.19  
 
The Singapore Mutiny of February 1915 did nothing to dispel Churchill’s 
already low opinion of the Indian Army.20 Yet it appears that he never looked at 
the reverse—that the overwhelming majority of the 800,000 Indian soldiers who 
saw action in France, Mesopotamia, Palestine and East Africa had fought 
valiantly alongside their British officers and counterparts and had remained loyal 
to the Empire.21 Churchill further revealed his opinion of the Indian Army in the 
Second World War when he recalled how, in September 1940, his attention had 
been drawn to the way that Indian brigades only contained Indian troops. He 
deemed that this change, made by the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East 
(Field-Marshal John Dill), ‘most desirable’.22 Churchill considered this change to 
be advantageous not as a result of the ‘grudging concessions’ that Indianization 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Winston S. Churchill, My Early Life: A Roving Commission (London: 
Thornton Butterworth, 1930), p. 164. 
20 See Ian F. W. Beckett, ‘The Singapore Mutiny of February, 1915’, Journal of 
the Society for Army Historical Research, 62/3 (1984), pp. 132–53; and ‘The 
Mutiny at Singapore’, The Times, 14 April 1915. 
21 Chandar S. Sundaram quotes the figure of 800,000 yet some estimates put the 
figure higher: see Chandar S. Sundaram, ‘Grudging Concessions: The Officer 
Corps and Its Indianization, 1817–1940’, in Marston and Sundaram (eds), A 
Military History of India and South Asia, p. 94.  Also see Budheswar Pati, India 
and the First World War (New Delhi: Atlantic, 1996), especially pp. 30–64. 
22 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume II, Their Finest Hour 
(London: Cassell, 1949), Churchill to Field-Marshal John Dill, 21 Sept. 1940, p. 
595. 
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of the Indian Army (during the previous two decades) had achieved, but because 
he believed the better trained and disciplined British troops could therefore be 
deployed elsewhere—in theatres such as Africa, Egypt and the Mediterranean, 
which he considered far more important.23  
Following the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.) 
from Dunkirk in late May to early June 1940, Churchill turned his attention to 
immediately reconstituting a similarly sized force in France as he feared that the 
French would not continue the war.24 According to Churchill, if ‘eight native 
battalions from India’ could be sent to Palestine then the eight regular battalions, 
made up of British troops, in Palestine could go towards the reforming of the 
new B.E.F.25 Once again, Churchill revealed how he relegated the status of 
Indian troops to no more than relief soldiers. Indeed, he would later describe 
them as such to Anthony Eden.26 In the same memo to Eden, Churchill wrote 
that ‘a ceaseless stream of Indian units’ should be sent to Palestine and Egypt 
because ‘India is doing nothing worth speaking of at the present time’.27 Even 
though Churchill wrote that British affairs in the East and Middle East were 
suffering from a ‘catalepsy by which they are smitten’, he did not consider the 
Indian troops able to deal with this state of paralysis—he considered them only 
sufficient to augment British troops.28 This illustrates how Churchill’s opinion of 
India was often affected by his opinion of the Indian Army, and vice versa, and 
that his opinion of both India and the Indian Army had neither softened nor 
moderated in the intervening years. Churchill was still overly emotional when it 
came to the subject of India.29 
                                                 
23 Andrew Sharpe, ‘The Indianisation of the Indian Army’, History Today, 36/3 
(1986), pp. 47–52; and Sundaram, ‘Grudging Concessions’, pp. 88–101. 
24 Churchill, Finest Hour, Churchill to Ismay, 2 June 1940, p. 123. 
25 Ibid., p. 124. 
26 Ibid., Churchill to Anthony Eden, 6 June 1940, p. 145. 
27 Ibid., p. 146.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Wavell depicted Churchill as overly emotional when it came to India. One 
example was over Britain’s debt to India over which Churchill was ‘intractable’ 
but calmed down after his ‘fireworks’. Moon (ed.), Wavell, pp. 12–13.  
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Churchill was equally disparaging towards the African brigades30 and 
viewed them with a similar suspicion.31 In a memo addressed to Ismay but 
marked for the attention of Wavell, Churchill wrote that he was not satisfied by 
the part played by the African brigades who were stationed in Kenya. Churchill 
viewed indigenous troops as inferior to British troops; he even viewed them as 
inferior to both the Australian and New Zealand soldiers whom he thought were, 
in turn, below the standard of the British troops. He also wrote that such ‘native’ 
troops were to be mixed together ‘so that one lot can be used to keep the other in 
discipline’.32 There was a hierarchy of troops in Churchill’s mind—a definite 
pecking order with British officers and men at the top. Without exception, in the 
first two volumes of his memoirs of the Second World War, Churchill intimated 
that Indian troops (like their ‘native’ African counterparts), were not to be 
trusted, and were ill-disciplined, inefficient and not as professional as their 
British counterparts.  
The Japanese invasion of Burma was a personal indignity for Churchill. 
Aside from his father’s connection to Burma, the root of this personal 
awkwardness lay back in July 1940 when, as a result of Japan’s ‘inscrutable 
glare’, he acquiesced in their demands to close the Burma Road.33 Not 
surprisingly, Churchill would not admit in his memoirs that the closure of the 
Road amounted to an act of appeasement, and that ‘our decision was my 
                                                 
30 See Ashley Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War (London: 
Hambledon Continuum, 2006), pp. 171–268; and David Killingray with Martin 
Plaut, Fighting for Britain: African Soldiers in the Second World War 
(Woodbridge: James Currey, 2010). 
31 Another example of Churchill being disparaging towards so called ‘native’ 
troops reads: ‘The African Colonial divisions ought not surely to be called 
divisions at all. No one contemplates them standing in the line against a 
European army’. See Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume III, 
The Grand Alliance (London: Cassell, 1950), Churchill to Chief of Staff 
Committee, 17 Feb. 1941, in Appendix C, p. 653. This also shows his lack of 
knowledge as the West African Brigade contained some white British troops. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Churchill, Finest Hour, p. 225. 
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doing’.34 He had said that this manoeuvre ‘was to stave off trouble for the time 
being in the hope and belief that our situation might become better in the future’, 
whereas in reality it left an already vulnerable Burma more susceptible to attack 
and invasion.35 Churchill’s strategy revealed that he had little understanding of 
the potential strength and force of the Japanese in the Far East. It also revealed 
his antiquated belief that Burma was nothing more than a geographical 
‘appendage’ to India, whose task was to act as a geographical buffer zone and 
protect India.36 He still held this belief in 1947 when he was compiling and 
editing his memoirs and when the second reading of the Burma Bill of 
Independence was taking place in the Commons. He did not want to draw 
attention to how vulnerable Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore and Burma had 
actually been. Nor did he wish to reveal how the British Empire’s perception of 
its power and influence in the Far East had been so skewed. Similarly, Churchill 
did not wish to narrate how some sections of the indigenous population had not 
only welcomed the invading Japanese but had helped them establish control of 
Burma.37 Churchill’s imperial pride seemed unable to confront the reality that 
some Burmese wanted to rid themselves of the British once and for all. 
Allocating fewer words on the struggles in Burma (when compared to other 
theatres such as the Mediterranean, Africa, Egypt or even the Middle East) meant 
that Churchill could avoid revealing the unstable nature of the British Empire 
east of Suez and how ill-informed his responses and reactions to this instability 
had been at the time.  
Before examining Churchill’s portrayal of the Indian Army’s role in the 
reconquest of Burma, it is worth noting that he began to make a distinction 
between the British and the Indian Army only in the fourth volume of his 
memoirs. Churchill described the Indian Army as the ‘British-Indian Army’,38 
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35 Ibid. 
36 Hansard, HC (series 5) vol. 443, col. 1851 (5 Nov. 1947). 
37 Michael W. Charney, A History of Modern Burma (Cambridge: CUP, 2009). 
38 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume IV, The Hinge of Fate 
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using what one historian described as a ‘clumsy locution’.39 Ismay and Pownall, 
those two stalwart members of the syndicate, found Churchill’s lack of 
consistency annoying. Ismay noted how 
 
Mr ‘C’ sometimes refers to these Divisions as ‘British 
Indian Divisions’, sometimes as ‘Indian Divisions’, and 
sometimes just as ‘Divisions’. I have a sort of idea that 
they had no British battalions and that therefore they 
ought to be called ‘Indian Divisions’. But, in any case, he 
ought to be consistent.40 
 
Pownall was even more scathing when he confirmed that he thought Churchill’s 
‘British-Indian Division phrase is rather a bore really’.41 Pownall continued to 
write that Churchill remembered only ‘now and again’ that it was ‘his own 
hobby horse’ and that, at times, he forgot or found ‘the hobby horse a 
nuisance’.42 Often asked to clean up the tracts of text on military matters, 
Pownall found that there were so many of these inconsistencies in Churchill’s 
expressions for the Indian Army that he had ‘got weary of chasing them up’.43 
Churchill’s use of the term ‘British-Indian Army’ speaks volumes about 
what he thought of the Indian Army.44 He saw the Indian Army as essentially 
British albeit including Indian soldiers and although he was not the only person 
to think this, he was one of an ever decreasing number. The series of reforms 
which had slowly begun to penetrate the enclave which was the British Army’s 
                                                 
39 Raymond Callahan, ‘Churchill and the Indian Army’, Second Joint Imperial 
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perception about the Indian Army had helped in this regard. Although 
Indianization of the Indian officer corps had been discussed since the early 
nineteenth century, it was not until after the First World War that these 
discussions turned into a slow reality. Reforms such as the Imperial Cadet Corps 
(ICC) which was established in 1897, the eight-unit scheme of the 1920s, the 
admission of Indians to Sandhurst, and the establishment of the Indian Military 
College at Dehra Dun in 1932 all went someway to creating a truly Indian Army. 
Even if some reforms either failed (the ICC) or created further problems (such as 
segregation through the eight-unit scheme) the process of Indianization was at 
least being openly pursued.45 
Churchill was disparaging about the ill-prepared state of the Indian Army 
at the outbreak of the Second World War. It must be pointed out that others, most 
notably British Commanding Officers posted in the Middle and Far East, shared 
Churchill’s views about the unready state of the Indian troops. For example, 
Pownall wrote in his diary that although the 45th Infantry Brigade of the 17th 
Indian Division were a ‘welcome reinforcement ... too much cannot be expected 
of them. They are raw and not fully trained’.46 Yet Pownall realised that it was 
not the fault of the troops themselves: it was typically the fault of the British 
administration as ‘we always seem to go into war in this condition’.47 There was 
a further difference between Pownall and Churchill. At the beginning of the 
Burma campaigns, Pownall was being characteristically realistic regarding the 
rawness of the newly formed Indian units, whereas Churchill was still being 
disparaging when it came to narrating his memoirs. Pownall had kept a diary 
during the war and speculated as to what had gone wrong at Singapore, and why 
the Japanese had found it so easy to conquer Malaya and Burma. He wrote that 
there was only one reason for it, the Japanese troops were ‘better led, better 
trained and, above all, tougher than ours’.48 Much to Churchill’s consternation 
were he ever to have read Pownall’s diary, Pownall added that not only were the 
                                                 
45 See Chandar S. Sundaram, ‘‘Martial’ Indian Aristocrats and the Military 
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46 Bond (ed.), Chief of Staff: II, 8 Jan. 1942, p. 76. 
47 Ibid.  
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Japanese ‘superior to the Indian troops, which was perhaps to be expected’, they 
were also superior ‘to the British troops and to the Australians’.49 Considering 
that Pownall became an integral member of the syndicate and (with Kelly) 
researched and drafted the majority of the text on Burma, it is surprising that 
Churchill’s clumsy and pre-war and pre-Indian independence terminology 
remained for all to see. In itself this demonstrates that ultimately Churchill’s 
opinion triumphed. 
Churchill began his chapter on the invasion of Burma, in volume four, by 
admitting that ‘there was a general belief that the Japanese would not start a 
major campaign against Burma until at least their operations in Malaya had been 
successful’.50 It was in this chapter that Churchill noticeably made the distinction 
between the British Army and the Indian Army, or the British-Indian Army as he 
sometimes referred to it. In this chapter Churchill also attempted to assuage his 
guilt over the fall of Singapore, and attempted an historical sleight of hand. 
Churchill included a telegram that he had sent to Reginald Dorman-Smith, the 
Governor of Burma (May 1941 to August 1946), in which Churchill wrote that 
he regarded ‘Burma and contact with China as the most important feature in the 
whole [Eastern] theatre of war’.51 Churchill was arguably hoping to halt any 
criticism his post-war detractors may have had regarding his pursuit, or rather his 
lack of pursuit, of the invading Japanese at the time of publication (the Hinge of 
Fate  was published in Britain in August 1951). Ever the forward-thinking 
politician, Churchill knew that the less ammunition he could give his critics, 
especially during the campaign for the general election which began in mid-
September 1951, the better.  
Having set the scene for the eventual fall of Rangoon, Churchill devoted 
the rest of the chapter to Anglo-Australian relations.52 Churchill called on his 
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American benefactor, Roosevelt, to intervene and persuade Curtin (the 
Australian Prime Minister) to agree to divert Australian troops to Burma. 
Churchill described, at considerable length, the Australian Government’s 
‘adverse’ reaction.53 Whilst Reynolds correctly noted that this was Churchill’s 
postwar ‘malicious jeu d’esprit’, in that he ‘remained unforgiving’ almost a 
decade later, it should be noted that if Churchill was so pushed for space (and 
time as he was campaigning for his triumphal return to Downing Street) on 
Burma, why include this anti-Australian diatribe at this point in his memoirs?54 
Once again, Churchill was attempting a historical sleight of hand. By focusing 
the reader’s attention on how obdurate the Australian Government had been 
(when they were arguably quite justified in declining Churchill’s demands), 
Churchill seemingly placed the blame for the ‘slender forces’ that were in Burma 
at the feet of the Australian Government and not at his own.55 But in this instance 
Churchill was not successful. When he wrote that as there were ‘no troops in our 
control [which] could reach Rangoon in time to save it’,56 and that the ‘loss of 
Rangoon meant the loss of Burma’57, he was intimating how the British 
Government, surprised by the overwhelming force of the Japanese, were almost 
completely unprepared.  
In writing of the resulting hasty retreat which the Japanese forced on the 
British and Indian Armies, Churchill reverted back to his ‘great men’ theory of 
history. The British were retreating and thousands of refugees from Burma, 
including hundreds of the Raj’s civil servants, were attempting to retreat at the 
same time to relative safety in India. The casualties and deprivations experienced 
by both troops and civilians were appalling.58 On the eve of the retreat, and 
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having set the scene for the inevitable loss of Burma to the Japanese, Churchill 
wrote that ‘if we could not send an army we could at any rate send a man’.59 
Whether Churchill purposely belittled the British and Indian troops who were in 
Burma at the time of the Japanese invasion, by over-emphasising the supposed 
superiority of the Japanese forces is perhaps little more than speculation.60 Yet 
the implication was that, whilst the troops themselves were beleaguered and 
Wavell, as the arbiter of the ‘supreme direction of the Burma campaign’ was 
clearly overwhelmed, there was nothing else to be done but send in a dashing 
British officer—General Alexander.*61 Churchill was reverting to type. By 
writing about Alexander in such terms, and by holding him aloft as he would 
later do Wingate,* Auchinleck* (for a short period) and Mountbatten* (for 
arguably an even shorter period of time), Churchill was reinforcing his long-held 
notion that all the Indian Army needed was ‘a white officer among them when 
fighting’.62  
The next time Churchill noticeably made the distinction between Indian 
and British troops appears in the fifth volume of memoirs in the chapter which 
narrated ‘the hardest fought battle of World War Two’—Monte Cassino.63 
Churchill wrote that the second major attack at Cassino ‘fell to the 4th Indian 
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Division’ who, having recently relieved the American troops, incurred such 
heavy losses on three consecutive nights that Churchill wrote that the second 
direct attack on Cassino ‘had failed’.64 Less than a month later the third attack on 
Cassino was taking place, this time not aimed against the monastery but on the 
town itself. Churchill wrote how the ‘1st German Parachute Division, probably 
the toughest fighters in all their Army, fought it out amid the heaps of rubble 
with the New Zealanders and Indians’.65 The battle for Cassino was hard and 
vicious. Casualties were high and Churchill reported them as totalling 2,400—
1,050 from the 2nd New Zealand Division; 401 British from the 4th Indian 
Division; 759 Indians from the 4th Division; and 190 from the 78th British 
Division.66 Churchill wrote that the ‘hard fighting in attacks and counter-attacks’ 
meant the by 23 March 1944 the ‘New Zealanders and Indians could do no more’ 
and that even the Gurkhas ‘had to be withdrawn’.67 Churchill acknowledged that 
the resultant casualties were ‘a heavy price to pay for what might seem small 
gains’ but at this juncture in the war, Britain needed every such ‘small gain’ it 
could muster.68  But why did Churchill make the distinction between British and 
Indian troops at this stage in his memoirs? Was it a literary device which he 
employed? For example, the entire first volume of his memoirs had been devoted 
to setting the scene for his climactic and dramatic arrival at Downing Street as 
Britain’s wartime Prime Minister. Similarly, was Churchill making the 
distinction between British and Indian troops in order to be able to attribute two 
years of defeats in Burma, from the retreat across Burma to India in 1942 to the 
beginning of the tide turning against the Japanese in early 1944, to the Indian 
Army itself? In other words, was Churchill setting up the Indian Army as a 
convenient scapegoat for the wave of disastrous campaigns in Burma? 
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The brief chapter in which Churchill portrayed the campaigns for the 
reconquest of Burma, ‘Burma and Beyond’, is located towards the end of the 
fifth volume, Closing the Ring.69 The title reveals that Churchill was merely 
giving Burma itself a cursory glance, as it alluded to what lay chronologically 
beyond Burma: the crushing defeat of Japan by American nuclear weapons 
(which would be covered in the sixth and final volume).70 By the time the fifth 
volume was published, Churchill had achieved his ambition to be Prime Minister 
of peacetime Britain.71 He was still concerned with not upsetting the American 
applecart, and with procuring access to atomic bomb research which had at one 
time been a shared Anglo-American venture.72 As always, Churchill and the 
syndicate were conscious of what should, and could, be written in such a limited 
space—and evidently had little more than Anglo-American relations in mind. 
Aware of this, as well as Churchill’s declaration that he could only spare 3,000 
words on Burma, it comes as no surprise that he spent the first three and a half 
pages of this chapter on a narrative of American Pacific strategy. Typically 
Churchill centred his narrative upon individuals, in this case Americans (General 
MacArthur, Admiral Halsey, Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Spruance for praise), 
and he detailed the successes they had against the Japanese during the latter half 
of 1943 and the early part of 1944.73 In August 1944 when Anglo-American 
relations were vulnerable to the slightest undercurrents, Churchill had written a 
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letter to his confidant and outlet for frustration, his wife Clementine. He wrote 
that Alexander was being ‘relegated to a secondary and frustrated situation’ due 
to American insistence, and that those troops fighting in Burma, ‘in the most 
unhealthy country in the world under the worst possible conditions’ were doing 
so in order ‘to guard the American air line over the Himalayas into their very 
over-rated China’. Disturbed by his belief that ‘two-thirds of our forces are mis-
employed for American convenience, and the other third is under American 
Command’, Churchill wrote that such ‘delicate and serious matters’ were to be 
‘handled between friends in careful and patient personal discussion’. He 
concluded that he had ‘no doubt’ that he would ‘reach a good conclusion, but 
you will see that life is not very easy’.74 Life in Burma was not easy, and 
Churchill wrote that the history of the reconquest of Burma had to be read 
against the ‘permanent background of geography [and] limited resources.’75  
Having dealt with his American-centred narrative, Churchill turned his 
attention to the ‘widely different scene in South-East Asia’ where ‘the Japanese 
had been masters of a vast defensive arc covering their early conquests’.76 Once 
again, Churchill employed the tactic of exaggerating Japanese strength in order 
to explain why the British and Indian troops, who ‘were at close grips’ with 
them, had been so savagely beaten in Burma.77 Yet he continued to air his 
grievances regarding American strategy in Burma. He mentioned how ‘the 
divergence of opinion’ between America and Britain continued and cited how he 
feared that if the proposed American strategy were followed then British forces 
would ‘become side-tracked and entangled’ in Northern Burma, the preferred 
American vantage point, and that this ‘would deny [the British Empire] our 
rightful share in a Far Eastern victory’.78 Briefly mentioning the 5th and 7th 
Divisions as well as the XVth Corps, which ‘put an end to the legend of Japanese 
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invincibility in the jungle’,79 Churchill then devoted two pages of his narrative 
on Burma to Wingate—whom Pownall described as ‘a genius in that he is quite a 
bit mad’.80 Orde Wingate and his Long Range Penetration units (the Chindits) 
continue to fascinate and deeply divide historians today.81 Despite Wingate’s 
mental instability, Churchill favoured him like a prize-winning pet and proudly 
displayed him to Roosevelt.82  In doing this, Churchill illustrated how the British 
were playing not only an essential role in Burma (Wingate’s remit was to help 
destroy Japanese lines of communications and supplies in order to support 
conventional advances from both the Chinese and British forces), but also how 
the British concurred with the preferences of American strategy.83 As Kelly later 
wrote, Churchill ‘sensed that the Americans felt we were not pulling our weight 
and consequently dispatched Wingate—whom Michael Howard once said to me 
was “a lunatic shit”—as a gun-toting flamboyant cowboy who would appeal to 
the Americans of the Middle West’.84 Kelly’s own take on Wingate was that 
‘few of us in the regular Indian Army will forgive Wingate for having deserted 
and slaughtered his own men’.85  
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At this stage of the campaign in Burma, from March to May 1944, some 
of the fiercest battles against the Japanese were being fought. The Japanese aim 
was to destroy the British and Indian forces around Kohima and Imphal, progress 
up through the Dimapur pass, and forge ahead across to India. Churchill 
allocated less than two pages to the battles for Imphal and Kohima.86 Churchill 
wrote one paragraph about the Battle of Imphal.87 He mentioned the 5th and 7th 
Indian Divisions and how they were flown into Imphal and Dimapur 
respectively. Churchill wrote of how the XXXIIIrd Corps (under General 
Stopford’s command), along with the 2nd British Division, ‘an independent 
Indian brigade,’88 and the remnants of Wingate’s Chindits were also sent to 
Dimapur.89 Churchill was equally scant regarding the battle of Kohima, to which 
he devoted a similar sized paragraph.90 He wrote that the garrison at Kohima 
‘consisted of a battalion of the Royal West Kent, a Nepalese battalion, and a 
battalion of the Assam Rifles’.91  The 2nd British Division, along with the 161st 
Indian Brigade, relieved the Kohima garrison, and Churchill ended his narrative 
by writing that the ‘valiant defence of Kohima against all odds was a fine 
episode’.92 
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Even though Churchill briefly mentioned eight individual British, Indian, 
or Nepalese units he made no mention of the fact that Stopford’s XXXIIIrd 
Corps had been placed under the command of General William Slim* on 27 
March 1944. Nor did Churchill once mention Slim’s Fourteenth Army. Churchill 
also mistook the units of the 2nd Indian Division for units of the 2nd British 
Division.93 After his narrative of less than two pages (of which he deemed two 
paragraphs were sufficient to cover the battles for both Imphal and Kohima) 
Churchill wrote that in London he had ‘felt the stress’ of how ‘sixty thousand 
British and Indian soldiers, with all their modern equipment, were confined’ to 
these two battlefields.94 Churchill then reverted to describing American 
successes (such as Stilwell’s manipulation of Chinese forces and especially of 
Chiang Kai-Shek, as well as Merrill’s Marauders),95 and finished this all too 
brief chapter on the beginning of the reconquest of Burma by quoting 
Mountbatten (another of his temporary favourites and one who fitted the great 
men of history model) who wrote that ‘the Japanese bid for India was virtually 
over, and ahead lay the prospect of the first major British victory in Burma’.96 
Churchill’s narrative lent heavily towards extolling American successes, 
rather than British and Indian ones. Churchill’s inability to glance eastwards 
during the war (especially towards Burma), was magnified during the postwar 
years, as his contemporary concerns were filled with appeasing American 
opinion in order for Britain to have access to the formerly shared research on 
‘tube alloys’.97 This meant that he needed to avoid any confrontation, and one 
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way of doing this was to deliberately gloss over the wartime differences about 
Burma. But ever aware that his postwar reputation was intertwined with his self-
penned wartime portrayal, Churchill did not wish to be seen as a leader who 
could not argue his case, even if he were up against formidable opposition. For 
this reason he introduced a note of rancour against the ‘American wish to 
succour China not only by an ever-increasing air-lift, but also by land’, which, 
Churchill claimed, led to ‘heavy demands upon Britain and the Indian Empire’.98 
Any postwar discussion of Burma would not only include the virtues of the 
Indian Army, virtues which Churchill would not accept, but also it would reveal 
how Burma had been the ‘tale of the rejection of one strategic plan after another’ 
because of divergent and opposed American and British purposes.99 Prasad 
succinctly encapsulated the conflicting American and British perspectives on 
Burma—‘one seeking to utilise India for the object of keeping China in the war 
and hitting Japan directly therefrom, the other keen to get back their old empire 
in South-East Asia’.100 
Burma became the political sticking point between America and Britain. 
America, under Roosevelt, not only saw Chinese troops under Chiang Kai-Shek 
as a way of diverting Japanese attention during the war but also considered China 
capable of maintaining the balance of power in Asia in the post-war world. 
Britain, on the other hand, saw China as lacking this potential both during and 
after the war. If China were to take centre stage in post-war Asia, that would 
undermine Britain’s post-war imperial claims. Churchill therefore became 
concerned that too much of a Chinese presence in wartime Burma might, once 
Japan had been defeated, encourage the centuries-old Chinese claim to Upper 
Burma. Admittedly, Churchill’s voice was not the only British voice to want to 
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safeguard Britain’s imperial power for a post-war Asian carve-up where it was 
hoped that pre-war imperial territories would be added to, and not detracted 
from. Wavell was particularly concerned about the wartime presence of too many 
Chinese troops in Burma, writing that ‘it was obviously better to defend Burma 
with Imperial troops than with Chinese and [that the] Governor particularly 
asked me not to accept more Chinese for Burma than was absolutely 
necessary’.101 
The second divergence between American and British strategy over 
Burma was the building of the Ledo Road which Churchill called ‘an immense, 
laborious task, unlikely to be finished until the need for it had passed’.102 The 
Ledo Road, which stretched from Assam to China, was the only viable 
alternative for maintaining supplies to China during the war. In order to execute 
the American request to increase the ‘flow of supplies into China’, which could 
‘only be done by increasing the air tonnage or by opening a road through 
Burma’,103 Churchill noted that British troops would have to ‘reconquer 
Northern Burma first and quickly’.104 Churchill stated his objection immediately, 
because whilst Britain ‘favoured keeping China in the war and operating air 
forces from her territory’ he hoped for ‘a sense of proportion and the study of 
alternatives’. He ‘disliked intensely the prospect of a large-scale campaign in 
Northern Burma’ where ‘one could not choose a worse place for fighting the 
Japanese’. Churchill claimed that although the British had vociferously argued 
that ‘the enormous expenditure of man-power and material would not be 
worthwhile’, he had ‘never succeeded in deflecting the Americans from their 
purpose’.105 
Churchill’s main objection to a campaign along the lines of the American 
suggestion was that it would invariably mean that British forces ‘would become 
side-tracked and entangled there [which] would deny us our rightful share in a 
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Far Eastern victory’.106 Churchill wanted to ‘contain the Japanese in Burma’ so 
that ‘our whole British-Indian Imperial front would thus advance across the Bay 
of Bengal into close contact with the enemy’.107 He wanted Burma to be 
liberated by the British Empire—not by the anti-imperialist Americans. 
Roosevelt offered support to Churchill when he wrote that ‘I feel that with your 
energetic encouragement Mountbatten’s commanders are capable of overcoming 
the many difficulties involved’.108 Roosevelt argued that:  
 
the continued build-up of Japanese strength in Burma 
requires us to ... prevent them from launching an 
offensive that may carry them over the borders into 
India. ... I most urgently hope therefore that you back to 
the maximum a vigorous and immediate campaign in 
Upper Burma.109  
 
In his memoirs, Churchill heavily edited this telegram from Roosevelt. In the 
original telegram the divergence between American and British strategy was 
clear. Roosevelt wrote that he was ‘gravely concerned over the recent trends in 
strategy that favor an operation toward Sumatra and Malaya in the future rather 
than to face the immediate obstacles that confront us in Burma’.110 Roosevelt 
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failed to see the merit in a Sumatran operation (or any amphibious operation) 
when there appeared ‘to be much more to be gained by employing all the 
resources we now have available in an all-out drive into upper Burma so that we 
can build up our air strength in China and insure the essential support for our 
westward advance to the Formosa-China-Luzon area’.111 (Interestingly, Kimball 
places this telegram at the end of his Alliance Forged and just before his Alliance 
Declining volumes of the complete Churchill and Roosevelt correspondence).112 
Burma was one of the thorns in the wartime special relationship and it revealed 
how the alliance was merely one forged out of necessity, rather than emerging 
naturally from similar ideals held by English-speaking peoples. Churchill would 
rather have extolled the virtues of the Indian Army in his memoirs, than reveal 
the fragile nature of the Anglo-American alliance—another reason why he would 
allocate only 3,000 words on Burma.  
The phrase ‘forgotten army’ is widely used to refer to Slim’s Fourteenth 
Army, as they not only received little in the way of equipment and supplies but 
also seemed to be ‘neglected by both London and Washington’.113 On the 
Fourteenth Army’s lack of equipment, Slim wrote: 
 
No boats? We’ll build ‘em! ... No parachutes? We’ll 
make ‘em out of sandbags. No road metal? We’ll bake 
our own tracks and lay ‘em! No air strips, put down 
bithess.  Medium guns? Saw off three feet of the barrel 
and go a shooting!114 
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Slim’s motto was always, ‘God helps those who help themselves’.115 But Slim’s 
army were also forgotten and glossed over by the British public. In The Times 
‘Review of the year 1942’, the British public read how the Japanese had attacked 
Pearl Harbor therefore bringing America directly into the war.116 The public read 
how ‘the Japanese did not pause, but turned at once to attack Burma’, and how 
the Russian, Mediterranean and Middle Eastern war theatres had been under 
constant attack.117 The North African campaigns, the Russian resistance to the 
German offensive, and the award of the George Cross to Malta for its ‘heroism 
and devotion’ were all mentioned. The Eighth Army received several mentions, 
as did Alexander, Wavell and American troops. But not even an allusion was 
made to the armies fighting in Burma, let alone any specific mention of Indian or 
African troops. Whilst Churchill was not the progenitor of the way in which 
these armies were forgotten, he did have the opportunity to rectify this situation 
in his memoirs. Reynolds suggests that Churchill did not include the 
achievements of Slim and the Fourteenth Army in his fourth volume of memoirs 
due to the more than usual rush, and disorganisation, in getting the proofs to the 
publishers.118 This may well be so, but arguably Churchill did not include the 
troops in Burma because they were a constant source of humiliation for him. 
They had, after all, to use Slim’s own phrase, turned ‘defeat into victory’ with 
very little help compared to the other theatres of war and, above all, it had been 
the Indian Army which had been in the majority.119 To include them by name, to 
remember the forgotten, would mean Churchill would have had to revise his 
opinion of Indian troops—something he was never prepared to do.  
On 1 June 1951, a year before the fifth volume of Churchill’s memoirs 
was published, Slim was invited to give another speech to the Burma Reunion 
meeting. He included an anecdote about how, one day in 1942,  
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at the worst time of the retreat from Burma, General 
Joseph Stilwell—Vinegar Joe to you—and I sat on a hill 
contemplating the situation. It could only be described, to 
use language politer than you’ve sometimes heard me use 
and a good deal politer than General Stilwell generally 
used, as a scene of considerable military confusion. After 
a thoughtful pause he turned to me. ‘Well, General,’ he 
said, ‘There’s some who say the British and the 
Americans are really the same people. I doubt it, but we 
sure did have one common ancestor!’ ‘And who was 
that?’ I asked. He looked at me over the top of his 
spectacles and answered: ‘Ethelred the Unready!’ Stilwell 
and I, and a lot of you were paying then, as poor old 
Ethelred had a thousand years before, the price of 
unreadiness. It’s a heavy price in blood and sweat and 
years.120 
 
Slim knew that the men who made up the British, Indian, and Commonwealth 
Armies in Burma, from 1941 onwards, had been ill-prepared, ill-equipped, and 
ill-trained. He also knew that, because of the many races which made up the 
Fourteenth, ‘the approach had to be suited to the man’. The result was that ‘in 
four months our army was a confident, efficient, fighting team’.121 Slim was 
highly aware of how being the forgotten army (in terms of supplies, rations, 
equipment, communications and Governmental as well as public concern) had 
led to them paying a heavy price. Slim possessed great virtues—he was a 
soldier’s soldier—but in contrast to Wingate, Auchinleck (for a brief time) or 
Alexander, Slim was ‘fortunate in not being in direct communication with the 
Prime Minister’ as such direct communication was cumbersome, to say the 
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least.122 Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke* observed that, in March 1942, after 
having spent an exhausting evening with the Chiefs of Staff, he finally managed 
to get Churchill to withdraw his ‘offensive wire’ to Auchinleck and send one 
which Alanbrooke and the Chiefs had drafted instead: ‘thank heaven we were 
able to stop the wire and re-word it’.123  
Slim was not one of Churchill’s favourites. Perhaps this is why, after the 
fifth volume of memoirs was published, Slim did not hesitate to confront 
Churchill over how he and his men had been forgotten all over again. Whilst 
Churchill notified Pownall of Slim’s complaint, there does not seem to have been 
any urgency to the communication nor did Churchill issue a directive to 
counteract the complaint. He simply wrote that Slim had received ‘a good many 
letters’ from the Fourteenth Army about their lack of a mention in Closing the 
Ring.124 By 1952, as Reynolds notes, Slim was not a man anyone could ignore. 
In 1948 Attlee had ensured that Slim succeeded Montgomery as Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, and in November 1952 Slim was offered the Governor-
Generalship of Australia (a post he was to hold for seven years).125 Pownall 
responded within two days to Churchill having drawn his attention to Slim’s 
complaint writing that he too had heard a complaint that the Fourteenth Army 
was not ‘referred to by name’ within the volume.126 Pownall explained that the 
absence came about due to the ‘strategic planning in this period’ being ‘generally 
above Army level’.127 He added, by way of explanation, that the ‘operations 
themselves’ had been carried out by a ‘widely dispersed Corps’, and that when 
Churchill arrived at the narrative (which covered how ‘two of the Corps joined 
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up near Imphal’ and how ‘from that time the Army had a much more direct part 
to play’) it would, of course, be ‘duly reflected’ in the final volume.128 Perhaps 
Churchill’s inclusion of Slim and the Fourteenth Army in the final volume of his 
memoirs would redress the imbalance which had been so clearly displayed—
especially against the Indian Army. 
It was therefore anticipated that Churchill’s portrayal of the reconquest of 
Burma would appear in the final volume of memoirs; a volume which was 
increasingly thought of as an apologia to those whom he had previously either 
forgotten or offended.129 Readers were once again to be disappointed, as 
Churchill concentrated on the war in the West. It was only briefly after the 
triumph of Overlord was depicted that Churchill turned his attention to ‘how, 
when and where’ British forces could ‘strike at Japan, and assure for Britain an 
honourable share in the final victory’.130 In other words, how and when could the 
British Empire regain Singapore, Malaya and Burma? Churchill was politic 
enough to admit that, in 1944, he did not want Britain’s ‘rightful possessions’ to 
be handed back at the peace table.131 Published in 1954, this sentiment of 
Churchill’s echoed a concern that Mountbatten had raised a decade earlier: 
 
our prestige in the Far East is unlikely to recover from the 
blow of having the British Empire handed back to us, 
possibly with strings attached, by a Peace Treaty imposed 
as the result of a predominantly American victory. I 
realise that this is a political aspect that does not concern 
me.132  
 
This was the crux of the problem for Churchill. Having ignored Burma for so 
long, having concentrated solely on the war in Europe and North Africa, and 
having favoured all other theatres of war above and beyond the Far East, let 
                                                 
128 Ibid. 
129 Reynolds, In Command of History, p. 453. 
130 Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 129. 
131 Ibid., p. 130. 
132 CHAR 20/173/28: Mountbatten to Churchill, 10 Oct. 1944. 
Chapter VI: Churchill’s Portrayal of the Indian Army, and the Reconquest of Burma. 
229 
alone Burma, he now had to align American wishes with as little prospective loss 
to British imperial prestige as possible.  
As he had done in previous volumes, Churchill emphasised the American 
strategic plans for the proposed Allied victory over Japan. After the briefest 
mention of ‘the British-Indian Fourteenth Army, under the able and forceful 
leadership of General Slim’,133 Churchill swiftly turned to recount American 
successes under Stilwell, and the perennial problems faced by British strategy in 
Burma—an inability and overwhelming reluctance to take resources from 
European theatres to make gains in the predominantly American sphere of the 
Far East.134 In between his communications with Mountbatten and Roosevelt, 
Churchill allocated one paragraph to Slim’s Fourteenth Army – the XXXIIIrd 
Corps, the East African brigade (who had established the bridgehead at Sittaung) 
and the 5th Indian division – before reverting to coverage of American strategy 
and American changes in command. Even though he included these troops in his 
narrative, this was done in order to highlight the extent of the involvement of 
British Commonwealth forces in Burma, and not as a way of lauding the Indian 
Army’s own efforts. It appeared as if Churchill was illustrating how the British 
Empire, with him at its helm, had followed American strategic policy willingly. 
Despite Mountbatten’s ‘excellent idea’ of a land advance across Burma whilst 
simultaneously carrying out an amphibious attack on Rangoon, Churchill wrote 
that, as it would have ‘demanded many more troops and much more shipping’ 
which could only ‘be found from North-West Europe’, it would not have been 
possible.135 Suddenly Churchill relegated Britain to the status of a declining 
imperial power—one which had the capacity to take only ‘diversionary 
enterprises’.136  
The final volume of memoir had a lot to contend with. It was not only an 
apologia to all those whom Churchill had offended or left out in previous 
volumes, but also it was compiled and edited whilst he was in his second tenure 
at Downing Street, and as ill health began to set in. It is not surprising therefore 
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that, when coupled with both India and Burma’s independence, and the British 
Empire having been watered down into a Commonwealth by Attlee and his 
Labour Government of 1945 to 1951, Churchill paid even less attention to the 
Far East and the Indian Army in his final volume. Throughout the proceeding 
volumes, as Mason noted, Churchill barely acknowledged that India had sent 
troops to the Middle East early in the war and that they had taken part in 
‘Wavell’s first victories against the Italians at Sidi Barrani and in Abyssinia’.137 
Indian troops had been instrumental in holding off Rommel’s advance on 
Tobruk; they had contributed three divisions to the invasion of Italy; and had 
held Iraq, Persia, and to a large extent Syria.138 But most galling for Churchill 
was how the Indian Army had been instrumental in the British victory over the 
Japanese in Burma. The price tag which accompanied the success of the Indian 
Army was, as Bayly and Harper commented, ‘the rapid independence of India’ 
which proved to be, at least for Churchill, too high a price to pay.139 
 Churchill’s ignominious dismissal of the Indian Army, and especially its 
role in the reconquest of Burma, was a deliberate omission from his memoirs. It 
may not however, be entirely fair to blame subsequent histories for a similar 
lapse. After all, one of the most momentous events in Indian history had only just 
occurred – independence (accompanied by the horrors of partition) – and 
understandably this became the focus of Indian history in the post-independent 
era rather than the contribution India, and the Indian Army, had made to the 
Second World War.140 It is however, inadequate and unjust to not question 
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Churchill’s disregard of the Indian Army. It is also not enough to explain his 
dismissal in terms of his imperialistic, racial assumptions. After all, he changed 
his mind regarding the Japanese soldier – from non-threatening throughout 1939 
and 1940 to a vicious, brutal and dedicated professional soldier by 1943 – yet he 
did not change his mind regarding the Indian soldier.141  
The Indianization of the Indian Army, a long, slow and overdue process, 
had occupied the entire length of the interwar years and left virtually no time to 
update and mechanize the Indian Army itself.142 By 1939, when the Viceroy 
(Lord Linlithgow) declared that India was at war with Germany, the Indian 
Army’s officer corps had only 344 Indian officers alongside the 1,912 British 
officers.143 The Indian Army ended the war with 15,740 Indian officers—three 
times the total peace establishment, British and Indian, of the mid-1930s.144 By 
the end of 1942, despite the failure of the Cripps Mission and ‘Quit India’, the 
loyalty of the Indian Army was not questioned by the majority of its British 
counterparts. In June 1942, for example, General Archibald Wavell, the recently 
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appointed supreme commander of the ill-fated American, British, Dutch and 
Australian (ABDA) forces who would later be made Viceroy of India, wrote to 
Churchill to tell him ‘on behalf of the Army in India’ the ‘achievements of the 
first two divisions sent abroad by India during this war’.145 Wavell told how the 
4th Indian Division fighting in Cyprus and the 5th Indian Division in the Western 
Desert had ‘well maintained their reputation and more than held their own in 
hard fought actions’ against Rommel’s troops.146 What is most striking is that, 
compared to Churchill’s portrayal of the Indian Army, Wavell favourably 
likened the Indian soldiers to hand-picked German troops. He therefore implied 
that whilst the Indian troops had been, at the start of the war, ill-prepared, poorly 
armed and relatively untrained, their capacity for quick and decisive action, their 
willingness to learn from mistakes, and their talent at adapting to varied and 
differing battlefield conditions, implied that their ability outweighed not only 
Rommel’s troops but also some of the British troops themselves.147  
In November 1942, Wavell would once again encourage Churchill to 
consider ‘sending a special message to armed forces in India Command’ as a 
token of his appreciation would ‘greatly hearten them’ at a time when successes 
in North Africa made the Indian troops ‘feel a little out of the picture’.148 The 
legacy of the mutinies of 1857 and 1915 had convinced some British officers of 
the Indian Army’s potential for disloyalty. By the end of 1942 however, this had 
changed and Indian troops were ‘far more wholeheartedly trusted’.149 As the 
political situation had changed in India, with the promise of self-government to 
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be seriously discussed and awarded after the war, the manner in which the Indian 
Army was trusted and accepted also changed.150 Whilst the British were 
determined to keep the colonial Indian Army depoliticized,151 and attempted to 
keep Jawans insulated from events in India, the Indian Army had never ‘been so 
trusted’ and had repaid that ‘trust so superbly’.152 The belief in the superiority of 
the British soldier over the Indian soldier proved to be outmoded, misplaced and 
wrong. As one historian wrote, ‘gone were the days when it had been supposed 
that the example of British troops was needed to fire Indians to valour’.153 Yet in 
his memoirs Churchill still maintained this outdated credo.  
While the fourth and fifth volumes of his memoirs were being hastily 
drafted and revised, Churchill was more concerned with his future political 
career and how to bury his wartime mistakes rather than with a truthful 
recounting of his tale. One such mistake regarding the Indian Army was his 
opinion, expressed in July 1943 that ‘all expansion’ should ‘be stopped’ and that 
‘there should be substantial reduction to the existing number’.154 Had the 
expansion been stopped, as Churchill urged (even if he had also argued that 
‘quality was better than quantity’), the Indian Army in Burma (as well as in 
every other theatre of war) would have been significantly reduced, with the 
knock-on effect of delaying victory in the war against Japan.155 If this had come 
to light in his memoirs, it would have shown how rarely he glanced eastwards 
during the war as well as the fact that he did not take American strategic 
concerns in the Far East as seriously as he claimed. Churchill was certainly not 
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prepared to reveal his disregard and distrust for the Indian Army so blatantly, as 
the consequence – for contemporary Anglo-American relations – would have 
been dire. 
Contrary to the overwhelmingly negative portrayal of the Indian Army in 
his memoirs, Churchill did, in a handful of instances, acknowledge its success 
and singled it out for praise. In January 1944, Churchill drafted a message to be 
published in the first edition of the South East Asia Command newspaper. The 
message included his ‘best wishes’ for the success of the paper and stated that 
‘soldiers of the Fourteenth Army as well as sailors and airmen now serving under 
Admiral Mountbatten have already won for themselves distinction in battle’. He 
encouraged the men to think of the ‘comprehension of great issues which [lay] in 
their hands’ and that he was sure that they would ‘acquit themselves with the 
audacity, the valour and the resourcefulness’ which Britain now required.156 
Whilst Churchill acknowledged, and encouraged, the Fourteenth Army in this 
message, it must be noted that in the following two months, he also drafted 
similar encouraging messages to General de Gaulle (on the success of the French 
troops near Cassino), to the National Farmers Union and to the National Savings 
Committee.157 All of which indicate that the Fourteenth Army, and its Indian 
troops, were lauded as a special force by Churchill only when it suited him. As 
Callahan commented, Churchill showed only a ‘brief flare of interest’ in the 
Indian Army during the last two years of the war,158 and only when it suited his 
purpose to do so.  
Churchill’s ‘brief’ interest in the Indian Army ‘flared’ again towards the 
end of 1944, when he became concerned about the morale and welfare of troops 
in the Far East. He felt it ‘essential’ that he should keep in close contact with 
Mountbatten as he regarded the campaigns being waged in Burma as having an 
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important effect on the ‘welfare and morale of the British forces in the Far 
Eastern theatres of war’.159 Churchill wanted the ‘best possible conditions for the 
men and women serving in the war against Japan’.160 Yet Churchill once again 
reverted to type and made a disparaging distinction between British and Indian 
(as well as African) troops. Churchill called for a ‘new view’ to be taken,161 
where the aim would be to ‘provide British sailors, soldiers, and airmen with a 
standard of amenities as close to that enjoyed by American troops’.162 However 
Churchill wrote that whilst ‘Indian and Colonial troops must receive full 
consideration’, the ‘improvements in the amenities for British troops must not be 
held back because they cannot be fully extended to troops more accustomed to 
the climate and to local conditions’.163 In other words, what started out as a 
promising and potential change in Churchill’s regard for the Indian Army was 
only to be dashed again.  
In May 1945, Amery wrote that he hoped Churchill would    
 
find time for a talk with Auchinleck and learn from him 
something of the real efficiency behind the front line of 
the Indian Army, as well as something of his plans for the 
future, both as to the Indian Army proper and as to his 
ideas for a British strategic reserve.164 
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Amery’s remark illustrates how Churchill had clearly not changed his outdated, 
imperialistic, and disdainful regard for the Indian Army by the end of the Second 
World War. When it came to writing his memoirs, and the pivotal role which the 
Indian Army had played in the reconquest of Burma resurfaced, it became one 
issue that Churchill would gladly gloss over. Churchill made it clear in his 
preface to Closing the Ring that he had ‘found it necessary ... to practise 
compression and selection in an increasing degree’.165 No doubt the advent of 
Indian (as well as Burmese) independence contributed to his snubbing of the 
Indian Army’s achievements; but, as he wrote his memoirs to aid his return to 
Downing Street, Churchill felt he had to gloss over and secure Britain’s ability to 
enter the Cold War as one of the main players. He could not do this without 
pandering to wartime, as well as contemporary, American sensibilities.  
Churchill had been humiliated by the events in wartime Burma. The 
country which his father had annexed in 1885 had always been rather neglected 
by the British Empire—it was thought of as impenetrable due to its extensive 
mountain ranges and intemperate climate, and it was cut off from the Pacific.166 
Churchill was also humiliated by the events of post-war Burma as even though 
his imperial rhetoric came out in force, it was merely hollow rhetoric as he could 
not realistically oppose the move to grant Burma independence. Burma had been 
devastated during the Japanese occupation. Its integral industries and exports 
(teak, oil, and rice) contributed a minimal amount to Britain’s sterling balance 
deficit. Post-war Burma required a huge amount of investment which, because of 
the virtually negligible return that Britain would receive, meant that it was not a 
viable option to retain Burma as part of the ‘new’ Commonwealth. Churchill 
may have been verbose about the influence Burma’s independence would have 
on India, but he was nonetheless realistic over Burma. He needed to hide, or at 
least deflect attention from how, his swift, yet pragmatic, U-turn had come about 
without too much inner turmoil. Writing about the reconquest of Burma between 
1947 and 1950 (and adhering to a strict word limit) allowed Churchill to side-
step his own failure: that he could not stop Burma being relinquished by the 
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British Empire although, in practical and economic terms, he may not have 
wanted to. Perhaps it was merely the pace at which the empire relinquished its 
hold on Burma to which Churchill truly objected. 
Burma had hit one of Churchill’s raw nerves: the Indian Army had 
proved itself to be a formidable fighting unit—one without which Burma would 
have not been (if only temporarily) regained.167 Burma had also been almost 
totally unprepared for an invasion and had proved incapable of defending itself. 
As Burma had been viewed by Churchill as an ‘appendage’ to India then it 
followed that, despite all his prevarications to the contrary, he had not been 
overly concerned over India’s protection from attack either. But more 
importantly for Churchill’s post-war status, Burma proved how fragile and 
temporary the Anglo-American wartime ‘special relationship’ had been. 
Churchill’s legendary pen manipulated history at the expense of the Indian Army 
as Burma had proved to be the ‘tale of the rejection of one strategic plan after 
another because the American and British purposes were so divergent’168 Prasad, 
Bhargava and Khera may have written the official history of the Indian Army in 
1958, but its accuracy and style were never heard above Churchill’s more 
powerful and verbose effort. The Indian Tiger had struck, it had killed, and it had 
triumphed.169 The wartime history was there for Churchill to include and expand 
upon, yet he chose not to.  
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Illustration VI 
 
 
 
 
 ‘I repeat sir, the Japs are no sportsmen—it’s always been clearly understood that 
these jungles are strictly impenetrable’. 
 
Osbert Lancaster, Daily Express, 20 Jan. 1942 
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Churchill mythologised the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ in his 
memoirs.1 He grafted Britain’s post-war economic, cultural and intellectual links 
with America onto the wartime ‘special relationship’—a relationship which he 
cemented at Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946. Having shown the world how 
sturdy a construct the Anglo-American alliance was in 1946, Churchill then set 
about hastily laying its foundations through the medium of his memoirs. The 
problem he then encountered was that the wartime ‘special relationship’ had not 
actually been all that ‘special’, particularly when he recollected the war in the Far 
East, or the British Empire east of Suez. Writing in November 1952, after he had 
achieved his ambition of a return to Downing Street as peacetime prime minister 
of Britain, Churchill was very much aware that he had to still tread carefully with 
the Americans: ‘of course we have not got permission to publish letters and 
telegrams from Ike and Truman. I do not intend to print anything they would 
object to’.2 Since Churchill was aware of the fragility of the union between the 
English-speaking peoples in the post-war world, it meant that, when 
reconstructing the wartime world for his memoirs, he had to be even more 
circumspect.  
Fortunately Churchill had not frequently looked eastwards during the war 
because his imperial rhetoric – a caricature of his own invention during the 1930s 
when he had been in his ‘political wilderness’ – had prevented him from doing 
so. After all, in March 1941, Churchill had written that: 
 
I do not think Japan is likely to attack us unless and until 
she is sure we are going to be defeated. I doubt very 
much whether she would come into the war on the side of 
the Axis Powers if the United States joined us. She would 
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certainly be very foolish to do so. It would be more 
sensible for her to come in if the United States did not 
join us.3 
 
Less than twelve months later, America entered the war due to the twisted steel 
and burning oil of Pearl Harbor. Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore were lost to 
the British Empire. Burma was in the midst of invasion, and Churchill’s 
unimagined horror, an India on the brink of invasion and almost at the point of 
rebelling, had come to pass. 1942 was the hinge upon which the outcome of the 
war teetered. This was no less true when Churchill came to recollect this 
momentous year for his memoirs.  
Churchill knew that wartime sacrifices in the Far East would be 
inevitable. As chapter four has shown, Britain’s loss of the battle for Hong Kong 
was a foregone conclusion; and once the flagship of the British Empire’s prestige 
in the Far East was lost, it was inevitable that Malaya and Burma would also fall 
like so many imperial dominos. The garrison at Singapore appeared to be the 
exception. The interwar British governments had done such a wonderful job in 
creating the image of an unassailable ‘fortress’ that even the wartime prime 
minister was shocked and appalled by the ‘worst disaster’ when it inevitably 
arrived.4 Churchill’s imperialism was revealed as hollow, and his imperial 
rhetoric as empty. But all this did not stop him from declaring in November 1942 
that he had ‘not become the King’s first minister in order to preside over the 
liquidation of the British Empire’.5 Issued as a warning to the British Empire’s 
troublesome imperial subjects as well as to his American allies, Churchill’s 
imperial ‘mission statement’ also hoped to rouse the empire from its slumber. An 
allied victory, he hoped, would also be an imperial victory. He sought to show 
that the wartime cost of Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore and Burma to the 
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Japanese would be a heavy, but nonetheless temporary, price to pay. Churchill, 
once again, assumed the mantle of the unrepentant Victorian imperialist. 
What Churchill did not envisage was how integral war-time American 
anti-imperialist sentiment would become to the future of the British Empire east 
of Suez. He had known since 1912, when he had been First Sea Lord, that: 
 
If the power of Great Britain were shattered upon the sea, 
the only course open to the 5,000,000 of white men in the 
Pacific would be to seek the protection of the United 
States.6 
 
America would become the last defence of the British Empire in the Far East if 
war were to break out for Britain simultaneously in the Mediterranean and in the 
Far East. The premiums for the insurance policy of the ‘Singapore Strategy’ of 
the 1920s were far too high, and successive governments (in one of which 
Churchill had been Chancellor of the Exchequer) had failed to pay them.7 
Placing the onus for the outbreak of war upon American economic and 
diplomatic failures, as chapter three has shown, enabled Churchill to side-step 
the way in which the British Empire had consistently antagonised Japan. The 
Atlantic Charter marked the start of American pressure on the British Empire to 
re-think its post-war imperial motivation. When coupled with pressure from the 
Left in Britain, as well as from Congress leaders themselves, the relentless 
pressure for imperial change culminated in Churchill sending Stafford Cripps to 
India with an offer of post-war independence. His portrayal of his acceptance of 
American pressure, and American strategy in the Far East overall, as chapter five 
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has demonstrated, enabled Churchill to omit how the ‘special relationship’ had 
started to stress and strain. 
The discernible wartime friction between the English-speaking peoples 
became palpable over Burma. Chapter six has shown how Churchill hid behind 
the history of the war east of Suez, albeit quite willingly, as it enabled him to 
vent his frustrations on the Indian Army, in order to hide the temporary and 
volatile nature of Anglo-American relations. It was easy for Churchill to rail 
against the Indian Army and India itself. It proved even easier, and far preferable, 
for Churchill to rant against an independent India, and the Indian Army, rather 
than to show the true nature of the ‘special relationship’. Churchill wanted power 
again for himself, but he altruistically wanted it for Britain and her New 
Commonwealth of Nations too. Facilitating the not-so ‘special relationship’, and 
turning a blind eye to its foibles and quirks, could possibly help him secure both.  
On 22 December 1941, a little over two weeks after the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor, Churchill arrived in Washington. A press conference was held 
the following day. One American journalist asked Churchill whether Singapore 
was the ‘key to the whole situation out there’. Churchill replied that the ‘key’ 
was the ‘resolute manner in which the British and American Democracies’ would 
‘throw themselves into the conflict’.8 He thought this was the key in December 
1941 to defeating the Japanese. When it came to writing his post-war memoirs, 
the key to his contemporary Cold War concerns was to not reveal that the 
resolute manner in which the English-speaking peoples had fought alongside 
each other had simply been a temporary wartime alliance. Churchill needed to 
mythologize the ‘special relationship’ so that his wartime role as its progenitor 
would emphasize how relevant he remained to international relations.  
The ‘staggering’ news of Churchill’s defeat in the general election of July 
1945, left Harry Hopkins (one of Roosevelt’s closest advisors) commenting that 
Churchill had ‘been a gallant fighter and his deeds will go down in Anglo-Saxon 
history for all time’.9 Churchill’s efforts at carefully constructing his narrative of 
the war made sure of this and, as Reynolds has observed, ‘for a while Churchill 
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almost turned time on its head: such was his command of history’.10 Regarding 
the war in the Far East, this still holds partly true; and, by building upon 
Reynolds’ work on the memoirs, this thesis hopes to have relocated the war in 
the Pacific into Churchill’s major narrative of the world war. The war against 
Japan was not an easy tale for Churchill to tell because it revealed personal and 
national weaknesses and mistakes. Most importantly for Churchill however, the 
post-war context of his narration of the war against Japan meant that he had to 
downplay these errors as much as possible. Churchill invited and encouraged 
Ismay and other members of the syndicate to fill in the gaps in his memory: 
‘Your comments as usual, are most considered and helpful. My memory is thus 
refreshed to tell this part of our tale’.11 But Churchill did not want his memory to 
be as ‘refreshed’ on the war in the Far East because of the potential impact it 
might have had on his contemporary situation.  
In 1936 Churchill was made an Honorary Vice-President of the Royal 
Historical Society for his four-volume biography of his ancestor John Churchill, 
the first Duke of Marlborough.12 He was now officially considered an historian. 
Of the four points which ‘might be called a basic code of historical practice’ 
Churchill certainly conformed to two.13 Churchill accepted the ‘possibility of 
revision of particular interpretations in the light of further evidence’.14 In the 
preface to the first volume of the Second World War, he wrote that whilst ‘every 
possible care’ had been taken ‘to verify the facts’, much was ‘constantly coming 
to light’ and this meant that a ‘new aspect to the conclusion’ could happen.15 
Churchill also relished the ‘commitment to enjoyment of the creativity of the 
historian’.16 Although it could be argued that he enjoyed the ‘creativity of the 
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historian’ for its end results – the financial rewards and, in the case of his 
wartime memoirs, the resurgence in his popularity and a return to power at 10 
Downing Street – he nonetheless enjoyed wielding his pen. His compelling 
language is evidence of that. There was also a ‘commitment to basic honesty and 
integrity rather than deceit’ in Churchill’s memoirs.17 The syndicate (most 
notably Deakin, Kelly, Pownall, Allen and Ismay) ensured the ‘basic honesty and 
integrity’ of the memoirs, as did the Cabinet Secretaries Edward Bridges and 
Norman Brook.  
The final point of the historian’s code of conduct is concerned with the 
‘absence of wilful distortion or omissions’.18 It is upon the ‘wilful’ gaps and 
omissions within Churchill’s narrative of the war in the Far East that this thesis 
has been based. Literary revisions indicate an author’s indecision, and this thesis 
has examined the revisions that appear in the draft chapters, proofs and galleys of 
Churchill’s memoirs. Churchill claimed that his memoirs were not history, but 
that they were merely a ‘contribution’ to history written from the perspective of 
one who had played a major role in events.19 The official historian of the 
syndicate, Bill Deakin, claimed that: 
 
Winston’s attitude to the war memoirs was ‘this is not 
history, this is my case’. He made it absolutely clear that 
it was his case he was making. It was an anthology—with 
his own papers—not a history.20 
 
Anthology or not, Churchill’s memoirs arguably became the most influential 
memoirs of the twentieth century. To debate whether Churchill was, or was not, 
an historian is to miss the essential point that this thesis has made about his 
memoir of the Second World War: the ‘broad avenues’ that Churchill’s portrayal 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. vii.  
20 Sir William Deakin in conversation with Martin Gilbert, 15 Mar. 1975 in 
Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: 1945–1965: Volume 8: Never Despair 
(London: Heinemann, 1988), p. 315. 
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placed over the war between the British Empire and Japan has kept this 
significant part of the conflict on the periphery of both collective memory and of 
mainstream history. Perhaps because of the long shadow of Churchill’s memoirs, 
it is only comparatively recently that the ‘forgotten armies’ who fought the 
‘forgotten war’ have been appropriately remembered.21 
 
 
                                                 
21 Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Armies: Britain’s Asian Empire 
and the War with Japan (London: Penguin, 2005); and Forgotten Wars: The End 
of Britain’s Asian Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2007). 
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appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East. January 1943, attended the 
Casablanca Conference. Directed the final victory in Tunis and was then sent to 
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Commander of the Mediterranean Theatre 1944–45. Appointed Field-Marshal in 
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whilst a journalist for The Times. Ardent believer in the British Empire. 
Conservative MP for South Birmingham 1911–45. Served as an Intelligence 
Officer in Flanders during the First World War. 1919 Under-Secretary to the 
Colonial Office. 1922, First Lord of the Admiralty—presided over the plans and 
initial stages of the construction of the naval base at Singapore. Appointed 
Secretary to the Colonies 1924–29 (at the same time Churchill was holding the 
Treasury’s purse). Secretary of State for India during Churchill’s wartime 
Coalition government led to continual frustration: some with Congress leaders 
but mostly with Churchill’s attitude towards self-government for India. 
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ASQUITH, HERBERT HENRY (1852–1928)  
Lawyer and QC from 1890. Liberal MP for East Fife in 1886. Appointed as 
Home Secretary in Gladstone’s fourth Liberal government in 1892. Served under 
Rosebery (who was appointed PM after Gladstone resigned) in 1894, and then 
Harcourt and Campbell-Bannerman. Joined, and later became Vice-President, of 
the Liberal Imperial League and helped draft the Liberal Leagues 1902 manifesto 
but was against the way matter of empire disrupted party unity. Appointed 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (1905–08) and after Campbell-Bannerman’s ill 
health forced him to resign, Asquith became PM. He promoted Churchill to the 
Board of Trade. Term as PM ended in 1916 when Lloyd George succeeded him. 
 
ATTLEE, CLEMENT RICHARD, FIRST EARL ATTLEE (1883–1967) 
Labour Politician. Educated Haileybury College and Oxford. Called to the bar in 
1906. Served in Gallipoli and the Mesopotamia during the First World War. 
1917, made rank of Major. 1922, Labour MP for Limehouse and became Ramsay 
MacDonald’s Parliamentary Private Secretary. Then served as Under-Secretary 
for War in 1924. Key member of the Simon Commission 1927–30. deputised as 
the leader of the Labour Party 1933–4; outright leader in October 1935. Leader 
of the Labour group in Churchill’s wartime coalition. PM of the Labour 
Government with an overwhelming majority in July 1945. Resigned after his 
general election defeat in October 1951. 
 
AUCHINLECK, CLAUDE JOHN EYRE (1884–1981) 
Army Officer. Wellington and Sandhurst. 1904 commissioned into the 62nd 
Punjabis in India. 1914–15: Turkey; 1916–18: Mesopotamia. 1917, awarded 
DSO. 1919, Staff College at Quetta. 1927, Imperial Defence College. 1930–33 
returned to Quetta as an instructor. 1933, commander of the Peshawar Brigade, 
subsequently promoted to Major-General. 1936 became Deputy Chief of the 
General Staff. 1938–39, integral member of the Chatfield Committee, tirelessly 
endorsed the Indianization of the Indian Army. After a brief spell in Norway 
(1940) he was replaced (by Montgomery), made Commander-in-Chief in India in 
1941 and in turn he replaced Wavell. Was sent to the Middle East by Churchill 
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(with whom he had a tense relationship) from 1941–43, and then back to India 
(when Wavell was made Viceroy) from 1943–47. Known affectionately by those 
he commanded as ‘The Auk’ his archive papers (presented to Manchester 
University in 1967) illustrate how highly he thought of the Indian troops under 
his command and how secure he was in his knowledge that the Indian Army was 
a superb fighting force. Worked closely with the Americans and Chinese in the 
Burma theatre, was praised as an exemplary soldier, and after realising the dire 
situation of the Indian Army in a post-Partition and post-Independent India (and 
amid rapidly deteriorating relations with Mountbatten) he retired in September 
1947. 
 
BALDWIN, STANLEY, EARL BALDWIN OF BEWDLEY (1867–1947)  
Politician. Conservative MP for Bewdley, PM of a Conservative government 
from 22 May 1923 to 22 January 1924. He resigned as the Conservatives failed 
to secure a majority in the general election of November 1923. The 
Conservatives achieved their majority in the general election of October 1924 
and Baldwin became PM for a second time from 4 November 1924 to 4 June 
1929, when he resigned to avoid disaffected Conservative voters from creating a 
revival in Liberal Party support. Baldwin’s final term as PM was as head of the 
National Government from 7 June 1935 to 28 May 1937 when his ill health 
forced him to resign. Created Earl Baldwin of Bewdley and founded the Imperial 
Relations Trust. 
 
BALFOUR, ARTHUR JAMES, FIRST EARL OF BALFOUR (1848–1930) 
Conservative politician. Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge. Nephew of Lord 
Robert Cecil. Elected as Conservative MP for Hertford in 1874. Achieved 
prominence as Chief Secretary for Ireland 1887–91 with his decision to 
prosecute Parnell and his Irish Nationalists. 1891, Leader of the House of 
Commons (and opposition leader in 1892). Became PM in 1902 (when he 
succeeded Lord Salisbury) and resigned his office due to his electoral defeat in 
December 1905.A full member of the Committee of Imperial Defence during the 
First World War and First Lord of the Admiralty from 1915–16  he backed the 
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for the Balfour declaration of 1917 which supported the need for a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine. Retired from the Commons in 1922.  
 
BARING, THOMAS GEORGE, LORD NORTHBROOK (1826–1904)  
Inherited title of Lord Northbrook  in 1866; ‘always true to his reforming Whig 
origins’, he served in the Admiralty, the India Office, the War Office and then 
the Home Office before being offered the position of Viceroy of India by 
Gladstone (following the previous Viceroy’s assassination – Lord Minto) in 
1872. Viewed the British administration in India differently to Salisbury but 
succeeded in arguing that the advice of those on the spot should at least be heard. 
Conflicted with Salisbury over Indian cotton duties issue but both men agreed on 
the threat that Indian Muslims posed to the Raj (Minto’s assassin had been a 
Muslim).  
 
BEVIN, ERNEST (1881–1951) 
Labour politician and Trade Unionist. No Eton or Oxbridge education for Bevin, 
He had no privileged background and worked from an early age. 1911 he was an 
official for the Dockers Union and worked his way up to General-Secretary of 
the Transport and General Worker’s Union by 1922. Elected to the general 
council of the Trade Unions Congress in 1925, he ensured that once the General 
Strike ended, fair terms for TUC members were brought about. Minister of 
Labour during the Second World War within Churchill’s coalition government. 
Under Attlee’s Labour government Bevin was appointed as Foreign Secretary (a 
sharp contrast to the tailored and well heeled Anthony Eden) but was arguably a 
successful Foreign Secretary (Berlin blockade, America in Korea). 
Overwhelming impression received from his archive papers (Churchill Archive 
Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge) is that he was a forthright, fair, respected 
and generous man. 
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BROOKE, ALAN FRANCIS, LORD ALANBROOKE (1883–1963) 
Army officer. Woolwich. 1902 joined RFA. 1917 Canadian corps, 1918–19 1st 
Army.1923–7, instructor at Staff College, Camberley. 1927 Imperial Defence 
College. 1934–5, commander of the 8th Infantry brigade. 1938–39 commander of 
AA Corps. 1939–40 commanded II corps in France. 1941–6, commander of 
Imperial General Staff. Diarist who was not afraid to balk against Churchill in 
public as well as in his diaries. 
 
CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN, HENRY (1836–1908)  
Liberal MP for Stirling Burghs in 1868; financial secretary to the War Office in 
1871; Irish Chief Secretary in 1884; then Secretary of State for War in 
Gladstone’s third government in 1886. Returned to War Office in 1892 (for 
Gladstone’s fourth government) and, when Rosebery succeeded Gladstone as PM 
in 1894, Campbell-Bannerman retained his Cabinet position. Following 
Harcourt’s relatively unsuccessful leadership of the Liberal Party, Campbell-
Bannerman wasvoted Liberal leader of the Commons in 1899. After the Boer 
War, the Liberals split into two factions (Campbell-Bannerman against 
Rosebery). Due to Rosebery’s increasing isolation, and Balfour’s resignation, 
Campbell-Bannerman selected a Liberal Cabinet at the King’s command and was 
then elected PM in January 1906. Ill health forced him to resign in April 1908.  
 
CHIANG, KAI-SHEK (1887–1975) 
Influential member of the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang), and a 
conservative anti-Communist. Chairman of the Nationalist League of China 
1928–1931. Established himself as the Chairman of the National Military 
Council 1932–1946. Despite accusations of cowardice, stock piling of essential 
goods and profiteering from both his own party and the Allies, he worked closely 
with the Allied forces during the Second World War in the hope of ridding China 
of  Japanese aggression (Manchuria had been invaded and occupied by Japanese 
force in 1937). Relations were never cordial between the Kuomintang and the 
Chinese Communist Party (CPC) but until the Japanese surrendered the tension 
between the two sides worked towards this common aim. After the Japanese 
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surrender relations deteriorated further and after the CPC defeated the 
Nationalists, Chiang Kai-Shek was forced to relocate to Taiwan where he 
declared himself the President of the Republic of China from 1950 until he died 
in 1975. 
 
CHURCHILL, LORD RANDOLPH SPENCER (1849–1895) 
Conservative MP for Woodstock from 1874–1885. American wife (Jennie 
Jerome). Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in 1877. Strong advocate of the legislative 
union between Ireland and Britain. But believed that Ireland should be granted a 
local form of self-government, yet he was a firm opponent to the proposed offer 
of Irish Home Rule. Leading member of the so-called Fourth Party upon return 
from Ireland. Pragmatic and realistic, known for his oratorical skill and 
manipulation of the press. Established a strong position for himself within the 
Conservative Party by the mid 1880s. 1885, Lord Randolph was made Secretary 
of State for India. Keen to promote the security of India, and welcomed attempts 
at international diplomacy with Russia. Persuaded Parliament to grant extra 
financial resources to bolster India’s security, and secured the annexation of 
Upper Burma. Salisbury’s Conservative replacement government was soon 
narrowly defeated (by Gladstone) and Lord Randolph stood for election at the 
safe Conservative seat at South Paddington (1885–1894). Gladstone and his 
Liberals needed Irish Nationalist support and so the policy of Irish Home Rule 
was once again in the fore. Lord Randolph had to accept that Home Rule was 
inevitable. Made Chancellor of the Exchequer by Salisbury in 1886 (after the 
defeat of Gladstone and the Liberals at another general election) and then became 
Leader of the House of Commons in 1887 (holding both positions 
simultaneously for a short while). At the Exchequer he called for a reduction in 
defence expenditure and, when it was not forthcoming, he resigned from his 
ministerial post. Poor health, his anti-Home Rule stance, and growing 
unpopularity also contributed to his resignation being so readily accepted.  
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CRIPPS, STAFFORD (1889–1952) 
Winchester and University College, London. Ambulance driver in France during 
First World War. Flirted with Marxist theory and expelled from the Labour Party 
due to his anti-appeasement stance in 1939. 1940 appointed British Ambassador 
to Moscow. Then return to be dispatched on the Mission to India in March 1942. 
Later made Minister of Aircraft Production. And in 1945 rejoined the Labour 
Party. 1945–47, President of the Board of Trade in Attlee’s Labour government. 
1947 brief time as Minister of Economic Affairs. 1947–50 Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. Churchill was overhead to have said when Cripps once walked past 
him ‘There but for the grace of god, goes God!’  
 
DISRAELI, BENJAMIN (1804–1881)  
A moderately successful novelist who, having opposed Whig policy, become a 
self-styled radical and was elected as the Conservative MP for Maidstone in 1837 
and then Buckinghamshire in 1847. Disraeli was convinced about the importance 
of knowing one’s history and saw a clear connection between British history and 
the Empire; to which he was totally committed. After the Indian Mutiny of 1857, 
Disraeli called for ‘a more direct, imposing, imaginative, and sympathetic tone to 
British rule in India’. Prime Minister from February to December 1868 and then, 
after Gladstone’s electoral defeat, from 1874 till 1876. After his second term as 
Prime Minister he became primarily concerned with protecting British India from 
attack and the so-called Russian threat.  
 
ELGIN, LORD VICTOR ALEXANDER BRUCE, NINTH EARL OF ELGIN AND 
THIRTEEN EARL OF KINCARDINE (1849–1917)  
Chairman of the Scottish Liberal Association in 1881 and a firm supporter of 
Gladstone’s policies (especially on Home Rule for Ireland). Viceroy of India 
from 1894–95. Returned to Britain, successful chairing of three public enquiries 
saw him promoted to Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs from December 
1905 to April 1908. Elgin appreciated the desires for self-government coming 
from the Indian Nationalists, but he did not believe that India was read for any 
such responsibility. Asquith became PM in April 1908, and Elgin was replaced.  
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FISHER, JOHN ARBUTHNOT (1841–1920)  
Joined the Navy in 1854. Swiftly promoted: Lieutenant in 1862 and then 
Gunnery-Lieutenant in 1863. Ordered to China where his success was rewarded 
with his promotion to flag captain of the armoured ship the Hercules in 1878. 
Took part in the annexation of Egypt in 1882, was on hand throughout the 
Panjdeh Scare of 1884 and was then made a Lord of the Admiralty in 1892. 
Promoted to a full Admiral in 1901 and was committed to naval reform in that he 
scrapped obsolete warships and instituted the dreadnought programme of ship 
building. Under Campbell-Bannerman’s Liberal government he was promoted to 
Admiral of the Fleet in December 1905. He retired in 1910 (after a scandal 
involving his acrimonious working relationship with Beresford who was 
Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean fleet) but a correspondence with 
WSC ensured that Fisher (despite reservations from within the Admiralty) 
returned as First Sea Lord in October 1914. He initially condoned the 
Dardanelles campaign, but then hastily resigned from his post once he saw the 
futility of it in May 1915.  
 
GANDHI, MOHANDAS KARAMCHAND (1869–1948) 
Trained as a barrister in London, returned to India, worked in South Africa 
(encountered Smuts) whilst defending Indian work force. Attracted millions of 
followers for his ‘devotion to truth’ movement (satyagraha) and its non-violent 
nature. 1920, dominant figure in Indian nationalist politics. Hated by Churchill 
because of what he symbolised (an independent India). 1922 imprisoned for six 
years. 1931 attended Round Table conference in London. 1934 resigned from 
Congress over its use of non-violence as a political tool. Saw the horrors of 
Partition but physically helped in trying to restore order and peace to India. 
Assassinated 1948. 
 
LLOYD GEORGE, DAVID (1863–1945)  
Welsh radical who (after becoming a solicitor in 1884 and narrowly defeating his 
Conservative opponent in a by-election for the marginal set of Caernarfon 
Appendix: Biographies 
299 
Boroughs in 1890) became a spokesman for Liberal values. He held a series of 
various ministerial posts (President of the Board of Trade from January 1906 to 
April 1908; Chancellor of the Exchequer from April 1908 to May 1915; Minister 
of Munitions from May 1915 to July 1916) before becoming Prime Minister 
(PM) of a Coalition Government from 6 Dec., 1916 to 14 Dec., 1918. Following 
the general election of December 1918, the Coalition Government was returned 
with Lloyd George as PM until 19 Oct., 1922. In spite of the fascination with his 
notorious private life, historians have reassessed his political career and 
overwhelmingly found it to be one where his social reform record during 
peacetime equalled his achievements as wartime PM. 
  
MACDONALD, RAMSAY (1866–1937) 
After several failed attempts to be elected as a Labour candidate he realised the 
necessity for a joint Labour and Liberal majority in Parliament if the 
Conservatives were to be defeated. After Baldwin’s electoral defeat in November 
1923, MacDonald became Britain’s first Labour PM but had to rely on Liberal 
support to overrule the defeated but outright majority of the Conservatives. His 
first term as PM was short lived, as in the general election of October 1924 the 
Conservatives, under Baldwin, were returned to Parliament with an 
overwhelming majority. MacDonald became PM for a second time after the 
general election of June 1929 but MacDonald, who only achieved a small 
majority of the votes, was once again forced to rely upon the Liberals to defeat 
the Conservatives. MacDonald, and his government, had to ride the storm 
produced by the Great Depression of 1929 but they collapsed under the strain. 
MacDonald formed a Coalition government in August 1931 and made massive 
cuts in public expenditure. His final term as PM ended in June 1935 when he was 
forced to step down due to ill health. He was replaced by Baldwin who became 
PM of a National Government. 
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MOUNTBATTEN, LOUIS FRANCIS ALBERT VICTOR NICHOLAS, FIRST EARL 
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA (1900–1979) 
Home schooled and then Royal Naval College. Joined Navy in 1916. Naval 
officer (known as ‘Dickie’ affectionately; sometimes as ‘Mount-bottom’) who 
was accident prone and quite hapless. 1934 give command of HMS Daring. 1941 
given command of HMS Kelly (sunk by German dive bombers – half the crew 
lost). 1942 Chief of Combined Operations (more to impress American allies than 
anything). Oversaw the (disastrous) Dieppe Raid of August 1942. 1943 
appointed as Supreme Allied Commander which he held until 1946. He received 
the Japanese surrender at Singapore in September 1945. March 1947, appointed 
Viceroy of India who hastened British withdrawal from India.1947–48 remained 
in India as Interim Governor. 1953 went back to the Navy and 1954 appointed 
First Sea Lord. 1959, appointed Chief of the Defence Staff, retired in 1965. 
Murdered by IRA in 1970. 
 
NICOLSON, HAROLD GEORGE (1886–1968) 
Diplomat and prodigious diarist. Wellington College and Balliol College, 
Oxford. Chief architect (alongside Leo Amery and Sir Mark Sykes) of the 
Balfour Declaration. Accompanied Smuts to Budapest in 1919. Various 
international postings but became disillusioned with diplomacy and finally 
elected as a National Labour candidate in 1935 for Leicester West. Joined 
Labour Party in 1947. Known for his tumultuous personal life and his always 
insightful yet sometimes scathing diaries. 
 
SALISBURY, ROBERT ARTHUR TALBOT GASCOYNE-CECIL, THIRD MARQUESS 
OF SALISBURY (1830–1903)  
Conservative MP for Stamford who, like Churchill, supplemented his income 
through journalism. Anti-radical who, in 1865 (when he became Viscount 
Cranborne after his brother died), became a fervent supporter of resisting the 
Franchise Bill. Secretary of State for India in 1866 (by the new PM Lord Derby). 
Resigned over the proposed Franchise Bill. Third Marquess of Salisbury and 
was, once again, appointed (this time by Disraeli) as Secretary of State for India 
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in 1874 during which time he was preoccupied with ‘the southward pressure of 
Russia on Persia and Afghanistan’. 1878, appointed as Foreign Secretary. 
Conservative Party Leader from 1880-84, Salisbury had to reach a compromise 
with Lord Randolph Churchill so as not to further alienate Conservative support. 
Salisbury became PM of a ‘caretaker’ government which lasted for seven 
months. His second time as PM lasted from 1886-1892 when the ‘most 
significant challenge’ to himself came in the form of the ambitious Lord 
Randolph Churchill. Finally, Salisbury was PM again from 1895–1902, a period 
which encompassed the Boer war and the raising of concern over imperial rule 
and safety. Heavily influenced Churchill on the notion of imperial security 
‘begins at home’. 
 
SLIM, WILLIAM JOSEPH (1891–1970) 
Army officer. Grammar school education and Sandhurst. 1914 joined Royal 
Warwickshires; wounded at Gallipoli; and again in France and Mesopotamia. 
1934–36, joined Indian Army Instructor Staff College, Camberley. Commanded 
the I Burma corps, XV Indian Corps, 14th Army and Allies Forces South East 
Asia. Not one of Churchill’s favourites. A soldier’s soldier. Highly respected. 
Confronted Churchill regarding the ‘forgotten armies’ being forgotten all over 
again in the memoirs. 
 
SMUTS, JAN CHRISTIAAN (1870–1950) 
South African politician, army officer, lawyer and twice PM of South Africa. 
Christ’s College, Cambridge. Back to South Africa, appointed Minister of 
Interior and member of Kruger's government. Fought against the British in the 
Boer War and also a lead negotiator in the Vereeniging Peace Treaty (1902). 
Defence minister as outbreak of First World War, rejoined army. 1917 joined 
Imperial War Cabinet in London. Proponent and advocate for a strong air force. 
PM of South Africa 1919–24; Deputy PM from 1933–39; and PM again from 
1939-48. Close and loyal friend to Churchill. 
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WINGATE, ORDE CHARLES (1903–1944) 
Army officer. Educated at Charterhouse School and then the Royal Military 
Academy at Woolwich. 1923 commissioned into Royal Artillery. 1928 Sudan 
defence force. 1936 Intelligence post in Palestine. 1938 awarded DSO. Mental 
instability noticed by other (especially Wavell & Pownall). Known primarily as 
Churchill’s favourite general and paraded in front of the Americans as such.  Use 
and effectiveness of his Long Range Penetration Units subject of much 
discussion, praise and criticism. Killed in air crash 1944. 
 
WOOD, EDWARD FREDERICK LINDLEY, FIRST EARL OF HALIFAX (1851–1959) 
Eton, Christ Church, Oxford, followed by an All Souls fellowship. Conservative 
MP for Ripon, Yorkshire in 1910. Captain in the Queen’s Own Yorkshire 
Dragoons and sent to the front line in France by 1916. Accepted the post Deputy 
Director of the Labour supply department at the Ministry of National Service 
from 1917–18. Appointed Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in April 
1921 and worked under Churchill who was the then Secretary of State. Board of 
Education and then Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
 
